

# CONFIDENTIAL

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## CHAPTER XIII

### SOVIET INTERVENTION UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME

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### CHAPTER XIII

#### SOVIET INTERVENTION UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME

1. The second intervention of the Soviet military forces has been described in chapter V. The circumstances in which the Kádár Government was established have been given in chapter VII. In the present chapter, the development of events in Hungary is examined with a view to showing (1) the measure of Soviet action to undo the results of the Revolution, (2) the extent of dependence of Mr. Kádár and his Government on Soviet support, and (3) the specific measures that were taken by the Soviet Government, following the cessation of the fighting, to impose the Kádár Government and maintain it in power.

##### 1. Soviet Administration of Hungary

2. In the "Szolnok" broadcasts of 4 November announcing the establishment of the Hungarian Worker-Peasant Government, it was explained that this ~~drastic~~ step was taken by Mr. Kádár and his colleagues for the purpose of saving the Hungarian workers and peasants from the dangers of fascism and reaction. The statement read by Mr. Munnich declared: "We have decided to fight with all our strength against the threatening danger of fascism. . . ." Similarly, one hour later Mr. Kádár was heard to say: "We must put an end to the existence of the counter-revolutionary elements. The hour for action has sounded. We are going to defend the interests of the workers and peasants and the achievements of the People's Democracy".



3. It has not been established whether Mr. Kádár or other members of his Government actually prepared the other announcements which were heard over the Soviet-controlled radio stations of Hungary between 4 and 7 November. In these announcements, the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government appealed to the Hungarian people, "to the workers, peasants and soldiers", and called upon them to fight against "the forces of reaction". However, there is no evidence that during the fighting from 4 to 11 November there were any ~~troops~~<sup>soldiers</sup> or groups of Hungarians, whether organized or unorganized, who fought against each other. The evidence supports unequivocally the conclusion that all fighting occurred exclusively between Hungarian nationals and the Soviet forces. Any Hungarian assistance that the latter may have received came solely from persons who have been identified with the AVH and persons closely associated with the past Rakosi leadership.

4. A striking feature in the period between 4 November and 11 November, when the Soviet forces finally prevailed, was the use of radio stations by the Soviet military commanders to transmit orders to the population. After the broadcasts of 4 November, the voices of Mr. Kádár or his colleagues were not heard again until the morning of 8 November when Mr. Marosán, Minister of State, made an appeal for a return to order. What was heard instead were the appeals for outside help addressed from those stations still under the control of the Hungarian fighters, and, from the other stations, the orders of the commanders of the Soviet troops to the Hungarian people. Thus at 10 a.m. on 4 November, Radio Szombathely transmitted an order of the Soviet Military Commander



of Vas County which stated that, "as the local administrative organs have been unable to maintain order and to secure public safety..., the Commanding Officer of the city and country commands the patrols of Soviet troops to guard public buildings and enterprises." The order further stated that all civilians must deliver all weapons to the Soviet Military Command, otherwise they would be severely punished; it established precise hours of curfew and regulated matters relating to the supply of food.

5. Similar radio announcements from Szolnok, Pécs, Miskolc and Nyiregyheza were heard throughout the days of 4 and 5 November, transmitting the orders of Soviet Commanders for the surrender of arms, the establishment of curfew hours and other administrative matters, or appealing to the population to assist in the re-establishment of order and the resumption of work.

6. Despite the appeal broadcast, in the name of the Kádár Government, by the Soviet controlled Budapest radio, in the evening of 4 November, calling upon "the faithful fighters of the cause of socialism" to come out of hiding, the fighting which took place in Hungary had nothing of the character of a civil war with one part of the population in armed opposition to another. The military operations were essentially those of a well-equipped foreign army crushing by overwhelming force a national movement and eliminating the government through which that movement was finding effective expression. The <sup>mere facade</sup> ~~simulacrum~~ of a government installed by the Soviet authorities was in no position to provide them with effective administrative machinery, and



accordingly the Soviet Army was placed in the position of undertaking various administrative functions, which were clearly of a civil nature, in addition to attaining its military objectives by the use of arms.

7. It is difficult to determine the precise extent of Soviet military administration after 4 November; but that it involved far-reaching control by foreign military authorities of internal Hungarian affairs is apparent from available texts of military orders. The following examples may be cited:

ORDER No. 1 OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF SOVIET MILITARY UNITS  
IN BUDAPEST

Budapest, 6 November 1956

*at*  
On the request of the Hungarian Revolutionary Government of Workers and Peasants, the Soviet troops marched into Budapest temporarily in order to render help to the Hungarian people in the protection of its socialist achievements, in the suppression of the counter-revolution, and in the prevention of a fascist danger.

With a view to re-establishing order and normal life in Budapest, I command

(1) Those persons who are in possession of arms should immediately but not later than 17.00 hours of November 9, 1956 *hand them over* deliver them to the Soviet military units or to the Soviet Military Command. Those persons who *hand over* deliver their arms will not be called to account.

The persons who by the date-line fixed above, *have* *handed over* will not deliver their arms or who *will* hide arms, will be severely punished.

*The population may*  
(2) From 7 November 1956, *it is permitted to* appear on the streets of the territory of Budapest only between 7 o'clock in the morning and 18.00 hours in the evening.

Everybody is unconditionally obliged to obey the patrols of the Soviet Military Command and without contradiction to carry out their instructions and orders.

(3) We call upon the workers and employees of *and* the factories, shops of the transport and municipal services, and of other enterprises and offices to resume work.

Persons who in any way hinder the workers and employees in the resumption of work will be called to account.

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VDB.*



(4) The local authorities should ensure the supply of the population with food and fuel. The Soviet Military Commands will give all help in this matter to the local administrative organs.

All food stores must be opened in order to be able to ensure the continuous food supply of the population. The time the stores must be open: from 8 a.m. to 18.00 in the evening. The railroad and motor vehicles delivering food and fuel can - with special permission - be under day and night service.

I call upon all workers of Budapest to help the local administrative organs and the Soviet troops in the re-establishment and assurance of normal life and public order of the city.

The Military Commander of the Soviet military units in Budapest.

K. GREBENYIK  
Major-General of the Guards"

"ORDER OF THE SOVIET MILITARY COMMANDER: 1/

The Soviet Military Commander of Pécs entered today on the discharge of his functions.

I order:

- (1) The counter-revolutionary National Committees shall be dissolved immediately.
- (2) The population shall deliver their arms to the Military Commandatura (AVH building) by 19.00 hours of 5 November 1956. Those who keep illegally arms at home will be called to account in accordance with the emergency laws.
- (3) In all factories and offices, work shall be resumed on the 5th at the official hour.
- (4) Demonstrations and meetings are forbidden.

Cultural institutions and places of amusement until further instructions shall observe the legal order of the Hungarian People's Republic.

- (5) In the town it is allowed to circulate on the streets from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. The shops may be kept open at the same time.
- (6) In the event of shooting at Soviet soldiers or at the citizens of the state in general, the fire shall be returned by the Soviet armed forces with arms of all types.

MAJOR KORNYSIN  
Soviet Military Commander of Pécs"

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1/ From the special edition of the "DUNANTÜLI NAPLO" published in Pécs on 5 November 1956.



8. Such were the orders issued by Soviet military authorities at the time of their armed attack on the Hungarian people. But even after the fighting had ceased there was no response from the people, or even a segment of the people, showing that they would be prepared to assist the Soviet-sponsored Government in the reconstruction work that lay ahead. Newspapers and radio broadcasts, for the next two weeks, repeatedly announced that order had been restored throughout the country. Such reports, however, had to be discontinued, for it was clear to all that this was patently untrue and that large numbers of the people were actively devising ways and means to oppose the Government. Thus the Soviet Military Command found itself confronted by the problem of having to continue administration of the country without the necessary administrative machinery. The Revolutionary Councils had ousted those administrators of the old régime who had not sided with the Revolution, but had not yet been able to replace them effectively. Furthermore, members of the Revolutionary Councils were participating in the armed resistance and at the end of the fighting were obliged to go into hiding. In many cases, even essential services in Greater Budapest were unable to function effectively, because many of the key personnel were not available. Another factor, and doubtless the most important one, was that with the end of the fighting, the workers decided on an organized campaign of passive resistance. This phase of the resistance, which was to continue until January 1957 inflicted an additional burden upon the Soviet Union, which was obliged to subsidize the Hungarian economy both in goods and services.



9. In some provincial centres, where the fighting had been limited, the Revolutionary Councils were permitted to continue their functions, with certain changes in personnel, under the overall supervision of the Soviet Command. In other centres, however, all Revolutionary Committees were abolished by military order. Thus, on 5 November, the Soviet Military Commander of Pécs ordered that "the counter-revolutionary National Committee shall be dissolved." In many centres, the persons who had been ejected from office by the Revolution reappeared at the Town Hall and, in the presence of Soviet officers or NKVD or AVH personnel, resumed the positions they had held prior to 23 October. According to the evidence, these persons were often unable to render any effective service to the Soviet military authorities as the local government or public utility staff had either abandoned their posts or limited their work so that only the consuming public would benefit by their services, and not the country as a whole.

10. The Committee <sup>was</sup> ~~has been~~ told that, although all public services were disorganized or had ceased to function, the population, particularly in Budapest, did not suffer directly as a result of this situation. Peasants from the surrounding countryside continued, as at the outbreak of the Revolution, to come daily to the capital with produce which they sold at little or no profit or even gave away to those in need. Similarly, the coal miners, truck drivers, and power station operators produced the minimum amount of goods and services for the needs of hospitals and private homes, but far less than the requirements of industry or public services. The tenacity of the workers had



brought the economy to a complete standstill. On 28 November, Mr. Antal Apro, speaking at a meeting held in the Parliament Building with representatives of the Workers' Councils, emphasized the gravity of the situation due to the abstention from work by factory workers and miners. The factories were idle owing to the lack of raw materials and fuel. The Communist countries had sent great quantities of raw materials needed by Hungarian industry; these were now massed on the frontier and could not reach the factories.



## 2. Soviet Repressive Measures

11. The only way by which order could be restored, short of acceding to the demands of the Hungarian people, was first for the Soviet Military Command to initiate a policy of repression and fear that would be pursued with equal tenacity by the Government of Mr. Kádár and, secondly, that centres of political opposition be removed through the reactivation of the Hungarian Communist Party. The first policy was put into effect as soon as the fighting was over. The second followed towards the end of November, and is dealt with later in this Chapter.

12. General Grebinyik, the Soviet Military Commander in Hungary, in his appeal to the Hungarian people of 5 November, emphasized that the Soviet forces were in Hungary not because they needed more land or more national resources, but because the Worker-Peasant Government had requested the Soviet Military Command "to give a helping hand in the liquidation of the counter-revolutionary forces." He called upon the Hungarian officers and soldiers to fight on the side of the Soviet troops "against the unbridled forces of reaction for freedom and democracy." But this appeal, and many others, remained unheeded by the Hungarian fighters. In the face of this opposition, the Soviet Military Command adopted stringent measures - individual arrests of persons suspected of leadership in the resistance, mass arrests, and deportations. Occasionally the Soviet troops resorted to summary executions, to instil fear into the people. Simultaneously, the Soviet Command took over the control of the nerve centres of

?  
uniform  
spelling -

? Grebennyik  
?

(The Hungarian  
spelling is  
Grebengik)

(The "g" is not  
in the Russian)



the country, such as broadcasting stations, telephone exchanges, road transport, and the principal railway lines so as to maintain control within the country and suppress any opposition movements.

13. These controls were effectively maintained by the Soviet Military Command for a number of months. It is known that, after the battles outside the Central Telephone Exchange of Budapest, this was immediately taken over by Soviet troops, who apparently remained to monitor all official calls. The Committee was informed that an official of a Foreign Ministry of a Western European government, while calling up in December its diplomatic representative in Budapest, was interrupted by a person speaking Russian who broke off the connection. Similarly, it was reported that all cars, including those with diplomatic licence plates, were obliged to receive a Soviet permit to circulate. The Committee was told that diplomatic personnel leaving the country with exit visas issued by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry were turned back from the frontier by the Soviet guards, if they had not also received an exit clearance from the Soviet Military authorities.

14. The Soviet Command laid special emphasis on control of the railroads. During their advance at the time of the second intervention, the Soviet troops commandeered the principal lines leading to Budapest. This was first noted on the Zahony-Nyiregyháza-Szolnok line, which was seized on 2 November after a skirmish with the Hungarian railway workers at Nyiregyháza. At the outset, the Soviet Command tried to get the railway men to operate the trains, but this was effected only under duress,



by seizing the men ~~from~~<sup>in</sup> their homes and taking them to the marshalling yards. Eventually, on the main lines the railroads actually had to be operated by Soviet personnel and the trains were protected against saboteurs and guerrillas by Soviet armed guards. The secondary lines were apparently in a chaotic state.

15. While fighting was still going on, the Soviet troops used varying tactics to consolidate their military gains. In some cases, if their objectives had been achieved easily, the Soviet troops, after disarming the fighters, would allow them to go home. This was the case in the smaller provincial centres during the days of 4 and 5 November. On the other hand, in Budapest, or wherever the Hungarian fighters persisted in their resistance, the Soviet troops showed extreme severity. In Morisz Zsigmund Square, for example, during a lull in the fighting of 5 November, five men were dragged out of their hiding place and shot in the street. In some districts of Budapest, when the fighting began to die down, Soviet troops, with the assistance of AVH men, effected mass arrests of persons suspected of having taken part in the fighting. Similarly, at Gyor, at the end of the fighting, they seized sixty men, of whom eight were summarily executed. There is abundant evidence that on numerous occasions truckloads of men and women were driven to jail under Soviet armed guard, and were kept in prison under the supervision of Soviet personnel. Witnesses have been emphatic in their statements that these arrests often had no direct connexion with the fighting. In one case it was reported that fifty prisoners had escaped from such a round-up, and Soviet troops immediately collected an equal number of persons from the houses surrounding the area.



16. The use of repression by the Soviet Military Command as a method of establishing some pattern of order in Hungary is illustrated in the following cases which were reported to the Committee:

17. Witnesses have testified that persons arrested by the Soviet Military Command were not turned over to the Hungarian authorities as officially reported in the press. The Chief Public Prosecutor, Mr. Szenassy, stated that he had no competence to order the Soviet troops to release anyone they had seized. Another witness stated before the Committee that when he, with some of his colleagues, had approached the Soviet Military Command of Budapest, asking for the return of a group of persons who had been deported to the Soviet Union, they were told by a senior Soviet officer that this could be done if the group would undertake to persuade the workers to return to work.

18. The Soviet Military Command was particularly interested in bringing under its control the Hungarian Officer Corps, as it had been demonstrated that pro-Soviet indoctrination had not prevented many of the officers from siding with the nationalist uprising. There is evidence that the Soviet Command, on the outbreak of hostilities, ordered certain Hungarian troops to their barracks in garrison towns, demanding their surrender. In a number of cases there was no opposition, as the barracks were denuded of troops except for a few pro-Soviet officers. There were instances (see chapter IV) where Hungarian officers had already been seized by Soviet troops on 3 or even 2 November. In Budapest, Soviet armoured



units, during the day of 4 November, surrounded the Military Staff College and seized the few men they could find there. It has been reliably reported that, even in the case of a Hungarian unit which had remained passive, Soviet troops issued an ultimatum to vacate the barracks within thirty minutes. They then proceeded to occupy the premises and take over all the military stores. In Budapest, members of the AVH attached to the Soviet troops assisted in identifying Hungarian officers who were considered to be in sympathy with the uprising. According to witnesses, these officers were immediately dispatched to the Soviet military base at Tököl and were put under arrest. Witnesses, who had themselves been deported to the Soviet Union, told the Committee that a proportion of the deportees were Hungarian officers.

19. Dr. Ferenc Munnich, Minister for the Armed Forces, between 8 and 10 November, in orders and appeals addressed to the armed forces, asked the men to report to their units. These orders, however, were soon to be countermanded by the issue of other orders by which a considerable part of the standing army was demobilized. Apparently the pro-Soviet Generals of the Hungarian Staff came to realize that the Army had disintegrated, and that it was impossible to reassemble it by issuing orders and appeals. In addition, according to witnesses in a position to know the facts, the Soviet Military Command objected strongly to the re-establishment of any organization that would have the status of a Hungarian Army, as recent experience had shown that Hungarian troops were liable



to turn their weapons against their Soviet allies. Instead, they demanded that State Security Forces be so organized as to provide a more effective political control against the present opposition and any subversive movements that might develop in the future. Dr. Munnich, in his Instruction for the implementation of the "Officers' Declaration" issued on 12 November, ordered all officers of the Hungarian Army who agreed with the Declaration and desired to pursue their military career to sign the document. Those who refused to sign or "disagree with the Declaration, or want to be disarmed for any other reason" would cease within 24 hours to be part of the active Hungarian Army. The instruction further established committees of 5 to 7 officers to decide doubtful cases of officers who had signed the Declaration but who, having "participated with arms on the side of the enemy", could not remain in the Army. Witnesses estimate that, as a result of this instruction, perhaps 80 per cent of the Hungarian officers have been separated from the



forces. Of the remaining 20 per cent who signed the Declaration, it is said that a considerable number did so for family reasons but that they cannot be otherwise relied upon to maintain pro-Soviet sympathies.

One of the first pronouncements of Mr. Kadar, following the cessation of hostilities on 11 November, was that past mistakes would not be repeated. As a proof of his intentions, he declared that the State Security Service (AVH) would be disbanded. The day before, however, a new security organization had been established, known as the "R" group which was to serve as an adjunct of the regular police, ostensibly to protect the people from being "molested by criminals". "Security Force Regiments" were also established, whose task was to patrol the cities, collect arms and prevent any disruption of order. The press also announced the formation of various other security groups; thus in all there were the "Security Force Regiments", the "R" groups, "mixed action" groups, "factory guards", the "Frontier Guard", the "Home Guard" and the "Militia". These forces, with the exception of the factory guards became, and still continue to be, following certain mergers, the foundation upon which the Kadar Government must rest. Witnesses have explained how these forces, under whatever title they may have been known, were fostered by the Soviet Military Command, and worked closely with Soviet troops in the repression of armed or passive resistance. The evidence appears conclusive that these security groups were staffed if not exclusively, at least to a considerable extent, by former members of the AVH. In some cases, the groups also included members of the NKVD (Soviet Secret Police), who were seen on duty wearing Soviet, and in other cases Hungarian,



uniforms. The function of these groups was to discover any centres of resistance, to make home arrests of individual suspects and to act as guides and interpreters for the Soviet troops wherever it was necessary to exercise armed force.

#### The Soviet Military

Command, having achieved its primary objective, which was the overthrow by force of Premier Nagy's Government, had to rely on the personnel of the AVH as the only group in Hungary whose loyalty and interests lay on the side of the Soviet Union. Yet Mr. Kadar, who came to power as a result of the Soviet military intervention, was presumably selected as Premier partly because his ~~personal~~ *own imprisonment* history might encourage the people to believe that there would be *no* return of Rakosi's methods and of his terror weapon, the AVH. It is possible that the Soviet authorities believed that the Hungarian people, following the military defeat, would submit to the new order under Mr. Kadar, and that through him a new equilibrium might be reached that would satisfy certain minimum political and strategic requirements of the Soviet Union. Developments, however, after 4 November showed that the Hungarian people were not prepared to co-operate with any government which would not, or could not, satisfy their two basic demands — the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and free elections. Resistance continued in the form of persistent strikes, deputations with demands that were ab initio unacceptable, passive demonstrations, manifestos and the intermittent appearance of guerrillas. In consequence, the mopping up operations of the Soviet troops at the end of the fighting had to be converted into an organized system of armed repression.

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### 3. Relationship of Workers' Councils and Soviet Authorities

22. The most significant evidence of the reality of Soviet control is to be found in the dealings of Soviet military commander<sup>S</sup> with the Workers' Councils. The Soviet military commander's order No. 1 issued on 6 November called upon the workers of factories, communications and publication<sup>2</sup> services to resume work. "All those who hindered<sup>2</sup> the resumption of work will be called to account. The Commander also appeals to every worker in Budapest to help the administrative organs and the Soviet troops in the restoration of normal life, public order and the functioning of factories." In the weeks following the revolution, negotiations between the Workers' Council<sup>S</sup> and the Soviet Command centered mostly around the question of the resumption of work. In some instances, however, certain specific incidents occurring in the city were taken up on occasion by the Workers' Councils with the Soviet Commander who was asked to intervene. The Greater Budapest Workers' Council was in continuous communication with the Soviet Commander of the Budapest<sup>area</sup>, General Grebennik.

23. On several occasions, leaders of the Workers' Councils were summoned to Soviet headquarters and called to account for the failure of the workers to resume work. A meeting between the Commander and leaders of the Workers' Councils of the 11<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest took place on 8 November, and witnesses testified that this conversation took place in a strained atmosphere. The workers' delegates declared that they had certain demands to make before work would be resumed; these demands, which reflected the 16-point programme of 2<sup>nd</sup> October, were read out. The answers of the Soviet



Commander were given in a strong tone: in so far as workers had not resumed work in the factories, the members of Workers' Councils and other fascist revolutionaries would be taught a lesson; workers who did not report for work would be locked out of factories and removed to a place "where they would have ample time to think about starting work again"; Mr. Nagy and Mr. Maleter would not be taken back into the Government because they were imperialist agents. They would go elsewhere, but not into the Government; there would be no secret elections, and Hungarians would never again have an opportunity to put the revolutionaries back into power; things would be done differently, as in the Soviet Union.<sup>1/</sup> The Soviet

Commander then stated that he expected Workers' Councils to use their influence to encourage the resumption of work within two or three days; otherwise members of Workers' and Revolutionary Councils would be put to work themselves.

24. On another occasion, the Soviet Commander summoned the representatives of the Workers' Council of Csepel to his headquarters and told them that workers who refused to resume work would be "removed". The workers' delegation answered, however, that work would not be resumed "in the shadow of arms nor in the presence

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<sup>1/</sup> The answers of the Commander to the question of possible withdrawal of Soviet troops are dealt with in Chapter VIII, para. \_\_\_\_.



of foreign troops", and demanded that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the factory. After a certain amount of discussion, the Soviet Commander agreed that the armoured troops would leave the factory, but if work was not resumed within 24 hours after their leaving, the factory would be reoccupied. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, about 20 per cent of the workers resumed work.

25. Witnesses have testified about a considerable number of interventions on the part of Soviet armed forces in the proceedings of the Workers' Councils. The meeting place at Ujpest where delegates of the Workers' Councils were to meet on 13 November to set up the *Greater Budapest Workers' Council* ~~meeting~~ was surrounded by 20 Soviet tanks, and it was only after lengthy conversations with the Soviet Commander that the meeting was authorized to take place elsewhere. On 15 November, at another meeting of workers delegates held at the headquarters of the Francar Workers' Union at Akacfa Street, Soviet troops surrounded the building, entering amidst the proceedings from both sides of the room. The meeting continued, and after three hours the Soviet officer in charge announced that it was a misunderstanding, and the troops left. On 16 November, at a meeting of workers' representatives of 28 of the largest factories in Budapest at the Iron Workers' headquarters, six Soviet soldiers, armed with submachine guns, surrounded the place; the meeting then broke up. It was reported by witnesses that one or two Soviet officers were continuously present at meetings of the Csepel Central Workers' Council. The first time they appeared, the Council protested but was told that the Soviets were there



only as observers, as they wished to learn how these councils functioned, not having similar councils in the Soviet Union. Later, the officers said that their intention was to protect the workers against "ill-intentioned fascist imperialist agents". The presence of the Soviet officers was then debated, and the workers answered as a matter of principle that they did not wish outsiders to be present at their meetings; nevertheless, if the officers wished to attend, the Council would be happy to tell them the problems faced by the workers. On occasion, the Soviet observers were asked questions in the course of such meetings. Thus, when the Council was discussing the withdrawal of Russian troops, they turned to the Soviet colonel present and asked him about it. The colonel answered that his information was that the moment work was resumed, troops would be withdrawn from the territory of Hungary.

26. Numerous clashes between factory workers, Soviet forces and the militia <sup>were</sup> reported to the Committee. Russian troops participated in the attempted arrest of the workers' leaders in the Danubia factory and in the actual arrest of the Chairman of the Workers' Council of the Ganz and Mavag factories. At the mining centre of Salgotarjan, in the course of a miners' demonstration, Soviet troops and militia opened fire. Those among the demonstrators who were armed returned the fire, and there were a high number of casualties. For a time after the dissolution of the *Greater Budapest Workers' Council* GBWC on 9 December, Soviet pressure on the Workers'



Councils continued. At Caspel and in other places, the Soviet authorities did not refrain from open threats and demanded to know the names and addresses of members of this Council.



4. Attitude towards the Government of Hungary

27. When Soviet troops reached the Parliament Building on the morning of 4 November, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, as though disdaining any pretence that the Hungarian People's Republic was to be maintained as an independent State, established their headquarters in the very offices that had been vacated earlier that same morning by Premier Nagy. Various witnesses who visited Mr. Kádár at different times after 11 November have reported that the Parliament Building, both outside and inside, looked like a Soviet military stronghold. Soviet tanks protected the entrance to the buildings; at the entrances themselves, Soviet Army and NKVD personnel checked the credentials of all who sought admittance, while inside, in the halls and corridors, many Soviet officers were to be seen. Witnesses explained that, during the meetings they held with Mr. Kádár, there were usually one or two people present, who apparently acted as observers, while remaining silent throughout the proceedings. Witnesses also told the Committee that around 17 November, when the Central Workers' Council was pressing Mr. Kádár for the withdrawal of Soviet troops as a condition for the resumption of work, General Grebenyik enlightened them on the situation as follows: "You have to understand that it is not the Kádár Government which is in control here, but the Soviet Military Command, and it has the power to force the Hungarian workers to return to work". When a delegation from the Kobanya district of Budapest visited Mr. Kádár to ask him to intervene with the Soviet Military Commander to stop the deportation of workers, Mr. Kádár is reported to have said to them in private: "Don't you see there are machine-guns at my back?".

28. There is good evidence to indicate that until recently, the Soviet authorities in general, and the Soviet Military Command in particular, were hardly concerned to extend towards Mr. Kádár and his Government the formalities customary in dealing with an independent government. Upon Mr. Kádár's return



from his visit to Moscow on 6 or 7 November, he held a meeting with Mr. Zoltan Tildy and certain other non-Communist political personalities to discuss the possibility of their joining his Government. The Committee received testimony to the effect that they accepted, but when the question was submitted to the Soviet Military Commander, the latter immediately replied with a categorical refusal. The situation can be further illustrated by an incident observed by a witness. In the middle of November, representatives of a professional group visited Parliament to ask for the release of some of their colleagues who had been arrested. After going through various check points in the building, where they were searched for concealed weapons, they were ushered into an office where a high-ranking Soviet officer addressed them in Hungarian and asked them what they wanted. The deputation asked for an interview with Mr. Kádár. The soldier at the door called out the name of Mr. Kádár and the latter, who was apparently nearby, came in immediately. Upon entering, Mr. Kádár

bowed to the Soviet officer. The group got the impression that he was not a free agent.

They then turned to the Russian officer, who listened to their request. He shrugged his shoulders and said he would see what could be done. Two days later, the witness reported, some of their friends were released from jail.

29. One of the many difficulties confronting Mr. Kádár at the time of his appointment was that the various elected bodies, such as Revolutionary Councils, Workers' Councils, trade unions, student unions and professional societies that visited him in Parliament made a point



of stating that they did not consider him and his Government as being legally in power. There were numerous reports in the Hungarian press and on the Budapest radio between 16 and 23 November indicating that the representatives of these groups were pressing for the return to power of Premier Nagy. On one occasion, Mr. Kádár was forced to state, that, as soon as Premier Nagy left the Yugoslav Embassy, negotiations would be undertaken to change the structure of the Government.



5. The Reactivation of the Hungarian Communist Party

30. When Mr. Kádár came to power, his Government represented a political Party that had disintegrated the previous week. The Central Committee of the Party - the Hungarian Workers' Party - dissolved itself on 28 October. Following Mr. Kádár's declaration on 30 October that the Party had failed, the more prominent Hungarian Communists whose faith was still unshaken decided to make a fresh start. For this purpose, they established the Preparatory Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. This subject has been treated in Chapter VII. It is referred to here only because the seven members of this Committee, which was intended to link past practice with the future reformed Communist movement, have all, with the exception of Mr. Kádár, been considered enemies of the State following the second Soviet intervention.

31. Many witnesses declared that Mr. Kádár had difficulty in finding people who would join his Government. They testified that many leading Communists <sup>had</sup> trusted Premier Nagy and had accepted his stand on the major political issues, while others again, during the uprising, had undergone a change of heart and refused to be associated with the Communist movement any longer. Mr. Kádár thus found himself with only a few associates and with a party machinery that could not operate.

32. Mr. Kádár's Government had to try and reassemble the rank and file of the Party and to deploy it in key positions. In the provinces and, to some extent, in the capital, this was done by using members of the AVH who came out of hiding or were liberated from prison by the advancing Soviet troops. The various local administrators, government officials and trade union leaders who had not sided with the uprising and had consequently been ejected from office by the Revolutionary Councils,



were reinstated in their former positions. Witnesses testified, however, that this was no solution, as so many of the former officials had broken away from the Party during the uprising that many essential posts had to remain vacant. In the industrial town of Dunapentele, for example, with the exception of the AVH and one or two Army officers, everyone had sided with the uprising. A similar situation existed in a number of other towns. The Government was therefore often unable immediately to remove from office even its declared enemies. Evidence has been received that Borsod County (Miskolc area) was administered independently up to January 1957 with few, if any, ties with the central Government.

33. Repressive measures by the Soviet Military Command helped to solve this problem. By 17 November when under-production by factory workers and miners amounted to a <sup>sit down</sup> strike, the Soviet Military Command, with the AVH, arrested many of the leaders in the factories and mines. As vacancies were created in the Workers' Councils, they were filled by persons designated by the Government. A number of reports show that, during the discussions between Mr. Kádár and the workers on the terms of the decree law on Workers' Councils, considerable pressure was exercised to have Communists elected to the Councils. Thus after 9 December, with the promulgation of the decree on summary jurisdiction, it was only a matter of time for all factories to receive their quota of Party members. First in the small factories and later in the big ones, the Workers' Councils were instructed to include certain persons in their membership. This was apparently one of the reasons why the



Workers' Council of the Csepel Iron and Steel Works dissolved itself on 11 January, after the armed fight that took place at the factory against Soviet troops.

34. Witnesses maintained that, among the 200,000 who are now claimed by the Government to be members of the Party, a considerable proportion joined solely for pecuniary reasons and could not be relied upon by the Government in an emergency. It was stated before the Committee that, in certain cases, a factory or group of factories was told that it had to increase its quota of Party members. For the purpose of avoiding the imposition of persons from outside, the workers decided that they would fill the quota by drawing lots from among the staff in the factory.



6. The Abduction of Premier Imre Nagy

35. A most conclusive sign of the inability of the Hungarian Government to maintain its sovereign independence against Soviet intervention was the abduction of Mr. Nagy. When Premier Nagy left <sup>the</sup> Parliament Building on the morning of 4 November, he told other members of his Cabinet that he was going to the Soviet Embassy to protest personally against the Soviet military attack. However, instead he sought asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy in the company of his son-in-law, Dr. Ferenc Janosi, and followed by the other Communist member of his Government, Mr. Geza Losonci. Within a few hours Messrs. Ferenc Donat, Gabor Tancos, Sandor Haraszi, György Fazekas, Janos Szilagyi, Szilard Ujhelyi, Miklos Vasarhelyi and Mrs. Julia Bajk, together with 15 women and 17 children, came to the Yugoslav Embassy seeking asylum.

36. According to a report issued by the Yugoslav News Agency Tanjug, dated 25 November, certain negotiations had taken place on 2 November between Mr. Zoltan Szanto, one of the Members of the Provisional Committee of the new Socialist Workers' Party of Hungary, and a member of the Yugoslav Embassy,

with regard to the possibility for him and some other Hungarian Communists to seek refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy should this prove to be necessary. The next day the Yugoslav Ambassador stated that in principle he would grant asylum, if this were requested.

37. Negotiations were under way between 11 and 22 November in which the Yugoslav Government and Mr. Kádár sought to settle the problem connected with the granting of asylum to Premier Nagy and his Party. The Yugoslav Government proposed that (a) the Government of Mr. Kádár should provide a written guarantee that Premier Nagy



and his Party be allowed to return freely to their homes or, if this were not possible, that (b) the persons in question be permitted to proceed freely to Yugoslavia, where they would be granted asylum.

38. In the course of the conversations that were held in Budapest between Mr. Dobrivoje Vidić, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and Mr. Kadar, the latter, while accepting the above proposals of the Yugoslav Government, had also suggested as an alternative resolution that Premier Nagy and his party seek refuge in Romania. This proposal was communicated by Mr. Vidić to Premier Nagy and his party and ruled out as unacceptable. The question was again submitted to Mr. Kadar on the basis of the original alternative proposals. Mr. Kadar seems to have agreed to this verbally on 16 November. However, the next day he set new conditions. These were that Premier Nagy and Mr. Losonci should resign from their positions in the Government, that they should declare themselves in sympathy with the efforts of the Hungarian Worker-Peasant Government, that they should offer a self-criticism of their earlier activities, and that they should guarantee not to undertake any steps against the activity of the Hungarian Government. Mr. Kadar also requested that Premier Nagy and Mr. Losonci seek asylum in one of the Socialist countries until conditions in Hungary became normal. These proposals were refused both by Premier Nagy and by the Yugoslav Government, which declared that it could not agree to releasing



the party in question on the basis of special terms which were exclusively of domestic concern to Hungary. Witnesses who had been in contact with Premier Nagy while he was in the Yugoslav Embassy have testified that they learned from him that he had rejected an offer to go to Romania.

39. In the letter of the Yugoslav Government dated 18 November addressed to Mr. Kadar, it was specifically stated that the Yugoslav Embassy would agree to the departure of the party from the premises only upon the receipt of the written guarantee of Mr. Kadar, in his capacity as President of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, that Premier Nagy and his party would be granted safe conduct to proceed freely to their respective homes. Mr. Kadar, in his reply to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia dated 21 November, stated:

"In the interest of terminating the matter, the Hungarian Government, agreeing to the proposals contained on page 3, section 8 of the letter of 18 November 1956 addressed to me by the Yugoslav Government, hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes."



40. The next day, 22 November, at 6.30 p.m., a bus arrived at the Yugoslav Embassy. This bus had been placed at the disposal of the refugees by Mr. Munnich, Minister of the Armed Forces and of Public Security. As the party was boarding the bus, Soviet military personnel arrived and insisted on entering ~~the bus~~<sup>it</sup>. Thereupon, the Yugoslav Ambassador asked two Embassy officials also to accompany the bus, to make certain that Premier Nagy and the party reached their homes as agreed. The bus was driven to the city Headquarters of the Soviet Military Command, where the two Yugoslav officials <sup>by a Soviet Lieutenant-Colonel</sup> were ordered to leave ~~the bus~~. Under an escort of Soviet armoured cars, the bus then drove away to an unknown destination.

41. The above incident caused the Yugoslav Government to issue a note verbale condemning the action of the Hungarian Government in terms of extreme severity. It described the action of the Hungarian Government as "a flagrant breach of the agreement reached. The very fact that it was committed immediately after the agreement was concluded sheds a peculiar light on the breach". The note categorically denied the version that Premier Nagy and his party voluntarily left for Romania, for they had made it quite clear while they were at the Yugoslav Embassy that they would refuse to go to Romania. The note then stated that this violation of the agreement would have a negative effect on Yugoslav-Hungarian relations and declared it to be completely contrary to the generally accepted practices of international law.

42. On 24 November Mr. Vidic received in Belgrade Mr. Gryaznov, Councillor of the Soviet Embassy, to whom he transmitted a note setting forth the contents of the note addressed to the Hungarian Government. The note in addition stated: "In informing the Government



of the USSR about the foregoing, the Government of the FPRY is obliged to express its surprise to the Government of the USSR over the fact that Soviet authorities in the Hungarian People's Republic prevented implementation of the above-mentioned agreement which was to have provided a friendly settlement of a disputed issue between the Government of the FPRY and the Hungarian People's Republic."

43. The Nepakarat, organ of the Hungarian trade unions, in its issue of 23 November mentioned that the "Cabinet" sat until 1.30 a.m., after which Mr. Kádár assumed full responsibility for Mr. Nagy's journey to Romania. In a Government communiqué issued in the evening of 23 November, it was announced that Premier Nagy and some of the ~~his~~ colleagues who had sought refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy had left the premises of the Embassy on 22 November and had gone to Romania, in accordance with a request they had submitted previously to be permitted to go to the territory of another Socialist country.

44. From the evidence at its disposal and the testimony of witnesses, the Committee is convinced that Premier Nagy and his party did not proceed of their own free will to Romania, as declared in the Hungarian communiqué, but that they were forced to do so as a result of Soviet action. It has evidence that, when they were forced to board a plane, they did not even know where they were being taken. From other testimony, it appears that the group is still held in Romania and that some of them are living under prison conditions.



7. Conclusions

45. The Committee is obliged to conclude that the Soviet intervention was not aimed at assisting a régime, in this instance Mr. Kádár's, possessed of a measure of popular support and already established in accordance with constitutionally prescribed forms. On the contrary, the evidence appears to show that it was Mr. Kádár and his associates who played the role of auxiliaries to the Soviet authorities in suppressing Hungarian liberties and the institutions in which they were organized. Thereafter, continued Soviet military intervention enabled the present rulers of Hungary to make a show of administering the country and to revive the organization of subservient party personnel <sup>P</sup> needed for <sup>the reassertion of control over the Hungarian workers</sup> dispossession of the workers from control of the means of production and distribution and of the public services.