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CHAPTER XIII

SOVIET INTERVENTION UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME

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In the present Chapter, the development of events in Hungary is examined with a view to showing (1) the measure of Soviet action to undo the results of the Revolution, (2) the extent of dependence of Mr. Kadar and his Government on Soviet support and the correlative lack of Hungarian support, and (3) the specific measures that were taken by the Soviet Government, following the cessation of the fighting, to impose the Kadar Government and maintain it in power.

CHAPTER XIII

SOVIET INTERVENTION UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME

by Soviet?

The activities of the Soviet military forces in connection with their second intervention in Hungary have been described in Chapter V. Matters relating to the circumstances under which the Kadar government was established have been given in Chapter VII. In the present chapter the development of events in Hungary are examined with the view of determining the extent of dependence of Mr. Kadar and his Government on Soviet support and the specific measures that were taken, following the cessation of the fighting, for the consolidation of this Government and its maintenance in power.

1. Imposition of the Present Regime

1. In the "Szolnok" broadcasts of 4 November announcing the establishment of the Hungarian Worker Peasant Government, it was explained that this drastic step was taken by Mr. Kadar and his colleagues for the purpose of saving the Hungarian workers and peasants from the dangers of fascism and reaction. The statement read by Mr. Munnich declared: "We have decided to fight with all our strength against the threatening danger of fascism, etc." ^{one hour later} Similarly, Mr. Kadar was heard to say: "We must put an end to the existence of the counter-revolutionary elements. The hour of action is here. We are going to defend the part of the workers and peasants and the achievements of the People's Democracy".

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It has not been established whether Mr. Kadar or other members of his Government had actually prepared the other announcements which were heard over the Soviet-controlled radio stations of Hungary between 4 and 7 November. What appears, however, to be definite is that neither Mr. Kadar nor the members of his Government during these days of fighting fulfilled the function of ^{independent} political leadership that would be expected of them under these crucial circumstances.

2. In these announcements the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government appealed to the Hungarian people, "to the workers, peasants and soldiers", and called upon them to fight against "the forces of reaction". However, there is no evidence that any Hungarian group fought on the side of Mr. Kadar's Government under some leadership which might be identified as Hungarian. The Committee has explored exhaustively the evidence at its disposal, for the purpose of determining the degree of response of the Hungarian people to Mr. Kadar's appeal.

has nothing to show
It found no instances showing that during the fighting of 4-11 November

whether
were there any troops or groups of Hungarians organized or unorganized

support
who fought against each other. The evidence points unequivocally to

conclusion occurred
the fact that fighting was exclusively between Hungarian nationals and

all Hungarian
the Soviet forces. Any assistance that the latter may have received

came from
was limited solely to persons who have been identified with the AVH

and persons closely associated with the Rakosi leadership. In the

opinion of the Committee, the absence of Mr. Kadar and of any other

is to be explained by the fact
Hungarian who might rightfully claim to act as a leader of the people

that no genuine

was prepared to follow

failure

to rally popular support

The evidence shows that
In the opinion of the Committee, the failure of

Mr. Kadar to rally any popular support whatever is to
be explained by the fact that no genuine Hungarian was
prepared to follow a leader who identified "the forces
of reaction" ~~against which he declared a crusade with~~
those who had fought for the principles proclaimed by
the Revolution and with the Government which had
undertaken to implement them.

*This is the opinion of
the Committee is the reason why Mr. Kadar
failed to rally popular support.*

*Freedom from external
interference*

by the Kadar Government

~~This conclusion is confirmed by another circumstance.~~

A striking feature in the period between 4 November and 11 November, when the Soviet forces ~~from~~ finally prevailed,

was the use of radio stations ~~presumably controlled by Kadar~~

not, ^{to} ~~for the purpose of rallying the support of the Hungarian~~ ^{support}

people to the ~~proclaimed~~ ^{PR} ~~crusade of the Kadar Government~~

~~against the forces of reaction but~~ ^{by the} ~~to transmit~~ Soviet military

orders and announcements to the population. After the broad-

cast of 4 November, the voices of Mr. Kadar, Mr. Munnich or

of their colleagues ^{were} ~~was~~ not heard again. ^{for several days until} By contrast, the

voice of Hungarian opinion was heard only from the "free stations"

of the Hungarian fighters. Thus at 10 a.m. on 4 November,

Radio Szombathely transmitted the order of the Soviet Military

Commander of Vas County which stated that "as the local adminis-

trative organs had been unable to maintain order and to secure

public safety...the Commanding Officer of the city and country

commands the patrols of Soviet troops to guard public buildings

and enterprises". The order further stated that civilians must

deliver all weapons to the Soviet Military Command or be severely

punished; it fixed the hour of curfew and regulated matters relating to

the supply of food. Radio announcements from Szolnok, Pecs, Miskolc

and Nyiregyheza throughout 4 and 5 November, transmitted the orders

of Soviet Commanders either for the surrender of arms, the establish-

ment of curfew hours and other administrative matters, or otherwise

appealed to the population to assist in the re-establishment of

order and the resumption of work. In spite of the fact that by

nightfall of 4 November the majority of the radio stations were

for several days
while the
population
was being
suffered

under Soviet control, on no broadcast was the voice of a Hungarian leader heard addressing the people in the way which would normally be expected from a government.

who identified

~~fighting against "the forces of reaction" can be explained only by~~

~~the fact that~~

~~the Hungarian people had~~

~~identified themselves with the principles of the Revolution and with~~

~~the policies / Premier Imre Nagy, and that Mr. Kadar's Government~~
~~was devoid of any popular support.~~

There was a striking contrast between the
 3. ~~It is in consequence understandable that all media of communications~~
~~broadcasts from radio stations immediately controlled~~
~~regarding developments in Hungary from the outbreak of the Soviet~~

~~attack on 4 November to the 11th, when the Hungarian fighters were~~

~~defeated, should carry the stamp of Soviet rather than Hungarian~~

~~authority. From the 4th of November, for four days, radio broadcasts~~

~~from Hungary were heard emanating either from the "free" stations~~

~~of the Hungarian fighters, or from the stations that had come under~~

~~Soviet control. The principal news items from the latter stations~~

~~were the Soviet military orders addressed to the Hungarian people.~~

~~Thus at 10 a.m. of 4 November, Radio Szombathely transmitted the order~~

~~of the Soviet Military Commander of Vas County which stated that "as the~~

~~local administrative organs had been unable to maintain order and to~~

~~secure public safety... the Commanding Officer of the city and country~~

~~commands the patrols of Soviet troops to guard public buildings and~~

~~enterprises." The order further stated that all civilians must~~

~~deliver all weapons to the Soviet Military Command, otherwise they~~

~~would be severely punished; it established precise hours of curfew~~

~~and regulated matters relating to the supply of food.~~

~~Such radio announcements from Szolnok, Pecs, Miskolc and Nyiregyheza~~

~~were heard throughout the days of 4 and 5 November, transmitted the~~

~~orders of Soviet Commanders either for the surrender of arms, the establish-~~

~~ment of curfew hours and other administrative matters, or otherwise~~

Imre Kadar's side

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a striking contrast between the
broadcasts from radio stations immediately controlled
by the
the Hungarian fighters
which emanates from the resistance sides. On
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~~appealed~~ to the population, to assist in the re-establishment of

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by nightfall of 4 November the majority were under Soviet control.

on no broadcast

on no broadcast
was the voice of a Hungarian leader heard, ^{addressing} giving the people the

the way difficulties which would normally be expected from a government
the same evening at

the same evening at

5. In Budapest, the Kossuth broadcasting station/ 9.15 p.m.

now transmitting under Soviet control, sent out an appeal

in the name of the "Worker-Peasant Government" calling upon "the

faithful fighters of the cause of Socialism ' to come out of hiding.

Generally there was little on the air until 8 November which would indicate that there was such a thing as a Hungarian Government.

Reviewing the

in the name of the God

Despite the appeal broadcast by the Soviet-Embassy

The fighting which took place in Hungary from 4 to 11 November

had nothing of a character of a civil war with one part of the

population in ~~new~~ armed opposition to another. Reviewing all

the evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that from a more

or less extended period beginning on 4 November there was no

Hungarian central authority which could be looked upon as a

Hungarian government. This point will bear some elaboration, since

what is important to observe is that the Kadar Government had neither

support nor authority. If the picture of government in Hungary

during this all-important period is one of the nonentity of

Mr. Kadar and his associates, the same evidence serves equally

to confirm the impression that the Soviet army, if not *the*

legitimate sovereign of the country, ruled it to all intents

and purposes. The evidence reviewed by the Committee leaves

no doubt that the Soviet forces in Hungary acted not only as

the supreme authority but also in most instances as the exclusive

authority.

a picture

support nor authority. If the picture
of a govt without "a real govt"
 during this all-important period is one

since
neither
any
on the
Calling
number
live
Calling

*Received of Mrs J. W.
the sum of £10
for the purchase of
the land*

*Administration
Adm. File
2. Soviet Government of Hungary*

While the Soviet authorities could use military force to overcome Hungarian resistance, they were not able by the use of Soviet troops to endow the Kadar Government with the necessary power to administer the daily affairs of the Country. The Soviet Military Command had, therefore, to undertake the direction and, in some cases, the actual conduct of certain governmental operations.

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of force and the establishment and maintenance of another Government, completely subservient to its commands, that would rescind the policies of neutrality and political independence as demanded by the Hungarian insurgents.] But the imposition of a government (on the Hungarian people, whose principal task was the reversal of the expressed popular will, ~~was no easy matter for the Soviet authorities. It required~~

They were not able through the use of the Kadar with the necessary
~~the use of military force to overcome the armed resistance of the people, and the stationing of Soviet troops in the country so as to maintain this Government in power, it also became necessary for the Soviet military command to undertake the control and, in some cases, the operation of internal Hungarian affairs.~~

to administer the daily affairs of the country
 Thus, in order No. 1 dated 6 November, the Soviet Military Commander, General Grebinyik, declared, inter alia, that "the Soviet Military Command will give local administrative organs every assistance in providing the population with food and fuel". The order also stated that motor vehicles carrying food and fuel may run day and night, provided they have special permission. According to the evidence, when the fighting ceased in Budapest, much of the work of restoration of tramway lines, clearing of street rubble, traffic control, guarding of factories, etc., was done under the immediate supervision of Soviet personnel.

7. If the Kadar Government had rested on some popular support, the task of the Soviet Military Command, at the time of the second intervention, would have been easier than it actually proved to be. Even after the fighting had ceased there was no response from the people or even a segment of the people, showing that they would be prepared to assist the Government in the reconstruction work that

lay ahead. Newspapers and radio broadcasts, for the next two weeks, repeatedly announced that order had been restored throughout the country.

Such reports were ^{soon} discontinued, ^{it was evident that} for it was obvious to all that this

was ^{overwhelmingly most} patently untrue and that the ^{offered the Government and used every possible} outstanding majority of the people were devising ways and means to oppose the Government. This left

the Soviet Military Command ^{when their opportunity} confronted with a central and local

administration which presented all the aspects of disintegration.

To some extent, this ^{problem} was also due to the ejection, from all public office, during the week of ^{freedom} of those persons who did not espouse

the cause of the insurrection. The Revolutionary Councils that

succeeded the previous administration tried to reorganize the

various services for which they were responsible, but in most

cases were unable to complete their task within the short period of

time at their disposal. Furthermore, members of the Revolutionary

Councils were participating in the armed resistance and were therefore

obliged to go into hiding at the end of the fighting so as to avoid

reprisals. Thus, in many cases, essential services in Greater Budapest,

were unable to function effectively, because many of the key personnel

were not available. Another factor, and doubtless the most important

one, was that with the end of the fighting, the workers decided as

a group on an organized campaign of passive resistance. This phase

of the resistance, which was to continue until January of this year,

inflicted an additional burden upon the Soviet Union as it was obliged

to subsidize the Hungarian economy in goods and services

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8. In some provincial centres, where the fighting had been limited, the Revolutionary Councils were permitted to continue their functions, with certain changes in personnel, under the overall supervision of the Soviet Command. In other centres, however, all Revolutionary Committees were abolished by military order. Thus, on 5 November, the Soviet Military Commander of Pecs ordered that "the counter-revolutionary National Committee shall be dissolved". In many centres the persons who had been ejected from office by the Revolution reappeared at the Town Hall and, in the presence of Soviet officers or NKVD or AVH personnel, resumed the positions they had held prior to 23 October. According to the evidence, these persons were often unable to render any effective service as the local government or public utility staff had either abandoned their posts or limited their work so that only the consuming public would benefit by their services and not the country as a whole.

9. The Committee has been told that although all public services were disorganized or had ceased to function the population, particularly in Budapest, did not suffer directly as a result of this situation.

The peasants from the surrounding country side continued the practice they inaugurated at the outbreak of the Revolution and brought daily to the capital their produce which they sold at little or no profit or even gave away to those who were in need. Similarly, the coal miners, truck drivers, and power station operators produced

the minimum amount of goods and services that were essential for the needs of hospitals and private homes, but totally inadequate for the purposes of industry or public life in general. The tenacity of the workers had brought the economy to a complete standstill. On 28 November Mr. Antal Apro speaking at a meeting held in the Parliament Building with representatives of the Workers' Councils, showed the severity of the situation which was due to the strike. The factories were idle owing to the lack of raw materials and fuel. The Socialist countries had sent great quantities of material needed by the Hungarian industry and this was now massed on the frontiers and could not reach the factories owing to ^{the} railway workers' strike.

10. The only way by which order could be restored, short of ^{first} acceding to the demands of the Hungarian people, was/for the Soviet Military Command to initiate a policy of repression and fear that would be pursued with equal tenacity by the Government of Mr. Kadar and, secondly, that ^(b) centres of political opposition be removed through the reactivation of the Hungarian Communist Party. The first policy was put into effect as soon as the fighting was over. The second followed towards the end of November.

2. Soviet Domination of the Kadar Government

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1. [The absence of Mr. Kadar and of the other members of his Cabinet from the Hungarian capital between 4 and 6 November, while it may have conformed to the wishes of the Soviet authorities, did not enhance the kudos of that Government in the eyes of the Soviet Military Command.] When the Soviet troops reached the Parliament Building in the morning of 4 November, the Soviet Commander in Chief and his staff, disregarding the theory that the Hungarian People's Republic was to be maintained as an independent state, established their headquarters in the same offices that had been vacated earlier in the morning by Premier Nagy. Various witnesses who visited Mr. Kadar at different times after 11 November, have reported that the Parliament Building both outside and inside presented the picture of a Soviet Military Stronghold. Soviet tanks protected the entrance to the building, at the entrances themselves Soviet Army and NKVD personnel checked the credentials of those seeking admittance, while inside, in the halls and corridors, many Soviet officers were to be seen. Witnesses explained that during the meetings they held with Mr. Kadar there were usually one or two people present, who apparently acted as observers, while remaining silent throughout the proceedings. Certain witnesses stated that among those present at these meetings, they recognized some men who belonged to the AVH, others again testified that the observers during their meetings with Mr. Kadar were Russians who knew Hungarian. When a delegation from the Kobanya district of

Budapest visited Mr. Kadar asking him to intervene with the Soviet/Military Commander, to stop the deportation of workers, Mr. Kadar is reported to have said to them in private "don't you see that machine guns are sticking in my back?". The evidence that has been received, though voluminous, is too fragmentary to establish a precise picture regarding the relations between Mr. Kadar and the Soviet authorities in Hungary.

It would not seem unreasonable, however, to state that Mr. Kadar did not appear to be the master in his own home. There is abundant evidence indicating that the Soviet Authorities in general, and the Soviet Military Command in particular, until recently, did not show towards Mr. Kadar and his Government the deference that is usually ^{accorded} ~~afforded~~ the legal authority of a Sovereign State. Upon Mr. Kadar's return from his secret visit to Moscow on 6 or 7 November, he held a meeting with Mr. Zoltan Tildy and certain other non-Communist political personalities with regard to the possibility of their joining ~~his~~ his Government. The Committee received testimony to ^{the effect that they} ~~accepted~~ but when the question was submitted to the Soviet Military Commander, the latter's immediate reply was a categorical refusal. The situation can be further illustrated by ~~describing~~ ^{described} ~~from~~ an incident ^{provided} by a witness. Some time during the middle of November, representatives of a professional group visited Parliament in an attempt to get the release of ^{from arrest certain} ~~some of their~~ colleagues who had been arrested. After going through the various check points in the building where they were searched for concealed weapons they were ^{taken to} ~~ushered in~~ an office where a high-ranking Soviet officer asked them what they wanted, ~~in Hungarian~~.

(addressed them in Hungarian and

The deputation stated they wanted an interview with Mr. Kadar. The soldier at the door called out the name of Mr. Kadar and the latter, who apparently was nearby, came in immediately. Upon entering, Mr. Kadar clicked his heels and bowed to the Soviet officer. The group got the impression that he was not a free agent and they told him they considered it futile to submit their request to an underling. They then turned to the Russian officer who listened to their request. He shrugged his shoulders and said he would see what could be done. Two days later, the witness reported, some of their friends were released from jail and went home.

3. One of the many difficulties confronting Mr. Kadar at the time of his appointment was that the various elected bodies such as Revolutionary Councils, Workers' Councils, Trade Union, Student Union, Professional Societies, etc., that visited him in Parliament made a point of stating that they did not consider him and his Government as being legally in power. There are numerous reports in the Hungarian Press and the Budapest Radio between 16 and 23 November, indicating that the representatives of these groups were pressing for the return to power of Premier Nagy. On one occasion Mr. Kadar was forced to state that as soon as Premier Nagy left the Yugoslav Embassy negotiations would be undertaken with regard to changes in the structure of the Government.

4. The Committee is of the opinion that the evidence clearly points to the fact that neither the circumstances under which Mr. Kadar came to power nor the subservient position which he was forced to maintain towards the Soviet Forces would justify his claim to be the head of a Government. If he is able now to receive some recognition from the Soviet Authorities, the evidence still indicate that he lacks any popular support.

around 17 November when the Central Workers' Council was pressing Mr. Kadar for the withdrawal of Soviet troops as a condition for the resumption of work, General Grebenyik according to witnesses said

"You have to understand that it is not the Kadar Government who governs here, but the Soviet Military Command and it has sufficient power to force the Hungarian Workers to take up their work".

The Strengthening of the Kadar Part
2a) Soviet Repressive Measures

Insert from p. 8.

1. General Grebinyik, the Soviet Military Commander in Hungary, in his appeal to the Hungarian people of 5 November, emphasized that the Soviet forces were in Hungary not because they needed more land or more natural resources, but because the Worker Peasant Government had requested the Soviet Military Command "to give a helping hand in the liquidation of the counter-revolutionary forces". He called upon the Hungarian officers and soldiers to fight on the side of the Soviet troops "against the unbridled forces of reaction for freedom and democracy". But this appeal, and many others remained unheeded by the Hungarian fighters. In the face of this opposition, the Soviet Military Command adopted stringent measures. These were individual arrests of persons suspected of leadership in the resistance, mass arrests, and deportations. Occasionally the Soviet troops resorted to summary executions, so as to instil a sense of fear among the population. Simultaneously the Soviet Command took over the control of the nerve centres of the country, such as broadcasting stations, telephone exchanges, road transport, and the railways, and was thus able to suppress any opposition movements.

2. These controls were effectively maintained by the Soviet Military Command for a number of months. It is known that following the battles outside the Central Telephone Exchange of Budapest, this was immediately taken over by the Soviet troops, who apparently remained to monitor all official calls. The Committee was informed that an official of a

Foreign Ministry of a Western European government, while calling up in December its diplomatic representative in Budapest, was interpreted by a person speaking Russian who broke off the connection. Similarly, it was reported that all cars, including those with diplomatic license plates, were obliged to receive a Soviet permit to circulate. The Committee was told that diplomatic personnel leaving the country with exit visas issued by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry were turned back from the frontier by the Soviet guards if they had not also received an exit clearance from the Soviet Military Authorities.

3. The Soviet Command laid special emphasis on the control of the railroads. During their advance at the time of the second intervention the Soviet troops commanded the principal lines leading to Budapest. This was first noted on the Zahony-Nyiregyhaza-Szolnok line which was seized on 2 November after a skirmish with the Hungarian railway workers at Nyiregyhaza. At the outset the Soviet Command tried to get the railway men to operate the trains but this was effected only under duress, by seizing the men from their homes and taking them to the marshalling yards. Eventually on the main lines the railroads were operated by Soviet personnel and the trains were protected by armed guards against saboteurs and guerrillas. With regard to the secondary lines, these apparently were in a chaotic state.

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4. At the time of the fighting, the Soviet troops used varying tactics to consolidate their military gains. In some cases, if the objectives had been achieved easily, the Soviet troops, after disarming the fighters, would allow them to go home. This was the case in the smaller provincial centres during the days of 4 and 5 November. On the other hand, in Budapest, or wherever the Hungarian fighters persisted in their resistance, the Soviet troops showed extreme severity. In Morisz Zsigmund Square, for example, during a lull in the fighting of 5 November, five men were dragged out of their hiding place and were shot in the street. In some districts of Budapest, when the fighting started to die down, Soviet troops with the assistance of AVH men effected mass arrests of persons suspected of having taken part in the fighting. Similarly, at Gyor, at the end of the fighting, they seized sixty men, of whom eight were abundantly summarily executed. There is evidence that on numerous occasions truckloads of men and women were driven to jail under Soviet armed guard, and were kept in prison under the supervision of Soviet personnel. Witnesses have been emphatic in their declarations that these arrests often had no direct connexion with the fighting. In one case it was reported that fifty prisoners had escaped from such a round-up, and the Soviet troops immediately collected an equal number of persons from the houses surrounding the area.

5. The Soviet Military Command was particularly interested in bringing under its control the Hungarian Officer Corps as it had been demonstrated

that the pro-Soviet indoctrination had not prevented many majority of the officers from siding with the nationalist uprising. There is evidence that the Soviet Command on the outbreak of hostilities directed certain troops to the barracks of the garrison towns demanding their surrender. In a number of cases there was no opposition, as the barracks were denuded of troops, except for a few pro-Soviet officers. There were instances (see Chapter IV) where some officers had already been seized by the Soviet troops by the 3rd or even the 2nd of November. In Budapest, Soviet armoured units, during the day of 4 November, surrounded the Military Staff College and seized the limited personnel that were on the premises. It has been reliably reported that even in the case of a unit which had remained passive, the Soviet troops issued an ultimatum to vacate the barracks within thirty minutes. They then proceeded to occupy the premises and take over all the military stores. In Budapest, members of the AVH attached to the Soviet troops, assisted in identifying the Hungarian officers who were considered to be in sympathy with the insurrection. These officers, witnesses have said, were immediately despatched to the Soviet military base at Tsköb and were put under arrest. The Committee is led to believe that many of these officers were deported to the Soviet Union for, according to witnesses who had themselves been deported, a large ^{proportion} of the deportees were Hungarian officers.

6. Dr. Ferenc Munnich, Minister for the Armed Forces, between 8 and 10 November, in orders and appeals addressed to the armed forces,

asked that the men/^{to}report to their units. These orders, however, were soon to be countermanded by the issue of other orders by which a considerable part of the standing army was demobilized. Apparently the pro-Soviet Generals of the Hungarian Staff came to realize that the Army had disintegrated, and that it was impossible to reassemble it by the issue of orders and appeals. In addition, according to witnesses, who were in a position to know, the Soviet Military Command objected strongly to the re-establishment of any Organization that would have the status of an Army, as recent experience had shown that the men could easily turn their weapons against their Soviet allies. Instead, they demanded that State Security Forces be organized in a fashion that would provide a more effective political control against the present opposition and the subversive movements that might develop in the future. Dr. Munnich, in his Instruction for the implementation of the "Declaration of Officers" issued on 12 November, ordered all officers of the Hungarian Army who agreed with the Declaration and desired to pursue their military career to sign the document. Those who refused to sign or "disagree with the Declaration, or want to be disarmed for any other reason" will cease within 24 hours to be part of the active Army. The instruction further established committees of 5-7 officers who would decide disputable cases of officers who had signed the Declaration, but who having "participated with arms on the side of the enemy" would make it impossible for them to remain in the Army. Witnesses estimate that, as a result of this instruction,

about 80 per cent of Hungarian officers have been separated from the Army. Of the remaining 20 per cent who signed the Declaration,

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it is said that a considerable number did so for family reasons but that they cannot be otherwise relied upon for their pro-Soviet sympathies.

7. One of the first pronouncements of Mr. Kadar, following the cessation of hostilities/ on 11 November, was that past mistakes would not be repeated and as a proof of his intentions/that the State Security Service (AVH) would be disbanded. The day before, however, a security organization / had been established, known as the "R" group which was to serve as an adjunct of the regular police, ostensibly to protect the people from being "molested by criminals". "Security Force Regiments" were also established, whose task would be to patrol the cities, collect arms and prevent any disruption of order. During these days, the press announced the formation of various other security groups:

the "Security Force Regiments," the "R" groups, "mixed action" groups, "factory guards", the "Home Guard" and the "Militia".

These forces, with the exception of the factory guards, became and still continue to be the foundations upon which the structure of the Kadar Government must rest. Witnesses have explained how these forces, under whatever title they may have been known, were fostered by the Soviet Military Command, and operated in close conjunction with the Soviet troops in the campaign for the repression of armed or passive resistance. The evidence appears conclusive that these security groups were staffed, if not exclusively, at least to a considerable degree, by men who previously belonged to the AVH. In some cases, the groups also included members of the NKVD (Soviet Secret Police) who were seen on duty wearing Soviet and in other cases Hungarian uniforms. The function of these groups was to discover any centres

of resistance, to make home arrests of individual suspects, and to act as guides and interpreters for the Soviet troops wherever it was necessary to exercise armed force.

8. The Committee cannot fail to note that the Soviet Military Command, having achieved its primary objective, which was the overthrow by force of Premier Nagy's Government, had to rely on the personnel of the AVH as the only group in Hungary whose loyalty and interests lay on the side of the Soviet Union. Yet, Mr. Kadar, who came to power as a result of the Soviet Military intervention, was presumably selected ^{partly} because his personal history gave some hope to the people that there would be no reinstatement of the Rakosi regime and the AVH. [It is possible that the Soviet authorities believed that the Hungarian people, following their military defeat, would submit to the new order under Mr. Kadar, and that through him a new equilibrium might be reached, that would satisfy certain minimum political and strategic requirements of the Soviet Union.] Developments, however, after 4 November, showed that the Hungarian people were not prepared to co-operate with any government which would not, or could not, satisfy their two basic demands -- the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and free elections. In the face of this continued resistance -- the persistent strikes, the deputations with demands that were ab initio unacceptable, the passive demonstrations, the manifestos and the intermittent appearance of guerrillas -- the moping up operations of the Soviet troops at the end of the fighting had to be converted into an organized system of armed repression.

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4. The Reactivation of the Hungarian Communist Party

1. One of the problems facing Mr. Kadar when he came to power was that his Government represented a political Party that had in fact disintegrated the previous week. The Central Committee of the Party - the Hungarian Workers' Party - dissolved itself on 28 October. Following Mr. Kadar's declaration on 30 October of its failure the more prominent Hungarian Communists, who still remained faithful to the dogma, decided that it was necessary to make a fresh start. For this purpose they established the Preparatory Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Material relating to this subject has been provided under Chapter VII. It is noted here however only because this Committee, which was intended to link past practice with the future Reformed Communist Movement, was composed of seven men, all of whom, except for Mr. Kadar, following the second armed intervention, have been considered as enemies of the State.

2. The severity of the problem, confronting Mr. Kadar during the days following the second intervention, was illustrated to the Committee by many witnesses who declared that he had difficulty in finding the individuals who would accept to join his Government. Witnesses have testified that many leading Communists trusted Premier Nagy and had accepted his stand on the major political issues, while others again, during the Revolution, had undergone a change of heart and refused to be associated any more with the Communist movement. Mr. Kadar thus found himself alone with a few associates and a party machinery that could not operate.

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3. The task confronting the Government was to reassemble the elements that had constituted the rank and file of the party and to deploy them into positions of command. In the Provinces and to some extent in the capital, this was done automatically by the members of the AVH who came out of hiding or were liberated from prison by the advancing Soviet troops. The various local administrators, government officials, trade union leaders, etc., who had not sided with the Revolution, and had consequently been ejected from office by the Revolutionary Councils, were reinstated in their former position. Witnesses testified, however, that this did not constitute a solution as so many of the former officials had broken away from the Party during the Revolution that many essential posts had to remain vacant. In the industrial town of Dunapentele, for example, with the exception of the AVH, and one or two Army officers, every one had sided with the Revolution. A similar situation has been noted in a number of other towns. The Government was therefore often unable to take any immediate action in removing from office even the more pronounced of their declared enemies. Evidence has been received that Borsod County (Miskolc area) was administered independently up to January 1957 with few if any ties with the central government.

4. The solution to the problem came largely as a result of the repressive measures that were pursued by the Soviet Military Command. By 17 November when the under production of factory workers and miners was realized to be no less than a general sit down strike, the Soviet Military Command, with the AVH, concentrated in arresting

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many of

/ the leaders in the factories and mines. As vacancies were created in the Workers' Councils they were filled by persons designated by the Government. There are a number of reports showing that during the discussion between Mr. Kadar and the workers, regarding the terms of the decree law on Workers' Councils, considerable pressure was exercised to have Communists elected to the Councils. After 9 December, with the promulgation of the decree on summary jurisdiction, it was only a matter of time for all factories to receive their quota of party members. As it appears in the evidence, first in the small factories and later on in the big ones, the Workers' Councils were instructed to include certain persons in their membership. This apparently was one of the reasons why the Workers' Council of the Csepel Iron and Steel Works dissolved itself on 11 January, after the armed fight that took place at the factory against Soviet troops.

5. Witnesses have testified that, among the 200,000 who are now claimed by the Government to be members of the Party, a considerable proportion have joined solely for pecuniary reasons and could not be relied upon by the Government in an emergency. It was stated before the Committee that, in certain cases, a factory or group of factories was told that it had to increase its quota of Party members. For the purpose of avoiding the imposition of persons from the outside, the workers decided that they would fill the quota by drawing lots from among the staff in the factory.

5. The abduction of Premier Imre Nagy

1. When Premier Nagy left the Parliament Building in the morning of 4 November, he told other members of his Cabinet that he was going personally to the Soviet Embassy to protest against the Soviet military attack that had been launched against Hungary.

However, ~~instead he~~ sought asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy in the company of his son-in-law, Dr. Ferenc Janosi, ^{followed by} and the other Communist member of his Government, Mr. Gergely Losonci. Within a few hours Messrs. Ferenc Lonat, Gabor Tancos, János János, György Fazekas, János Szilagy, Szilard Mihelyi, Miklos Vasarhelyi and Mrs. Julia Rajk, together with 15 women and 17 children, came to the Yugoslav Embassy seeking asylum. ^{According to a report} issued by the Yugoslav News Agency Tanjug, dated 25 November, certain negotiations had taken ^{place} on 2 November between Mr. Zoltan Szanto, one of the members of the Provisional Committee of ^{new} the Socialist Workers' Party of Hungary, and a member of the Yugoslav Embassy, with regard to the possibility for him and some other Hungarian Communists to seek refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy should this prove to be necessary. The next day the Yugoslav Ambassador stated that in principle he would grant asylum if this were requested.

3. Negotiations were under way between 11 and 22 November between the Yugoslav Government and Mr. Kádár, to settle the problem connected with the granting of asylum to Premier Nagy and his Party. The Yugoslav Government proposed that (a) the Government of Mr. Kadar would provide a written guarantee that Premier Nagy and his Party would be allowed to return freely

to their houses or if this were not possible that (b) the persons in question would be permitted to proceed freely to Yugoslavia, where they would be granted asylum.

in Budapest

4. In the course of the conversations that were held/between Mr. Dobrivojc Vidić, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and Mr. Kadar, the latter, while accepting the above proposals of the Yugoslav Government, had also suggested as an alternate solution that Premier Nagy and his party seek refuge in Romania. This proposal was communicated by Mr. Vidić to Premier Nagy and his Party and as they were ruled out as unacceptable the questions was again submitted to Mr. Kadar on the basis of the original two alternative proposals. Apparently Mr. Kadar agreed to *this* verbally on 16 November. However, the next day Mr. Kadar set new conditions. These were that Premier Nagy and Mr. Losonci should resign from their positions in the Government, that they should declare themselves in sympathy with the efforts of the Hungarian Worker-Peasant Government, that they should offer a self-criticism of their earlier activities, and that they should guarantee not to undertake any steps against the activity of the Hungarian Government. **Mr. Kadar also requested** that Premier Nagy and Mr. Losonci seek asylum in one of the Socialist Countries until conditions in Hungary became normal. These proposals were turned down by Premier Nagy and by the Yugoslav Government, which declared that it could not agree to releasing the party in question on the basis of special terms, which were exclusively of domestic concern to Hungary.

5. In the letter of the Yugoslav Government dated 18 November addressed to Mr. Kadar, it was specifically stated that the Yugoslav Embassy would agree to the departure of the party from their premises only upon the receipt of the written guarantee of Mr. Kadar, in his capacity as President of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, that Premier Nagy and his party would be granted safe conduct to proceed freely to their respective houses.

Mr. Kadar in his reply to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia dated 21 November, stated: "In the interest of terminating the matter, the Hungarian Government, agreeing to the proposals contained on page 3, section 8 of the letter of 18 November 1956 addressed to me by the Yugoslav Government, hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his Group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the Group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their houses".

(Type in as quotation)

6. The next day, 22 November, at 6.30 p.m. a bus arrived at the Embassy which had been placed at the disposal of the refugees by Mr. Munnich, Minister of the Armed Forces and of Public Security. As the party was boarding the bus, Soviet military personnel arrived on the spot and insisted on entering the bus. Thereupon the Yugoslav Ambassador asked two officials of the Embassy to accompany the bus to make certain that Premier Nagy and the party reached their houses as agreed. The bus was driven to the City Headquarters of the Soviet Military Command where the two Yugoslav officials were forced to leave the bus by order of a Soviet Lt. Colonel. The bus then under the escort of Soviet

Armoured cars left for an unknown destination.

7. The above incident provoked the Yugoslav Government into issuing a note verbale that condemned the action of the Hungarian Government in terms of extreme severity. It described the action of the Hungarian Government to be "a flagrant breach of the agreement reached. The very fact that it was committed immediately after the agreement was concluded sheds a peculiar light on the breach." The note categorically denied the version that Premier Nagy and his party voluntarily left for Romania, for they had made it quite clear while they were at the Yugoslav Embassy, that they would refuse to go to Romania. The note then stated that this violation of the agreement would have a negative effect in Yugoslav-Hungarian relations and declared it to be completely contrary to the general accepted practices of international law.
8. The Nepakurat organ of the Hungarian Trade Unions in its issue of 23 November mentioned that the "Cabinet" sat until 1.30 a.m., after which Mr. Kadar took the whole responsibility for Mr. Nagy's travel to Romania. In an official communiqué of the Government issued in the evening of 23 November, it was announced that Premier Nagy and some of the colleagues who had sought refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy left the premises of the Embassy on 22 November and proceeded to Romania in accordance with the request they had submitted previously to be permitted to go to the territory of another Socialist country. The Committee from the evidence placed at its disposal and the testimony of witnesses, is convinced that Premier Nagy and his party did not proceed of their own free will to Romania as declared in the

Hungarian communiqué, on the contrary, it has evidence that when the party was forced to board a plane they did not know their destination. From other testimony it appears that the group is still located in Romania and that some of them are living under prison conditions.