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Translation of an article entitled:

"WHAT IS THE REPORT OF THE 'COMMITTEE OF FIVE' OF THE  
U. N. SAYING ABOUT THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM"

which was published in five instalments in the official daily  
newspaper of the Hungarian Communist Party in Budapest, NEPSZABADSAG,  
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The following is a translation of comments on the Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary which appeared serially in the official daily newspaper of the Hungarian Communist Party, Nepszabadsag, under dates of 27 through 31 August 1957.

27 August

What is the Report of the "Committee of Five" of the U.N. saying about the "Hungarian problem"?

The two volumes, as a matter of fact, do not say anything new. They summarize all the lies and slander of the counter-revolution and of the imperialists which were collected in the weeks and months of their work by the Committee, in order to blacken the socialist system, the Soviet Union which came to the Hungarian people's help, and in order to distract attention from the activities of the reactionary circles at home and of the imperialists abroad who are the most guilty in launching the counter-revolution.

In our serial we shall publish the Report in order that the Hungarian people be informed of its statements, its twisting of the truth and its impudent slanders.

Chapter I carries the title "Organization and functions of the Committee". We are informed in it that "the Committee has heard 111 witnesses: 35 were heard in New York, 21 in Geneva, 16 in Rome, 30 in Vienna and 9 in London".

The first three witnesses - Miss Kethly, Bela Kiraly and Jozsef Kovago - were heard in public. The whole activity of the Committee was devoted to backing up the statements of these three "star witnesses".

And something more: "At the request of the Committee, suggestions as to persons to be heard were also made by the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States." By what right? And the Report goes further: "The Committee is grateful for the helpful and voluminous material received from Member States . . . Besides other documentary material, the Governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted reports giving a detailed and extensive picture of events in Hungary based on information available to them."

Damn it, gentlemen, Western diplomats. If we remember well, at the occasion of submitting your credentials you have promised to work for good relations among our countries. Intelligence work, collection of information, is not a work for diplomats, but for spies. Or is this just the same to you?

The Report further says that the questioning of a great part of the witnesses was carried out in closed meetings and 81 of them were heard anonymously. After that how can be taken seriously the statement that "the Committee has sought scrupulously to assess the value of the testimony and of the documentation placed before it".



The Report affirms that the witnesses were drawn from all segments of society but "Relatively few peasants were heard by the Committee, since comparatively little fighting had taken place in country areas."

With reference to the anonymous witnesses, the Committee states that they have heard "certain leaders of revolutionary forces . . . the Commander of the Corvin Block; the Commander of the revolutionary forces of southern Budapest; and the leader of the 'freedom fighters' and guerrilla forces in southwestern Hungary."

This means - as we can see from this list - that only "impartial" and "objective" counter-revolutionaries were heard. Their testimonies were checked in <sup>such</sup> a way that "Care has been taken to subject witnesses to detailed interrogation in order to test the reliability of their evidence. The Committee has on many points been in a position to check the testimony of one witness with the testimony of others."

It is legal nonsense: if several were lying about the same thing, then the Committee accepted it as a truth.

Chapter II under the title of "Brief history of the Hungarian uprising" tries to prove the statement that the uprising was a spontaneous act. Talking about the events before 23 October, the Report speaks - against the will of its authors - about the planning of the counter-revolution. It states, for instance, that "the foundation of the Petöfi Club provided a new forum for discussions, which were often critical of the régime."

What kind of régime was in Hungary last summer? Popular democratic régime. Accordingly, not the mistakes were criticized but the régime.

The Report describes how the demonstration was organized; the organization of the demonstration but not its spontaneity is described. The Report further says that Gerö's speech was the limit and talking about the demonstration before the Radio Building it repeats the lie that the guard started the shooting. The Report states further that "at the Headquarters of SZABADNEP, AVH guards opened fire on demonstrators", although it is well known that at the Headquarters of SZABADNEP on 23 October there was no fighting and that only vagabond hooligans made their way into the building.

How did the insurgents get arms? This would be difficult to explain with spontaneity. About this the Report states that people coming from different parts of the city "seized trucks . . . and obtained arms on the way . . . from soldiers or police or from military barracks and arms factories."

From barracks and from arms factories? Obtained them? In an amicable way or by a magic formula? Or is it not more logical to think that at several places they came into possession of arms through force or through betrayal. If it was a betrayal, then where did the instinct come from?

The Report then speaks about the formation of "revolutionary" councils in the whole country which "was one of the most characteristic features of the uprising". The Report states that Maleter joined the insurgents "which meant in plain Hungarian language that he had broken his military oath and had become a traitor."



Under the subtitle "Mr. Nagy clarifies his position", the Committee tries every means to whitewash Imre Nagy who allegedly had no active part in the development of the events. As a matter of fact, Imre Nagy was the prisoner of the AVH - says the Report. But Imre Nagy on 29 October disbanded the AVH - which means that the "prisoner" disbanded his guardians and "as a result he was himself freed for the first time from the control of the AVH".

What does the Report say about the days of the white terror? Nothing. It speaks about the cease-fire which had been ordered on 28 October, when "a few isolated skirmishes took place but the cease-fire became fully effective by the time the new Cabinet took office on 30 October."

A mere nothing. During this "effective cease-fire" there occurred such "skirmishes" as the armed attack on the Party Headquarters at Republic Square, the massacre, torture and desecration of people, the arrest of Communists and of other patriots.

And this all was not isolated.

The Report takes up the question of the formation of the Kadar Government and questions its legality although at the time of the establishment of the Kadar Government, the same Praesidium and the same President was functioning in Hungary as before. When the Parliament is not in session, the Praesidium personifies the sovereignty of the people. But the Committee of Five was investigating not to find the facts but to prove the unprovable.

This same Chapter has a "Summary of Conclusions". But while the Report is silent about the real instigators of the counter-revolution, it states that "it is untrue that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary or that it drew its strength from 'imperialist' circles in the West."

It is worthwhile to note the conclusion about Imre Nagy. Mr. Nagy, seeing "the united desire" of his countrymen, "threw in his lot with the insurgents". Nothing will erase this disgrace from Imre Nagy.

Chapter III tries to preserve the appearance of objectivity and wants to give the impression that it is discussing the uprising "as seen by the USSR and by the Government of Janos Kadar". About this false appearance of objectivity we would like to say: to the selected newspaper quotations and to quotations from statements the Report always adds the word "allegedly". Truly the fabrications of fugitives and traitors such as Miss Kethly are accepted by the Committee without any restrictions as authentic.

The Report does everything to free the imperialist powers from the accusation that they helped the counter-revolution and it says: "The Committee gave a thorough consideration (where and how?) to the possibility that the uprising may have been planned in advance, but it could find no evidence to justify any such hypothesis."



They have not found such evidence because the Committee was very anxious to remove attention from these facts. The Committee has not investigated the effects of the U.S. 100 million dollar Mutual Security Pact, the balloon and leaflet provocations, the spy activities and the activities of the inciting of radio stations, etc. In fact by admitting that the Radio Free Europe was "optimistic and encouraging" the Report absolves this so-called American "international" propaganda organ from any guilt.

The Report denies that Mindszenty demanded the return of the church latifundia; it denies the existence of saboteurs, spies and that arms from the West were coming into the country.

To deny these facts and to take at face value the slander - that is the procedure of the makers of the Report.

NOTE: The above instalment quotes 167 words from Chapter I, 132 words from Chapter II and 39 words from Chapter III.

#### 28 August

Chapter IV was written very lengthily and evidently with the intention of condemning the Soviet Union which was rushing to the help of the Hungarian People's Government. The title of the Chapter is "Soviet Military Intervention (24 Oct - 3 Nov 1956)". From its introduction we shall quote two sentences which could be considered a self-avowal of its authors: Many Members of the United Nations would undoubtedly have watched with sympathy the efforts of the Hungarian people to win for themselves a different form of government. However, such internal developments would not have constituted a matter of international concern calling for the attention of the United Nations."

Let's see: if in our country "a different form of government" would have been victorious (it means a counter-revolution), this for "many Members" of the U.N. would not have constituted a matter worthy of interference. This means that if with the help of the imperialists new terrorists like Ivan Hejjas or Ostenburg in the past, would massacre the best of the Hungarian people, this the Western gentlemen "would undoubtedly have watched with sympathy". But the aim of the Report of the "Committee of Five" is to slander the Soviet Union. Although in the introduction it states that "it is not proposed to deal with the uprising itself or to discuss the reasons which have been advanced to justify Soviet intervention", the Report does not do anything, then arbitrarily arranges and selects at random the real and the trumped-up episodes in order to prove the statement made in the title. This means that the authors of the Report admit that they have no intention of discussing the reasons (the political and armed help of the West for the counter-revolution) which have caused the legal action of the Soviet troops on the Hungarian Government's request.



The whole Chapter describes in detail the troop movements and it makes them appear as if the whole country had become a theatre of war. Who took part in it? According to the Report, "However important the role of the students in the initial stage of the demonstrations, it was matched by equal determination on the part of the workers as the fighting grew in intensity."

We have to watch the generalization: the students, the workers! The intelligentsia are protesting that they should be treated in a general way. And the workers, to tell the truth, strongly object to being identified with a handful of vagrants. But the authors of the Report need all this in order to be able to say that "the fighting was nowhere more severe than in certain factory districts."

The Corvin Square, the Kilian barracks, the Jozsef Boulevard - are these factory districts? Angvalföld is a factory district. But there was no fighting even if somewhere else there were places where fighting took place. The Report insists stubbornly on the statement that on 30 October "the cease-fire came into full effect and thereafter the armed truce was respected by both sides. . ."

Let's see again what happened between 30 October and 3 November in Hungary.

Chapter V already in its Introduction states that before 4 November "order was being rapidly restored in the damaged streets of the capital. . . . No looting took place. Good progress was being made in the direction of political consolidation. . . . A sense of confidence had developed among the citizens of Budapest."

Such an untruth is stated in the Introduction of the Chapter whose title is: "Second Soviet Military Intervention".

This Chapter seems to contain information of <sup>a</sup> military nature. And in spite of that it tries to give certain political explanations. If the whole thing would not be so tragic, we could smile about how the "Committee of Five" itself justifies the advance of the counter-revolution. For instance the Report says that "no single unit of the Hungarian Army fought as such at the side of the Soviet troops. . . . But it happened that Hungarian Army units fought on the side of the uprising."

The first part of the statement is a lie. The units in Szolnok, Kecskemet, Kiskunhalas, Szekesfehervar, Esztergom, Dombovar and other units as such resisted the counter-revolution. The units in Eger, Dombovar, Szeged, Szentes and elsewhere as well as the total strength of several military schools co-operated with the Soviet forces. There were innumerable units which had earlier asked the Government to give them orders to fight against the counter-revolution.



The second part of the quotation proves our point of view. While the contrivers of the Report tried to discredit the Hungarian Army, as a matter of fact they show how the teachings of Imre Nagy, Bela Kiraly, Maleter and others did paralyze the unified action of the Army on the side of the people's power. The Report admits that "the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army and the Command of the National Guard established a working relationship with the insurgents" and that "the freedom fighters had welcomed deserting soldiers and officers into their ranks".

Now you can see the nature of the treason: The traitors who attained leadership conspire with the enemy and so they disrupt and disorganize the Army. The Report describes in great detail the activities of Kiraly, Maleter and others during these days. And we are getting a further picture of the treachery. We read in the Report: "Leaders of Revolutionary Councils seemed to derive special satisfaction from being in direct telephone communication with Mr. Nagy. . . or General Kiraly. . . as they had no confidence in the hierarchy of officers transmitting their messages from the field to the highest echelons."

This means that the traitors were actually isolated from the greatest part of the officers of the Army. And in spite of that the Report patiently and without batting an eye puts on paper the "finding" that "it must be stated that on the evidence before the Committee it may safely(!) be assumed that the whole population of Budapest took part in the resistance."

Can it be safely assumed or is it a fact?

About the fighting in Budapest the Report categorically and repeatedly states: "Soviet armoured units opened fire on all buildings along avenues and streets", and in the next paragraph the words "avenues and streets" are left out and it says that: "Soviet troops were shooting indiscriminately at anything." Let's remember this statement because we shall refer to it again.

Two paragraphs further we read that "it was the apparent aim of the Soviet High Command to avoid clashes wherever possible".

The Report takes up in detail the situation in the provinces. It mentions several counties and cities where fighting was going on and some cities - for instance Dunapentele - where fighting occurred only in the dreams of the witnesses and of the Committee members. And since there were not enough examples, the authors of the Report must explain why there was and "absence of resistance". According to them that was because "the Revolutionary Councils had no weapons in store."

Did the Army after all not support them or did the Commander of the Units "prevent" the desertion of the Army; this means that they remained faithful to the people and to their oath.

At the end of the Chapter the Committee discusses the figures of casualties during the uprising. It quotes the Report of the Central Statistical Office (around 2500-3000 dead) but only in order to be able to say that these figures "do not present a complete picture". (They grumble about the insufficient number of Hungarian dead!) In connexion with an estimate of 25,000 Hungarian dead, the Report comments that "The Committee received the impression that this figure may well be too high." Well, if



"the Soviet troops were shooting indiscriminately at anything" and if the Hungarian people or if only the whole 1 1/2 million population of Budapest was fighting against them - as the Report states - how can the comparatively low figure of the casualties be explained?

Chapter VI discussed the "Political circumstances of the First Military Intervention", and returns again to 23 and 24 October, brings Imre Nagy's person again into the fore and the whitewashing continues:

"Imre Nagy could have stopped the fighting at a much earlier stage if he had not been . . . kept incommunicado". Perhaps this "incommunicado" brought about that he as Prime Minister should not give effect to the martial law which was ordered by himself. According to the Report, this "incommunicado" was the reason that Imre Nagy could not show quickly enough that he was co-operating with the counter-revolutionaries.

The Report talks about visits of delegations with Imre Nagy and states also that during the first days doubts had arisen with regard to Nagy's true position.

"It was not until the last days of October that most of them recognized him as the leader and heeded his appeals to re-establish order."

Let's well understand it: only when Imre Nagy - dropping the line of Communist statesman - moved with his Government gradually to the right and included in his Government the Kelemen and Bibos and only when it became evident that he (Nagy) was doing nothing against the white terror, only then did the counter-revolution finally "recognize Imre Nagy as the leader". And what kind of order could it be which would have been "re-established" on his order?

About the doubts of the delegations we cannot speak. But we shall quote the statement of a delegation from the Report: One day Imre Nagy asked the counter-revolutionaries who were visiting with him to trust him because "he was as good a Hungarian as they were. At this and other points in his speech, according to witnesses, Mr. Nagy implied doubt as to whether what he said was really what was in his mind." To another delegation Imre Nagy said that "in his opinion the new course would have to be based on socialism founded on Marxism."

Chapter VII has the title "The political position of Mr. Kadar prior to 4 November." (Translator's note: This title is a sub-title and not the main title of the Chapter). This Chapter reviews the events preceding the formation of the worker-peasant Government and presents the happenings in such a way as to make the Communist Ministers responsible for the Imre Nagy Government's actions. These Communist Ministers recognizing the danger of a counter-revolution, have broken all contacts with Imre Nagy and they turned against him. In its conclusions the "Committee of Five" states that "no well-placed observer could conclude that Mr. Nagy's Government was in any serious danger from counter-revolutionary forces".

Without any discussion it would be good to remind the reader of Imre Nagy's radio speech on 4 November, in which he had asked to turn the country into a battlefield. That is a well-known fact. But it is not known what the Report says: Imre Nagy after his radio speech has allegedly dictated another speech. In this speech he speaks openly about a Soviet-Hungarian war; he calls upon the leaders of the "revolution" to leave the country. He was asking the leaders of the "revolution" to spread abroad the text of his speeches. This is the bottom of Imre Nagy's career.



It is quite possible that this Government would have been tolerated, for a certain time, by the counter-revolution. The Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government was established not to protect the Imre Nagy Government but to protect the people's democratic socialist order. The present Government is dedicating its efforts to this aim.

NOTE: The above instalment quotes 107 words from Chapter IV, 132 words from Chapter II, and 39 words from Chapter III.



29 August

Chapter VIII contains legal comments and carries the big-sounding title "The Question of the Presence and the Utilization of the Soviet armed forces in Hungary in the light of Hungary's international Commitments". The legal comments mention only incidentally Article 4 of the Peace Treaty of 1947 in which Hungary accepted the obligation not to permit "The existence and activities of organizations of a fascist-type . . . whether political, military or para-military."

Of course they challenge the competence of the Warsaw Pact although the Pact is in accordance with the U.N. Charter which permits the signing of certain regional agreements for defense purposes and against aggression. The Warsaw Pact is such an agreement.

What has the Report to say in order to deny the competence of the mentioned international agreements?

It tells the old story that "The uprising was not of a fascist or anti-democratic character as those terms are generally understood."

Of course they do not consider the activities of people like Dudas or of Uncle Szabo and of the white terrorists as fascistic or anti-democratic as the activities in Cyprus, in Kenya, in Algeria in Oman and elsewhere. Of course that's all a matter of "consideration".

The authors of the Report want to prove that the neutrality declaration of Imre Nagy as well as the demand for removal of Soviet forces from Hungary was legal. But they avoid saying that the Warsaw Pact was ratified by the Parliament and therefore only the Parliament could have denounced it. They are quoting in full Imre Nagy's well-known cable and other communications asking for the intervention of the U.N. and of the Security Council, as well as the cable of the Government which took office on 4 November. In this cable it is stated that "Imre Nagy's request to the U.N. to have the Hungarian question discussed in the U.N. has no legal force and cannot be considered as a request emanating from Hungary as a State."

An interesting statement is in the Report about the ideas of Imre Nagy: "It has been reported to the Committee that during his retirement from active political life in 1955, Mr. Nagy had in his writings referred to the possibility of Hungary adopting a neutral status . . . "

Accordingly it is not true that Imre Nagy was pushed only by unexpected events on the side of the counter-revolution. He carried into effect his old ideas about the necessity of unity in the socialist camp and his negative attitude towards internationalism of the proletariat.

In order to recognize the legality of Imre Nagy's foreign policy, the Report says: "The Nagy Government has not resigned."



But the Report does not say that the same Praesidium which has appointed Mr. Nagy, has also relieved him. Constitutionally this is decisive.

Finishing with Chapter VIII one would think that there was nothing more to write about, particularly because the Report contained up to now many repetitions. Apparently the Committee had nothing more to say and therefore suddenly in its Chapter IX chronologically returns to the "Background and Aims of the Uprising." If it is possible to make distinction between the parts of the work of the Committee, then this Chapter is the most brutal interference with the internal affairs of our country. The aim is clear: to blacken our democratic popular progress and our socialist order. In this Chapter under the listing of economic and other demands, the Report collects and mixes up all the legal and justified demands which last year were discussed in public opinion and which became a matter of common knowledge through the intellectual promoters of the counter-revolution.

"A demand for revision of the country's economic programme was often put forward" states the Report, and not mentioning the results, it ridicules our difficulties originating from the earlier years. Through enumeration of the facts and through lies they try to prove that the reason for the difficulties lies in the international co-operation of the socialist states.

After enumeration of these demands, the Report states that "it would appear that no demand was ever put forward for the return of estates to the former landowners."

We do not know what the word "appear" means in this case. Mindszenty said quite audibly in his radio speech that he insisted on the return of nearly 1 million hectares of church land property. And Pal Eszterhazy appeared again probably because he wanted to supervise the return of the land to the former landowners.

It is worthwhile to compare this with that statement of the Report :  
"There is less documentary evidence on the attitude of Hungary's peasants toward the uprising than on that of other classes of the population."

It is right; the peasants, instead of producing documents, ploughed and sowed and they defended their rights with arms or, if they did not have arms, with scythes.

Chapter X is not worthwhile discussing in detail. This Chapter describes again the history of October 22nd and 23rd in great length, probably because the most witnesses came from among the organizers of the revolution. (Translator's note: The writer of the article did not even dare to quote the title of the Chapter.)

The same can be said about Chapter XI. This Chapter discusses the "Revolutionary" and workers' councils. In its introduction we read: "No aspect of the Hungarian uprising expressed its democratic tendencies or its reaction to previous conditions more clearly than the creation of Revolutionary Councils in villages, towns and on the county level, and of Workers' Councils in factories." It is



obvious to say that if this were the truest expression of democracy, then the capitalist Western countries should be in a hurry to create those councils. According to the Report those organs were created in order "to ensure for the Hungarian people real ... control" in the local Governments and in economic life. Only the Report does not mention that in the work of the local governments, of the councils, the workers, the working peasants, the progressive intellectuals and the little man were taking part since, after the liberation, we have created the Soviet system. This the Report cannot state and therefore it has to say that the old apparatus (translator's note: They say only "apparatus" leaving out the words "The entire Communist-controlled Party apparatus".) had collapsed in Hungary, leaving a vacuum in public administration", and in their place were created the organs of the counter-revolution.

Further the report mentions that "on 30 October official recognition was given to the Revolutionary Councils by Mr. Nagy in the name of the National Government."

The legal sensitiveness of the authors was apparently not damaged by knowing that no Prime Minister and no Government has the right to replace the constitutionally elected local administrative organs or to amend the Constitution.

At the end of the Chapter in its Conclusions the Committee finds that the so-called Revolutionary Councils "were the result of a spontaneous, nation-wide movement"; nevertheless "a broad identity of aim underlies both the demands and the methods."

Has anybody ever seen a "spontaneous, nation-wide movement" whose organs were created without any contact with each other - as the Report says - where a "broad identity" characterized their work? Let's see what this "identity" was.

"These Councils at once assumed important responsibilities in the factories, mines and other undertakings".

But the Report does not state that these "important responsibilities" consisted of incitement to strike, of paralyzing the national economy, of waste of the people's property, of arrest or expulsion of Communists and other Democrats. Instead the Report comes to the conclusion that the creation of these organs "were among the most important achievements of the Hungarian people".

The authors of the Report must stick to this statement when they want to call the counter-revolution a revolution.

NOTE: The above instalment quotes 86 words from Chapter VIII, 47 words from Chapter IX and 103 words from Chapter XI.



30 August 1957

The title of Chapter XII reveals how objective the Committee was in investigating the events. The title of this Chapter is "Reassertion of Political Rights (26 Oct - 3 Nov.). The Report reproaches the Government of that time in that it had decreed the liquidation of the armed uprising should they (the insurgents) not lay down their arms by a certain time-limit which was extended several times.

"The Government order instructed non-existent Hungarian forces to 'deal annihilating blows at all who continued the armed fight against the people's power' after the time-limit had expired," says the Report. (Were Hungarian forces really non-existent? Then who was asking and waiting for orders from the barracks?) The Government, with Imre Nagy on the top, was not relying on them.

"The composition of the new Council of Ministers went far toward meeting the insurgents' viewpoint," states the Report, and accordingly Mr. Nagy was striving more and more not towards the liquidation of the counter-revolution but toward "meeting the insurgents' viewpoint".

The Report discusses the Governments of that time which were changing from day to day and says: "They accepted Imre Nagy without enthusiasm"... and "Mr. Nagy sought to placate the insurgents".

"To placate" meant that the Government appointed on 28 October did not call the counter-revolution a counter-revolution.

On 30 October already "it was clear that Mr. Nagy had gone beyond his earlier position. From his address of 300 words, two words were conspicuously absent, "Communist" and "Socialist". (This is really a great merit.)

The Report praises the dissolution of the AVH and the introduction of the multi-party system.

The Report is again inconsistent with its often repeated assertion that the uprising was spontaneous when it writes that "almost within an hour of the announcement by Prime Minister Imre Nagy of the abolition of the one-party system, political parties were being re-established in Budapest and in the provinces."

The Report plays the role of a historian and returning to 1945 and even earlier in the history of our country it tries to prove the legality of the different political parties. In spite of that it states that after the announcement of 30 October the parties were set up according to the 1945 coalition system. About the fact that besides that another dozen or so more of small parties were founded, the Report comments simply: "In addition other smaller parties were set up."

To prove the statement that there was a beautiful democracy developing in Hungary, the Report quotes in great detail from the statements of the leaders



of these parties and from their papers. But one single quotation will throw light upon what was hiding behind the beautiful promises and that the party leaders considered the situation of that time only as temporary. Ferenc Farkas, the Secretary-General of the newly established National Peasant Party (Pestőfi Party) expressed the attitude of his Party when he said: "although the insurrection had scored military success, it had not so far been politically successful". (Translator's note: The article does not quote the previous sentence of Farkas' statement saying "as long as Soviet troops were in Hungary his party could not take part in the Government".)

What would have Mr. Farkas considered "politically successful?" Let's quote another passage of Sandor Varga's radio broadcast from Miskolc in which he described the programme of his party. Among others he demanded a freedom of religion but in a peculiar way only the "institutional protection of the activities of churches true to the spirit of Christ."

The programme was also saying that "we consider it necessary to maintain existing agricultural co-operatives until peasant co-operatives are set up on a sound basis". What do we mean by "sound basis"? The basis of the former "Hangya Co-operative" or of the institutionally organized exploitation?

The Report praises as the summit of democracy the masses of newspapers which appeared in those mournful days. It names only a few names among their Editors-in-Chief. Among them the Report mentions the ill-famed Horthy sympathizer, Bishop Laszlo Ravasz.

According to one anonymous witness the Smallholders' Party "had no intention of eliminating genuine socialist achievements such as land reform". It is really nice of a "smallholders" party not to demand the return of the lands to their former owners. But why is the anonymous witness not quoting the radio speech of Mindszenty in which he demanded the return of the Church properties? Let's have real democracy and let's see how the "ideas" of the different parties will make out.

Why do the "political rights", the "revalidation" of which was so warmly appreciated by the Committee, not concern Mindszenty?

The title of Chapter XIII is "Soviet Intervention under the present Régime." What kind of "intervention" is it which is condemned by the Committee? They condemn the energy shown by the Soviet troops in restoring order without fulfilling the demands of the Hungarian people. As if the most ardent wish of the Hungarian people were not the quick restoration of order in the country. They are reproaching the Soviet forces because they took control of the "nerve centers of the country... the railroads and the principal lines," and that "the trains were protected against saboteurs and guerrillas by Soviet armed guards."

From this it is evident that the Soviet troops helped in great measure to restore public order and public supply. The "Committee of Five" is angry because of it; the Hungarian people are grateful for it. But that action by which the counter-revolutionary bandits were promoted to partisans by the "Committee of Five" can be called more than impudence.



The authors of the Report do not like either that the Soviet troops were helpful in the organisation of the Hungarian forces and that Hungarian units, especially police forces, co-operated with the Soviet troops who were rushing to come to our help.

"The function of these groups was to discover any centres of resistance, to make arrests of individual suspects." They have not fulfilled their task badly, that's sure.

The authors of the Report feel themselves entitled in the name of the Hungarian people to declare: "The Hungarian people were not prepared to co-operate with any Government which would not, or could not, satisfy their two basic demands--the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and free elections."

Why argue about questions which were decided a long time ago? The facts show which Government is supported by the people. The "Committee of Five" does not refer to general facts, to our political and economic consolidation, but it talks about provocations which appeared a few weeks after November, to provocations such as the well-known fascist attempts in Salgotarjan and in Csepel. Needless to say that these provocations and the others were the last attempts of the counter-revolution which was at that time not yet completely crushed.

NOTE: The above instalment quotes 151 words from Chapter XII and 70 words from Chapter XVII.



August 31

The following Chapters (Chapters XIV, XV and XVI) discuss the political and social situation after 4 November. To illustrate in what manner, let's quote a sentence: "The dissolution of Party cells was one of the first acts of the Workers' Councils during the revolution." Since when is anti-Communism called revolution? To crush this "revolution" the Report says that "during November a campaign was launched to reactivate the Party movement" and at the same time "Communist infiltration had begun in the factories".

The authors of the Report evidently do not like the fact that during the fight against the counter-revolution the Party gradually became stronger and they regret to find that "more and more Workers' Councils found themselves in a position where they had to negotiate on all major issues with the delegates of the factory Party cell."

From where did these Party cells come? From where, we ask, when everybody was loyal to the "revolution"? The authors of the Report find an explanation for everything and unflinchingly they declare that "The Party cells were established by force." We regret, but we cannot imagine how a party organization could be created by force. Have we forced the counter-revolutionaries

the hesitants with weapons to join the Party? On the other hand it is true that "As the Communist Party grew stronger, in each factory it dominated the elections to the Workers' Councils."

The Report quotes lengthily from newspapers published at that time and with traditional propaganda methods quotes statements where our leaders and our papers revealed the difficulties. About the results and about consolidation of the situation, the Report remains, of course, silent.

Many more words are used to talk about "deportations" although the Report does not mention the name of one single "deportee". But for propaganda this is good. In further discussions the Report talks about the repressive measures taken against counter-revolutionaries, i.e., how legal proceedings were carried out against them.

Chapter XVII recapitulates the statements several times published. Thus, "To the best of the Committee's belief . . . represent the essential facts about the Hungarian uprising which are necessary to an understanding of the nature and outcome of the Revolution." Further: "The thesis that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary and that it drew its strength from such circles and from Western 'Imperialists' failed to survive the Committee's examination . . . At no time was any proposal made for the return to power, or to the Government, of any figure associated with pre-war days."

Even if it is true that no proposal was made for the return to power of any figure associated with pre-war days, it is not true that other less compromised people could not be found - the Zajgovari-s, the Soltesz-es and others, for instance - who would have been ready to follow in the footsteps of Miklos Kallay or of Nicolas Horthy who at that time was still alive.

The Report, of course, tries to deny the existence of help from foreign imperialists: "Fascists and 'saboteurs,' heavily armed, could not have succeeded in landing on Hungarian airfields which were under Soviet supervision, or in crossing the Austrian frontier, where a closed zone was shown by the Austrian authorities to the military attachés of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR."



In answer we would like to say that in the first days of the counter-revolution there was no closed zone at the Austrian frontier. There were arms brought in, often in Red Cross trucks; spies and diversionists crossed the border into the country as reported by the Hungarian press. And ready to come into the country, there were the gendarme and "arrow-cross" units of Kisbarnaki-Farkas.

The Report insists in its statement that "The uprising was not planned in advance . . . The events took the participants by surprise. . . The whole course of the uprising bears the hallmark of continuous improvisation."

Is an attack against important state buildings and projects an "improvisation"? Similarly, the event which the authors of the Report so stubbornly call a "spontaneous national uprising" cannot be called an "improvisation".

"While disappointment at Mr. Gerö's speech may have angered the crowds, it would hardly of itself have sufficed to turn the demonstration into an armed uprising. That this happened was due to the action of the AVH in opening fire," says the Report, but it was several times refuted by well-known facts. There is nothing in the Report about the fact that the action of the AVH "would hardly of itself have sufficed" if the masses should receive arms. Wasn't there treachery? Wasn't there preparation in advance?

We quote further: "When Mr. Nagy became Prime Minister, he was not at first able to exercise the full powers of that office. Only when the grip of the AVH was loosened by the victory of the insurgents was he able to take an independent stand. By this time, the real power in Hungary lay with the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils,". Accordingly, Imre Nagy's "independent stand" was not dependent from the legal order of the Hungarian People's Republic because the Report itself states that the power was in the hands of the counter-revolutionary forces.

"The few days of freedom enjoyed by the Hungarian people provided abundant evidence of the popular nature of the uprising. A free Press and radio came to life all over Hungary,". Why are they so modest? We did not "enjoy" their world only a few days but between 1919 and 1945, for a quarter of a century. During that time the tone of their press and radio was the same as it was during the "few days". And that the authors of the Report are devoted to these 25 years can be proven best by the following quotation from the Report: "There were a number of lynchings and beatings by the crowds. These were, in almost all cases, confined to members of the AVH or those who were believed to have co-operated with them."

We can say that even the murderers of Orgovany could praise them for their sincerity and for their courage. The Ku-Klux-Klan negro-lynchers and the Hitler gas-chamber hangmen could envy their followers from 1956 in Budapest, because even during the time of Goebbels it was not very proper to boast about murders committed on open streets, especially not to boast before the forum of an international organization.



"The basic human rights of the Hungarian people were violated by the Hungarian Government prior to 23 October . . . and such violations have been resumed since 4 November" says the Report. According to this the Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic is deprivation of civil rights; yet the lynching is legal.

Noting such cynicism, we cannot be surprised to read in the Report the thesis that the so-called democratic achievements were endangered by a kind of counter-revolution, stating: "The 'counter-revolution' consisted in the setting up by Soviet armed forces of Mr. Kadar and his colleagues."

According to it the cradle of socialist revolution should be somewhere in Washington and the restoration of capitalism might be organized in Moscow . . . Or perhaps not?

In another part the Report says: "The Hungarian workers have shown no sign of support for Mr. Kadar's Government." Evidently as a result of this antipathy, and to the imperialists' great annoyance, public order and economic life were quickly restored.

The Report relates in full detail that "The Revolutionary and Workers' Councils were dissolved" and mentions the dissolution of several organs and bodies of the counter-revolution. From all this it concludes that "Representative government does not exist for the time being in Hungary. In the interval between 23 October and 4 November 1956, the voice of the Hungarian people was heard in organizations which appeared or reappeared in the climate of freedom. . . the voice that spoke through these organizations was harmonious, rather than discordant."

It is possible that for the Members of the Committee the voice of the counter-revolution was not "discordant". But probably they will consider discordant the uniform protest with which the Hungarian people and every freedom-loving man denounces all slander and machinations directed against them.

We come to the end of a sketchy report. Since every statement of importance from the days of the counter-revolution, and published in the Report, are well known, and since the Report is the rehashed version of several times refuted statements, we confined ourselves to only a few characteristic parts.

The imperialists thought that through this Report they would be able to interfere with the process of consolidation and calming down, and they were hoping to upset again the temper. But as in October, now again they have made a miscalculation. The Hungarian people know these lies; many believed them for a certain time until they became convinced that their credulity was being used for covering up such perfidy. Therefore they will never believe them again. The Report of the "Committee of Five" has only strengthened the Hungarian people in this resolution.

Note: The above instalment quotes 63 words from Chapters XIV, XV and XVI, and 390 words from Chapter XVII.

Altogether 1623 words were quoted from 160,000 words of the Report.