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ROUTING SLIP

609

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ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS

29 WEST 57th STREET

New York 19, New York

PLaza 1-3850

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September 29, 1958

Your Excellency:

We have the honor to present Volume II of HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE, a supplement to the report which we submitted to you and to the various national delegations to the United Nations a year ago, during the Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly on Hungary, in September 1957.

In undertaking this project we were prompted by our conviction that a comprehensive and accurate survey of developments in Hungary during the past year would fill a gap in the information available to the United Nations Secretariat, to the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary and to delegations to the United Nations. We felt that in making the result of our efforts available at this time we would render a positive contribution to the debates which are scheduled to take place on this subject in the Thirteenth General Assembly of the United Nations.

We respectfully call Your Excellency's attention to the Introduction, in which we express the recommendations of our two organizations as to the action the Assembly should take, and our reasons for them. We strongly believe that the least the Assembly should do is to withdraw its recognition of the delegation of the puppet regime of Hungary.

Respectfully yours,

Christopher Emmet
Christopher Emmet
Chairman, American Friends
of the Captive Nations

Stefan Korbonski
Stefan Korbonski
Chairman, Assembly of
Captive European Nations

His Excellency Dr. Charles Malik
President, Thirteenth General Assembly
of the United Nations
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Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Estonia
Hungary
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FOR RELEASE: Tuesday,
September 30, 1958 -
12 noon, and not before

Summary of

HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE II
September 1957 - August 1958

Published by
THE AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE CAPTIVE NATIONS
and
THE ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS

In Association with
THE HUNGARIAN COMMITTEE

Editorial Committee:

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Leo Cherne

Clare Boothe Luce

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- Chapter I: Evidences of Continuing Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary
- Chapter II: The Murder of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter
- Chapter III: Soviet Intervention in Hungary and the Continuing Violation of Human Rights
- Chapter IV: The Continuing Resistance of the Hungarian People

PURPOSE

Volume II of HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE, compiled by the American Friends of the Captive Nations and the Assembly of Captive European Nations in association with the Hungarian Committee, will provide U.N. delegates with a complete account of developments in Hungary from September 1957 to August 1958.

In their Introduction, Christopher Emmet, Chairman of the American Friends of the Captive Nations and Stefan Korbonski, Chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, note that in order to debate the problem of Hungary, the U.N. delegates need up-to-date information at their disposal. They cite the fact that the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary was authorized by the Assembly to issue only one report during the past year - a brief analysis of the trials of Premier Nagy and General Maleter which referred to other manifestations of terror in Hungary and contained a spirited statement condemning the executions. The present volume is designed to fill the gap.

The Editorial Committee for this volume consisted of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State; the Hon. Clare Boothe Luce, former Ambassador to Italy; and Leo Cherne, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America.

The Introduction points out that the importance of the forthcoming

U.N. debate was underlined by Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai, who last February gloated over the lack of U.N. action on Hungary:

"The Hungarian people, with the friendly internationalist help of the Soviet Union, crushed the forces of the counter-revolution... The Western states made a big noise about the Hungarian events, they made a big thing of the 'Hungarian problem' and brought it before the General Assembly of the United Nations. And what was the result? The noise subsided slowly..."

(Nepszabadsag, February 9, 1958) (p.3)

Citing the total defiance of all the U.N. resolutions on Hungary by the Soviet Union, and the fact that the reign of terror there continues unabated, Mr. Emmet and Mr. Korbonski call upon the U.N. General Assembly to withdraw its recognition of the delegates of the Hungarian puppet government. They say:

"It is grotesque that the representatives of the very regime which has been convicted by the U.N. General Assembly of usurping power over the Hungarian people with the help of Soviet tanks, should be permitted to speak for Hungary in that Assembly." (p.2)

NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

Information in HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE II was largely compiled from official Communist sources - speeches, radio broadcasts, newspaper items - as well as documents smuggled out of Hungary and letters written directly from Budapest. No item was used without corroboration.

In their Foreword, the editors point out that despite all the efforts of Hungarian authorities to conceal the terror which characterizes Hungarian life, the true facts cannot be hidden since "no regime in history has been so passionately and universally hated by its own people." The regime can trust no one, as an article in Nepszabadsag of June 2, 1957, indicates:

"Today the enemies operate with even trickier and more secret methods than a few months ago. Some of them...insinuate themselves into various positions, or infiltrate the Party and state

apparatus and other organs of our society... It is intolerable that even today political and state secrets are misused, spread all over town within minutes, along with reports of the most secret debates, giving access to facts and figures to any outsider." (p. 4)

CHAPTER I: Evidences of Continuing Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary

The report notes that the Red Army is still "the supreme factor in Hungarian political life... although military control is less noticeable than in the months immediately following the revolution." (p. 5)

The regime's abject dependence on the continued presence of the Red Army is underlined by its spokesmen's constant reminders that Soviet forces "intervened to crush the 'counter-revolution' and that they would be ready to intervene again." (p. 5)

Soviet military control over Hungary is insured by the following basic factors (p. 6):

- (1) The presence of approximately 60,000 Soviet occupation troops.
- (2) The strictest Red Army and Communist control over the Hungarian armed forces.
- (3) The Red Army's direct control and operational command over the Hungarian frontier guard.
- (4) The existence of the so-called Workers' Militia under Communist Party control.

The report reveals that the much-vaunted withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary means little since the reduction has been more than offset by the increased power and mobility of the remaining units, which are concentrated near key factory and communication centers, indicating that they are in Hungary primarily as an army of occupation.

The report points out that "the pattern of disposition of Soviet troops in Hungary makes no sense at all if one accepts Soviet claims that its troops are there to protect the frontiers of Communism against the 'aggressive Western imperialist powers.'" (p. 6)

Despite the reduction of the Hungarian Army from 250,000 men before the revolution to its present force of 120,000, the report notes that it is still almost twice the size permitted by the Hungarian Peace Treaty, which provided for an army of only 65,000 men. It also notes that the right of the Soviet Union to keep troops in Hungary in order to maintain its communication lines with Soviet occupation forces in Austria obviously lapsed after the Austrian Peace Treaty of May 15, 1955. Attempts to justify the presence of the Red Army in Hungary by the Warsaw Treaty are equally invalid since the Warsaw Treaty permits a foreign army to enter the territory of a signatory only when it is threatened by outside aggression.

CHAPTER II: The Murder of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter

This chapter provides the most complete analysis so far published of the illegality of the trials and executions of Premier Nagy and General Maleter. The treachery of the Hungarian puppet government is revealed by Kadar's assurance to the Yugoslav Government on November 21, 1956:

"The Hungarian Government...hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes." (p.11)

When Nagy was abducted from the Yugoslav Embassy the Yugoslav Government charged the Kadar government with "a flagrant breach of the agreement reached. The very fact that it was committed immediately after the agreement was concluded sheds a peculiar light on the breach." (p. 12)

The report brings out a hitherto neglected aspect of the trials by recalling the pledges of the Romanian Government that "the stay of the group in Romania would be marked by all the rules of hospitality and that all necessary steps would be taken to guarantee the personal safety of Mr. Nagy

and his friends," and that the Romanian Government promised to "observe the international rules relating to political asylum." (p. 13) The report points out that no official explanation was ever given by either the Hungarian or Romanian Governments as to the circumstances under which Nagy and his associates were returned to Hungary - a further proof of the mockery of the alleged independence and sovereignty of Soviet satellites.

According to the official "White Book" of the Hungarian puppet government, Nagy and his associates were tried by the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court, although the Hungarian Constitution clearly provides that the Prime Minister and members of his government can only be tried by the National Assembly. In addition, both the Constitution and the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provide that all trials except those involving military security shall be open. These provisions were, of course, violated by the secret trials of Nagy and Maleter; significantly, however, Soviet legal procedure specifically authorizes secret trials.

By citing official Communist sources, the report proves that Nagy, Maleter and their associates were murdered primarily as a lesson to the Hungarian and other captive peoples of the folly of their dream of freedom:

"These sentences constitute a warning to all those who dare attack our legal order. They serve as a warning example; those who attack the peaceful work of construction of the people will have to face the full rigor of the laws of the Hungarian People's Republic."

(Nepszabadsag, June 18, 1958) (p. 18)

CHAPTER III: Soviet Intervention in Hungary and the Continuing Violation of Human Rights

The regime of terror installed by the presence of the Red Army in Hungary since the revolution has alternated between periods of relaxation and intensification, which the Hungarians refer to as "the accordion system," applied in order to crush their will to resist.

Estimates of the number of Hungarians in prisons or concentration camps

range from 50,000 to 60,000. More than 12,000 have been deported to the Soviet Union while an additional 10,000 have reportedly been the victims of internal deportation. Many of the deportees are used to provide slave labor, especially in the mines.

The chaotic situation caused by the constant disappearance of people who have been abducted by the secret police was eloquently described by a Hungarian newspaper:

"Readers keep approaching our editors with complaints we cannot ignore. Mothers complain that for weeks they can find no trace of their children. Factory managers ask our help in finding out what happened to one or another of their employees. After long investigation, we have learned that the missing persons were in the Marko or Fo-utca prisons where for days no one had so much as questioned them or revealed the cause of their detention. Lawyers come to us who for days have not been able to reach clients imprisoned for long periods, because at times, not even the authorities know where they may be."

(Nepakarat, December 19, 1957) (p. 21)

Thousands of well-known Communist poets and writers, who were among the revolution's intellectual leaders, have been sentenced to long prison terms.

~~Although~~ 65% of the Hungarian people belong to the Catholic Church, *and* Hungarian religious life has always been very active. Church attendance of all faiths increased markedly after the revolution and apparently the regime has not dared to risk an open battle either with the clergy or the faithful. Instead, it is attempting to create a relationship with religious leaders similar to that between the Gomulka government and the Catholic Church in Poland, i.e., one which is characterized by a certain permissiveness on the part of the regime in return for certain acts of cooperation on the part of the clergy.

The Soviet Union has once again forced Hungary to function as a cog in its satellite economic machine. An agreement signed in Moscow in May 1958, called for "the rational specialization of production" and the establishment of uniform standards in Hungarian industry. The eminent periodical The

Economist of September 5, 1958, notes that this agreement disposes of three-quarters of the planned volume of Hungarian trade over the next three to five years.

In addition to making the above points, this chapter gives detailed accounts of the juridical terror and the persecution of the intellectuals, the youth, the workers and peasants.

CHAPTER IV: The Continuing Resistance of the Hungarian People

Although by the summer of 1957 the Soviets had finally stamped out open resistance, the Hungarian people have found passive ways of expressing their unanimous opposition to the regime, as is evidenced in the fulminations of the controlled press. Without preparation or organization, there seems to exist a tacit understanding between the intellectuals, the workers and the peasants, between the adults and the children, on the manner in which each group should conduct its resistance.

What are called "social crimes" and "social property violations," such as stealing or wasting of materials, slow-downs in production, sabotage of deliveries, are felt to be particularly threatening to the regime. A statement by Minister of Justice Ferenc Nezsval last September reveals the effectiveness of this type of resistance:

"Counter-revolutionary activity takes a different shape today. The loosening of morale and the citizens' disobedience of the law are still manifest. The increase in the number of social property violations, if we do not act with proper firmness, may threaten our power as seriously as an open counter-revolution." (p. 41)

(Nepszabadsag, September 3, 1957)

HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE II

A Survey of Developments

From September 1957 to August 1958

Prepared by

THE AMERICAN FRIENDS of the CAPTIVE NATIONS

and

THE ASSEMBLY of CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS

in association with

THE HUNGARIAN COMMITTEE

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

A. A. Berle, Jr.

Leo Cherne

Clare Boothe Luce

TYRANNY

Tyranny is in each kiss of parting also,
In the question each wife asks daily:
When will you be back, darling?
This is tyranny —
Whether in confessions of prisoners
Or the confessions of lovers,
In the words that should be soft, half-spoken,
Tyranny is the fly in the wine-glass;
Not in your day and night-dreams only,
Not in the bride-bed only,
But in the yearning, the wasting eyes,
And in beauty and love even —
Because tyranny has been there before you,
Love, your love, has been ravished,
Tyranny is there when you lie down together,
It is the darkness in your throat,
Tyranny is in your mouth, your nose,
You smell it, taste it, warm or cold,
Indoors or out, by night or day,
Where there is tyranny
There is tyranny only
And all is vain —
Great art or this true liberty.
And when your grave is dug,
When your body is lowered,
It states who you were,
It makes use of your ashes.

Gyula Illyés

Gyula Illyés is one of Hungary's finest living poets. His poem "Tyranny" was one of the most eloquent statements of protest to emerge from the historic 'recess of the writers' which preceded and inspired the Hungarian revolution.

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INTRODUCTION

A year ago the undersigned organisations published a report on HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE for presentation to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Our purpose was to supplement the magnificent report of the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary which had closed its hearings in the spring of 1957. We were gratified over the interest our report aroused both in the General Assembly and in the world press and radio, an interest which led to its translation into five different languages and the distribution of some 70,000 copies to libraries, universities, government officials, leaders of public opinion, writers and intellectuals throughout the world.

In the preface to that first report we urged the U.N. General Assembly to reactivate its Special Committee on Hungary and called for the Committee to make *"periodic, official, supplementary reports — so long as the Soviet Union continues to defy the U. N. General Assembly by refusing to withdraw its troops from Hungary and by continuing to intervene in the internal affairs of that country."*

Although the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary met "as a matter of urgency" after the gruesome executions of Premier Nagy and General Maléter, its report was confined to a brief analysis of the trials, a reference to other manifestations of terror, and a spirited statement condemning the executions. Because the U.N. neglected to provide the Special Committee with the means necessary for another full-scale study, there exists no document which deals factually with the events in Hungary over the past year.

We have, therefore, again undertaken to fill the gap by this new study, carried out by the same editorial committee (with the exception of Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr who was prevented from serving because of illness) and by virtually the same staff of editors and writers who rendered such fine service last year. We are deeply grateful to all of them, notably to David Martin who has been the moving spirit in this effort from the start.

It is with the feeling of satisfaction but also with a feeling of sadness that we present the second volume of HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE. The hopes which many of us still cherished even as late as last September, that *some political action beyond words alone* would be undertaken by the

U.N. have been disappointed. As was the case during the Hungarian revolution itself, world attention has been diverted to the crisis in the Middle East and now to the Far East.

We welcome efforts of the U.N. General Assembly to promote a just and peaceful solution of these problems — but this cannot justify a failure to deal with the tremendous unfinished business of the Hungarian revolution. Twelve resolutions condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary, and calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the holding of free elections, were passed by the U.N. General Assembly from November 1956 through January 1957. At the Special Session last September, the Assembly appointed Prince Waiwathayakon of Thailand to negotiate with the Soviet Government and the Hungarian puppet regime to secure compliance with the Assembly's resolutions, but the two Communist governments refused even to permit Prince Wan to enter Hungary.

We believe that this flagrant and insulting defiance of the U.N., and the continuing crimes against humanity in Hungary, so amply documented in this report, call for the application now by the *present Assembly of at least the minimum sanctions prescribed by the Charter*. Above all, it is grotesque that representatives of the very regime which has been convicted by the U.N. General Assembly of usurping power over the Hungarian people with the help of Soviet tanks, should be permitted to speak for Hungary in that Assembly.

The free world must not permit a pail of silence to bury the memory of the deathless bravery of the Hungarian people, and the injustice which they still suffer. To do so would not only be shameful and cowardly — it would be suicidal folly. The Soviet Union has tried, both by guile and by threat, to divert attention from the terrible truths about Communism which the Freedom Fighters revealed and from the shattered myths which were the roots of Soviet power which lie as irreparably fragmented as Humpty Dumpty, among the debris of the revolution. That is why the Soviet Union will talk and negotiate about almost everything under the sun except Hungary and the other captive nations.

The confident hope of the Communists that the free world will forget Hungary was expressed by

Premier Chou En-lai, reported in NEPSZABAD-SAG, February 9, 1958.

"The Hungarian people, with the friendly internationalist help of the Soviet Union, crushed the forces of the counter-revolution. . . The western states made a big noise about the Hungarian events, they made a big thing of the 'Hungarian problem' and brought it before the General Assembly of the United Nations. And what was the result? The noise subsided slowly...

There may have been valid reasons for the free world's failure to help Hungary while the revolution of the free nations made such help possible. But nothing can excuse the failure to tell the story of Hungary again and again, to keep the matter of

Hungary actively on the agenda of the United Nations, and place the freedom of Hungary, and of the other captive nations, at the forefront of all their diplomatic efforts and all their propaganda.

Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. If free men fail to remember, freedom will not survive. In that spirit, and in humble tribute to the Hungarian people, we present this new report and commend it to the attention of the United Nations delegates, and to all men who cherish freedom.

Christopher Emmet, Chairman
AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

Stefan Korbonoki, Chairman
ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS

As this is written, the morning newspapers report that the matter of Hungary will be on the agenda of the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. In an otherwise tragic situation we can derive some comfort from the knowledge that the civilized world has not forgotten Hungary. If the problem of Hungary is to be discussed intelligently, it is essential that the delegates have in their hands a factual documentation dealing with developments since the historic Special Session of September 1957. For Soviet military intervention in Hungary and Soviet violation of the human rights of the Hungarian people are as harsh realities today as they were in November-December 1956. All recent reports are agreed that the installation of Ferenc Mészáros as Premier in January 1958, represented a victory for the die-hard "Stalinist" wing of the Communist Party. According to popular belief in Hungary, the intensification of terror in recent months is directly due to the increasingly firm hold of the neo-Stalinists, headed by Mészáros, over the Party and security apparatus.

It was with a deep feeling of moral obligation, therefore, that we again agreed, at the request of the American Friends of the Captive Nations and the Assembly of Captive European Nations, to assume editorial responsibility for this study, which, as a sequel to HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE I, is designed to provide the U. N. delegates with an account of events from September 1957, until the end of August 1958.

The evidence and information presented here has been carefully weighed by a staff of competent editorial assistants in whom we have confidence. As was the case last year, it is largely based on official Communist documents, speeches, radio broadcasts and items in the controlled Communist press. In addition, our staff and collaborators had access to numerous statements and documents smuggled out of Hungary and to letters written directly from Budapest.

The true facts about Hungary cannot be concealed for the simple reason that no regime in history has been so passionately and universally hated by its own people. With the possible exception of the secret police, the regime can trust no one, either in the government, the army, or in the Workers' Militia—and the constant leakage of state secrets makes them painfully aware of this. The Communist Party newspaper, *NEPSZABADSAG* of June 2, 1957, made this pathetic admission:

"Today the enemies operate with even trickier and more secret methods than a few months ago. Some of them, . . . insinuate themselves into various positions, infiltrate the Party and state apparatus and other organs of our society. . . . It is intolerable that even today political and state secrets are misused, spread all over town within minutes, along with reports of the most secret debates, giving access to facts and figures to any outsider."

A few words might be said about the manner in which the evidence has been weighed. Whenever an item is stated as a fact, its authenticity has been established from a number of sources, generally including the official Communist press. Other information from individual Hungarians, either inside or outside the country, has been accepted as almost certainly authentic when it is substantiated by other sources or is completely consistent with known facts. Items for which it was felt that satisfactory confirmation was lacking were not included.

For the vast research which has gone into this report we are first of all indebted to the capable group of scholars of the Kossuth Foundation, who have been working on a comprehensive survey of conditions in their homeland. Fortunately certain completed chapters could be made available to us in typescript, and they proved a most fruitful source of information.

We also owe very special debts for the information contained in this report to Gyula Szustadorjany of the Hungarian Committee and to Dr. Thomas Passtor of Vienna.

Among our other Hungarian collaborators and sources, we wish to make special mention of General Bela Kiraly, Dr. Laszlo Varga, Professor Vilmos Juhasz and Professor Ferenc Vall.

Finally, we wish to express our gratitude to the capable group of volunteers who assisted in preparing the final text of this report: David Martin who, as executive editor, was responsible for co-ordinating the project and for much of the work of drafting; Moshe Dexter and Norbert Mahlen who contributed to the draft; and Ruth Berenson who also contributed to the draft, in addition to serving as editorial assistant.

Adolf A. Beric, Jr.
Leo Cherne
Clare Boothe Luce

CHAPTER I

EVIDENCES OF CONTINUING

SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY

September 1957 — August 1958

In HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE I, we concluded that Soviet military intervention in Hungary continued unabated, and that this intervention was so massive and total in character that Hungary had to be considered a Soviet military protectorate rather than a simple satellite. We concluded further that it was only against the background of the total Soviet military control of Hungary that one could understand the political developments and systematic destruction of human liberties which characterized the period since the Red Army invaded and re-subjugated Hungary on November 4, 1956.

Nothing has happened over the past year (August 1957 to August 1958) to alter this evaluation in any way. Indeed, there is much fresh and alarming evidence which confirms that the Soviet Army is the supreme factor in Hungarian political life.

Soviet military control is less noticeable and more subtle than it was during the months immediately following the suppression of the Revolution, when the Red Army governed the country by military proclamation, instituted its own military tribunals, carried out mass arrests and summary executions, policed the railroads, broke strikes, and guarded all key buildings and installations. But the continuing dependence of the Hungarian puppet government on the presence of the Red Army is pathetically revealed by the repeated and almost frenetic reminders that the Red Army intervened to crush the "counter-revolution" and that it would be ready to intervene again. Instead of minimizing the role of the Red Army in the events of November 1956, spokesmen for the Hungarian Communist regime speak openly about it — indeed, they boast of it — and this with increasing frequency since September 1957.

Thus on October 9, 1957, the then Premier János Kádár wrote in *PRAVDA*, "When the Imperialists directed their counter-revolutionary attack against the Hungarian People's Republic, they found themselves not only facing the

Hungarian people but confronted by the whole Soviet camp...The Hungarian people then requested and promptly received aid from the Soviet Union..."

A short while later on October 30, 1957, NEPSZABADSAG spoke even more blatantly: "The outstanding Communists realized during the days following October 30, 1956, that the socialist system of government could be defended, and the restoration of the fascist regime could be prevented, only if every shot is returned with 100 shots, every series of machine gun attacks is returned with hand grenades and tank guns, and only by addressing ourselves to our faithful friends for armed help to crush the counter-revolutionaries." (Editor's note: Since the Hungarian Army had ceased to exist as a fighting force, this statement, in effect, calls for 100 shots from the Red Army for every shot fired by a Hungarian.)

A week later on November 7, 1957, NEPSZABADSAG made this interesting admission: "This friendly relationship (i.e., with the Soviet Union) has maintained the workers' power in Hungary since 1945, and it is our innermost belief that this will maintain it until the end of time...The best forces of the Hungarian people are careful that no attempt to weaken our friendship with the Soviet Union will ever succeed. This friendship means to us not only favorable commercial, cultural and other relations, based on equal rights, but much more: the very existence of the Hungarian workers' power, the existence of the Hungarian nation." (Editor's italics)

Paraphrased in the language of the civilized world NEPSZABADSAG's declaration was tantamount to an open admission that the Hungarian Communist regime could not survive without the presence and support of the Red Army. The decreased visibility of Soviet military control, and the token but highly publicized reduction in Soviet forces in Hungary, become meaningless in the face of these obvious attempts to

intimidate the Hungarian people by repeatedly threatening them with the Red Army.

Soviet military control over Hungary is assured by the following basic factors:

- 1) The presence of approximately 60,000 Soviet occupational troops.
- 2) The strictest Red Army and Communist control over the Hungarian Armed Forces.
- 3) The Red Army's direct control and operational command over the Hungarian frontier guard.
- 4) The existence of the so-called Workers' Militia, under Communist party control.

The evidence is conclusive that the entire military and paramilitary apparatus in Hungary is directed from the office of the Soviet High Command.

The Soviet Army

A year ago (August 1957) the strength of the Red Army in Hungary was estimated at 60,000 - 100,000 men. This, as we pointed out, meant in effect that each 100 Hungarians were guarded by a Russian soldier or an MVD man - a scale of control that very nearly approaches the customary proportion of prison guards to prison inmates. Over the past year, the number of Soviet troops has been somewhat reduced. In part this may be explained by the re-creation of a quiescent apparatus of terror and by the desire to impress Hungarian and world opinion. But basically it may be attributed to the fact that the Soviet forces remaining in Hungary are more mobile and heavily equipped and that their effectiveness as an army of occupation has not been diminished.

The reported withdrawal earlier this year of some 17,000 Soviet troops from Hungary was the occasion for a great fanfare by the Communists. At Szombathely, and at other points there were farewell ceremonies for the Soviet troops returning home. Hungarian dignitaries turned out to a man, and thousands of workers were marched to the ceremonies by the Workers' Militia. Speeches were made and photographs and films were taken. There have been reports from Hungary that in certain cases, after their much

publicized departure ceremonies, the Soviet troops merely embarked on trains and moved off to another Soviet military encampment near the Hungarian frontier. Whether or not these rumors are true, they are indicative of the general disbelief in Hungary that there has been any effective reduction of the Soviet forces in that country.

The Hungarian people and Hungarian observers abroad, like General Bela Kiraly, are inclined to believe that Soviet troops in their country still number about 100,000. This estimate is almost certainly on the high side and is probably conditioned by an understandable mistrust of Soviet statements. Expert Western opinion accepts the validity of some of the withdrawals and places the number of Soviet troops now in Hungary at approximately 60,000. On the other hand, there is general agreement that the withdrawals have in no way affected Soviet military control of the country. At the time of the withdrawals, for example, the BONNER RUNDSCHAU had this to say:

"In the opinion of Western military experts, such withdrawal is a mere trick. The Soviet Union may well reduce its forces, however, having meanwhile built up or modernized over 12 air bases, such as Tokol, Papa, Tassar, Szelesek and Debrecen."

The pattern of disposition of Soviet troops in Hungary makes no sense at all if one accepts the Soviet claim that its troops are there to protect the frontiers of Communism against the "aggressive Western Imperialist powers". If this were really the case, the major troop concentration would be in the West with a series of reserve concentrations of troops and material disposed in depth. Actually the general disposition of Soviet troops over the territory of Hungary and their concentration near key factory and communication centers indicates conclusively that they are in Hungary primarily as an army of occupation. On this central point, there is complete agreement between all qualified observers.

The Soviet troops stationed in Hungary at the time of the October 1956 uprising had made friends among the Hungarian people, and, not very surprisingly, they showed little enthusiasm for shooting Hungarian civilians. There were many reports, in fact, of Red Army soldiers deserting to the side of the revolution or turning

their weapons over to the revolutionaries. So alarmed was the Red Army command by the scale of the demoralization that it withdrew its occupation troops and brought in fresh troops to destroy the revolution.

The Red Army command, with the events of October 1956 still fresh in its memory, has made every effort to isolate the Soviet soldiers from the Hungarian populace. In this effort, they have been abetted by the understandable hostility of the Hungarian people for the uniform of the Red Army. It is reported that the families of Soviet officers live in constant fear of the local population and that they have no contacts at all with Hungarians. In some towns they venture into the stores only in daylight or when they are in groups.

In the town of Janoshalma, it is reported, the Soviet colony for weeks on end was so terrified that they did not dare to spend the night in their houses and flats. At nightfall trucks would arrive and transport the wives and children of the Soviet officers to the Soviet barracks. In the morning, they would return to their flats. This terror was not without reason. During the revolution the people of the Janoshalma area took over large quantities of weapons and ammunition from the disintegrating Hungarian Army. Despite the death penalty for the unauthorized possession of weapons, less than 30% of the weapons believed to be in the possession of the people of Janoshalma had been turned in. Shots can often be heard at night in the vicinity of the Soviet colony in Janoshalma. . . Needless to say, the townspeople have indicated no unhappiness over the discomfiture of the Soviet families.

For a long time the Red Army had striven to make itself less visible to the Hungarian people and to foster the impression that the country was being run by native Hungarians. In late June and early July, however, immediately after the execution of Premier Nagy and his colleagues, there were persistent reports of Soviet troop concentrations along the Budapest-Vienna highway. Travelers counted about twenty Soviet military summer encampments along the road. Armored cars and other military vehicles were clearly visible, indicating that the troops belonged to armored and motorized infantry formations. While summer maneuvers are customary for the Red Army's divisions in

satellite countries, the local population understandably felt that this special disposition of Soviet troops was not unrelated to the execution of the Hungarian leaders, the current wave of terror, and the tense international situation.

The Hungarian Army

In our report of last year, we pointed out that Soviet policy on the Hungarian Armed Forces had gone through two distinct phases: (a) a phase of deliberate atomization of the army, involving the destruction of the larger part of the officer corps (November 4, 1956, to March 1, 1957), and (b) a phase of cautious and selective reconstitution.

The army was deprived of its artillery, tanks and heavy equipment, the air force was grounded, and officers were required to sign a statement swearing fealty to Kadar and endorsing Soviet intervention. A majority of the officer corps, loyal to their own people, left the army rather than sign this statement. Those who remained have been screened and re-screened by special Control Commissions, and these screenings have resulted in many arrests and courts-martial.

The repeated purgings of the ranks of the officer corps speak eloquently of the chronic uncertainty of the Hungarian regime and its Soviet masters. The recent and largest of all the purgings extended from January of this year through mid-July. Every remaining officer was subjected to the screening whether he was on active duty or reserve.

The Control Commission was primarily interested not in the officer's general qualifications but in his behaviour during and after the revolution. Officers were required to account for their activities almost on an hour-by-hour basis. It is reported that as a result of this massive screening some 800 officers on the active list and several thousand on the reserve list were reduced to the ranks. Those who were dismissed were replaced for the most part with newly appointed officers selected from the ranks of the Workers Militia (a party organization) and given accelerated courses of training.

The Minister of Defense of the reorganized Hungarian Army is Lieutenant General Gena Revesz, who was appointed on February 28, 1957. General Revesz is an old-time Bolshevik who

fled to the Soviet Union after the suppression of the Communist coup in 1919, became a Soviet citizen, served as a Communist agent in clandestine activities in Hungary and other countries, and during the war fought in the Red Army as a colonel in the corps of engineers. He is reputedly one of the most capable and one of the most ruthless of the "Muscovite" Hungarians who went back to their country when the war was over on orders from the Kremlin.

The strength of the reorganized Hungarian Army is reliably placed at about 120,000 men. (This compares with the total of 250,000 men before the revolution.) It includes an artillery division in Cegléd, an armored division in the Gyongyos-Natvan area, a motorized mechanical division in Esztergom and at least nine rifle and motorized rifle divisions.

The air force was not allowed to fly until late 1957, when, after a rigid screening of air crew personnel, training and operational flights were resumed. Earlier this year it was reported that two fighter divisions and a mixed air division had again become operational. However, the Russians had not yet returned to the Hungarian Air Force the light bombers and fighter bombers which were confiscated after the revolution.

There has been much talk of drastic reductions in the military budget. On June 6, 1957, Reuters reported that the Hungarian Parliament had halved the military budget of the previous year. This is in line with the persistent efforts of the Soviets to persuade the world that there has been a voluntary process of demilitarization in their own and in the satellite countries. This report, however, can only be evaluated against the background of the political situation in Hungary and the pre-revolutionary status of the armed forces.

First of all, it must be remembered that prior to the revolution the Hungarian Government maintained an army of 250,000 men, in contravention of the terms of the treaty of peace which allowed only 65,000 men, and a force of 100 military planes as against 90 allowed by the treaty. The present force of 120,000 men is almost double that allowed by the treaty. Secondly, the Soviets have, as we pointed out, cut back drastically on the Hungarian air force—which automatically accounts for a large part of the saving. In the third place, there is every

reason to believe that the reduction in military budget was motivated not so much by a desire for demilitarization and economy as by the Soviet fear that a larger army might be too broadly based and, therefore, less subject to control.

The OLIEP-Command, which originally embraced the air force, anti-aircraft divisions and parachute troops, is again functioning. Observers report seeing no Hungarian paratroops in the reorganized army. They also report that at OLIEP-Command there are more Soviet officers to be seen than Hungarians.

The Red Army exercises complete control over the reorganized Hungarian Army through (1) Soviet "advisers" attached to all military units down to battalion command level, (2) going Communist, or "politruks," and (3) the Communist Party cells within the Army.

During the so-called Stalinist period, the politruks were considered co-commanders of their units; the commander could not issue any order without the co-signature of the politruk. In the months preceding the Hungarian uprising, the politruks were subordinated to the military commanders. This reform is theoretically still in force. In practice, however, two changes have taken place which make Communist Party control over the armed forces more rigid and more complete than at any previous time.

In the first place, all personnel problems—promotions, decorations, leaves, discharges—have been made the sole responsibility of the politruks. The significance of this is that the everyday life and the future careers of soldiers and officers alike are completely dependent on the mercy of their political officers.

Party control, in the second place, has been further strengthened by giving the Party secretary in military units enhanced authority. Whereas in the pre-revolutionary period, the politruks were superior to the Party secretary in their units, according to reports this situation has now been reversed.

Above the Party secretary and the politruk there stands the figure of the Soviet military "adviser." Although normally he has no command function, there is not a soldier or civilian in the whole of Hungary who is not convinced

that these are the real commanders of the Hungarian Armed Forces.

The Frontier Guards

After overcoming the resistance of the Hungarian people and installing the puppet Kadar government in Budapest, the Red Army sent its own Frontier Guard troops to the western frontier area. These troops remained there for almost an entire year, while the officer corps of the Hungarian Frontier Guard was being screened and purged. Hundreds of officers whose loyalty was questioned were dismissed. By mid-1957 the process of screening the Frontier Guard apparently had been completed to the satisfaction of the Communist regime, and Hungarian units took over from the Soviet Frontier Guard units the task of policing.

Simultaneously with the assignment of Hungarian guards to the frontier zones, the Soviet authorities assumed direct command of the reorganized Frontier Guard.

The Hungarian Commander-in-Chief of the Frontier Guards, who is subordinated to the Minister of Interior, has no operational authority—his headquarters function simply as an administrative and supply office. The district command and the independent Frontier Guard command at Győr, are directly subordinate to the Soviet divisional commanders stationed in their districts. To prevent any independent communication between Hungarian members of the Frontier Guard administration, the radio and telephone links between the headquarters of the Frontier Guard, the district commanders and the battalion commanders, are all in Russian hands.

The Workers Militia

The Workers Militia was established after the suppression of the revolution as an instrument of terror and control. Units are stationed in all larger factories, industrial plants and mines. Their number at present is estimated at about 25,000. They are armed with tommy guns but have no heavy armament.

The leaders of the Workers Militia are trusted Communists or Party functionaries. The rank and file also contains some Communist stalwarts

but the majority of them are recruited workers who joined the Militia only because of the threat of dismissal.

Because it is officered by trusted Communists, the Workers Militia has been an effective instrument of terror which has earned for itself the hatred of the entire Hungarian people. But the regime knows that the rank and file is far from trustworthy and that, in a crisis, the combat value of the Workers Militia would be negligible.

To emphasize its organic relationship to the Communist Party, the Workers Militia units are named after deceased Communist leaders and AVH (secret police) men. For example, the Workers Militia unit at Szentgotthard, near the Austrian frontier, is named after Lajos Varga, an AVH man who was killed during the siege of the Budapest radio station. The district Workers Militia of Mór is named after another AVH man, Ferenc Bata, who died in the Budapest Party headquarters.

The Red Army commanders and their Hungarian puppets have done their utmost to create a satellite Hungarian army which is ostensibly free from Soviet control but which, in fact, take its orders from the Kremlin and serves its enterprises. How far short they have fallen of this goal was dramatically demonstrated last April when Khrushchev arrived at the Budapest airport. He was greeted by an honor guard in full dress. This honor guard consisted not of men of the Hungarian Army or even of the Workers Militia, but of the personnel of a secret police unit. Apparently the Hungarian Communist leaders and their Soviet "advisers" considered it unsafe to place any less reliable unit in proximity to Khrushchev.

In itself, this is a striking commentary on the attitude of the Hungarian people toward their regime and on the military value to the Soviets of the reconstituted Hungarian Army.

The Legal Status of the Soviet Armed Forces in Hungary

The presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, it is to be noted, has no justification under international law or internationally recognized covenants.

Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary in the initial post-war period under the terms of the Armistice Agreement with Hungary, signed at Moscow on January 20, 1945. In the Treaty of Peace between the Allied powers and Hungary, which became effective September 15, 1947, Soviet troops were authorized to remain in Hungary only so long as it was necessary to maintain communications with Soviet occupation forces in Austria. Article 22 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary provided:

"Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, all Allied forces shall, within a period of 90 days, be withdrawn from Hungary, subject to the right of the Soviet Union to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria."

The authorization provided for in this paragraph obviously ceased to be effective when the Soviet Armed Forces evacuated Austria in consequence of the Four-Power Agreement signed May 15, 1955. (One can only speculate on the failure of the Western powers to invite the Soviet Union to evacuate Hungary after the conclusion of the treaty with Austria.)

After the reoccupation of Hungary by Soviet forces on November 4, the world was told that the Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, which had been signed on May 14, 1955. There is, however, no clause in this treaty which expressly justifies the stationing of troops on the territory of one signatory by another signatory. Articles 4 and 5 of the Warsaw Treaty speak in these general terms:

Article 4

"In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty... each of the Parties to the Treaty, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems

necessary, including armed forces..."

Article 5

"The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression."

The Soviets have argued that their right to station troops on Hungarian soil may be deduced from Article 5 — although they cannot argue that Article 5 specifically authorizes such stationing.¹ That the Soviet legal experts were themselves unconvinced by this argument may be concluded from the fact that they considered it advisable to enter into a special "agreement" with the Kadar government on May 27, 1957, relative to "the legal status of Soviet forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic". The Preamble to this "agreement," after referring to the remilitarization of West Germany and to NATO, continues in these terms:

"...taking note of the fact that in these conditions the temporary stationing of Soviet forces on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic is expedient for the purpose of ensuring joint defence against the possibility of aggression and that it accords with international agreements..."

Apart from the fact that the "status of forces" agreement constitutes an implicit admission of the prior lack of legal status of the Soviet forces in Hungary, the agreement *per se* cannot be considered valid under international law, since it involves an understanding not between independent sovereign states, but, in effect, between an occupying power and the puppet regime it has installed in the country it occupies.²

¹ American Journal of International Law Supplement, 1948, pp. 225-231.

² Quincy Wright, "Intervention, 1956", American Journal of International Law, 1957, p. 273.

³ V.A. Vall, "Servitudes of International Law, A Study of Rights in Foreign Territory," London, 1958, p. 217.

CHAPTER II

THE MURDER OF IMRE NAGY AND PAL MALETER

June 16, 1958 - Excerpt from Communiqué issued by the Ministry of Justice and broadcast by Budapest Radio, Rome Service:

"The Chief Prosecutor, in his indictment, charged Imre Nagy and his partners in crime - Ferenc Donath, Miklós Gimes, Zoltan Tildy, Pal Maleter, Sandor Kopaszi, Jozsef Sallagyi, Ferenc Janosi, Miklós Vasarhelyi - with the crime of organizing to overthrow the Hungarian democratic order of state. In addition Imre Nagy was charged with the crime of high treason. . .

"Upon weighing the gravity of these crimes, the aggravating and extenuating circumstances, the People's Court Council of the Supreme Court, on the basis of the trial proceedings, sentenced the defendants as follows: Imre Nagy to death, Ferenc Donath to 12 years in prison, Miklós Gimes to death, Zoltan Tildy to 6 years in prison, Pal Maleter to death, Sandor Kopaszi to life imprisonment, Dr. Jozsef Sallagyi to death, Ferenc Janosi to 8 years in prison, Miklós Vasarhelyi to 5 years in prison."

There has been no more dramatic evidence of the continuing nature of Soviet intervention in Hungary than the trial and execution of Premier Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter. Both men had been apprehended on Hungarian soil by representatives of the Soviet security apparatus: this is firmly established in the evidence amassed by the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary. There are also many facts which point to the conclusion that the trial itself took place on the orders of the Kremlin. And even according to the official accounts of the trial, the court at many points completely ignored the Hungarian Communist constitution and legal code, and based itself instead on procedures which enjoy acceptance in the Soviet Union.

Before proceeding to a consideration of the trial itself, it is essential to consider the manner in which Premier Nagy and General Maleter were arrested as well as the record of correspondence and statements made subsequent to their arrest.

The Arrests

It will be recalled that Imre Nagy, the last legal Premier of Hungary, took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy on November 4, 1956, a few hours after the Soviet forces re-entered Budapest. The Yugoslav Government, acting in consultation with Mr. Nagy and his group, proposed

to Mr. Kadar that (a) the persons in question be permitted to proceed freely to Yugoslavia where they would be granted asylum, or (b) that they be allowed to return freely to their homes. The Kadar government adamantly refused to consider proposal "a" and suggested instead that Premier Nagy and his group should seek refuge in Romania. According to the evidence submitted to the U.N. Special Committee, this proposal was categorically rejected by Premier Nagy. The Yugoslav government stood by the position that it would agree to the departure of the group from the premises of its embassy only upon the receipt of a written guarantee by Mr. Kadar, as President of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, that Premier Nagy and his party would be granted safe conduct to proceed freely to their respective homes.

On November 21, Mr. Kadar addressed the following statement to the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia:

"In the interest of terminating the matter, the Hungarian Government, agreeing to the proposals contained on page 2, section 8, of the letter of 18 November 1956 addressed to me by the Yugoslav Government, hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note

that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes."

The next morning Premier Nagy and his associates boarded the bus provided by Ferenc Muennich, then Minister of the Armed Forces and Public Security Affairs in the newly-formed puppet government. As they waited to be taken to their homes, Soviet soldiers entered the bus and drove it to Soviet Military Headquarters. Here, two Yugoslav Embassy officials, who had insisted on going along to see that the refugees were taken to their destinations, were forced to leave. The bus then drove away to, as the U.N. report put it, "an unknown destination." The following day the Soviet Hungarian Government announced that Nagy and his companions had gone "voluntarily" to Romania.

The Yugoslav Government responded to this act of treachery with an angry statement. It charged that the abduction of Premier Nagy and his colleagues was "a flagrant breach of the agreement reached. The very fact that it was committed immediately after the agreement was concluded sheds a peculiar light on the breach." The note rejected as false the statement issued by the Kadar government that Nagy and his party had left voluntarily for Romania — because they had made it abundantly clear to the Yugoslav Ambassador that they would refuse to go there.

From November 22, 1956 until June 16, 1958 nothing was known of the fate of Premier Nagy and his colleagues, though repeated inquiries were made by the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary.

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of Lieutenant General Pal Maleter, Minister of Defense in the Nagy government, were equally shocking to the civilized world. Concerning this matter, the U.N. Special Committee was able to obtain detailed evidence. On the night of November 3, General Maleter and several other representatives of the Nagy government were negotiating with representatives of the Soviet forces for the withdrawal of the Red Army from Hungary. At the request of the Red Army, the negotiations took place at the Soviet Military Command Headquarters at Tokol on Csepel Island. The following passage from the report of the

U.N. Special Committee eloquently describes the manner in which the arrest was perpetrated:

"... Discussion proceeded till about midnight on minor points, such as the ceremony of withdrawal and the replacement of Soviet memorials. Regular reports were sent to Mr. Nagy regarding the progress of these talks. Towards midnight, telephone contact with the Hungarian delegation at Tokol was broken off. Reconnaissance parties sent towards Tokol by General Kiraly also failed to return. The Committee has been informed that the discussions between the Soviet military delegation and the Hungarian military delegation at Tokol were in fact interrupted by the entry of a personage 'who bore no insignia of rank' — General Serov, Chief of the Soviet security police. Accompanied by Soviet officers, he announced that he was arresting the Hungarian delegation. The head of the Soviet delegation, General Malinin, astonished by the interruption, made a gesture of indignation. General Serov thereupon whispered to him; as a result, General Malinin shrugged his shoulders and ordered the Soviet delegation to leave the room. The Hungarian delegation was then arrested. In vain, therefore, did Mr. Nagy, at 5:56 A.M., broadcast an appeal to Generals Maleter and Istvan Kovacs and other members of the mission to return to their posts. . ."

Reviewing the known facts about the arrests of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter and their associates, the International Commission of Jurists stated:

"The conclusion is inevitable that the arrest. . . was a breach of international law as well as of Hungarian internal law. From the point of view of international law, there was firstly a clear breach of a solemn undertaking on the part of the Hungarian Government to the Yugoslav Government in respect of the safe-conduct promised to Imre Nagy and his associates in the Yugoslav Embassy. Secondly, with regard to Pal Maleter and other members of the Hungarian Military Delegation there was a flagrant disregard of the personal inviolability of representatives of one government in negotiations with the representatives of another government. Thirdly, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, there was in relation to Imre Nagy as well as Pal Maleter no justification for such

a violation of the State sovereignty of Hungary as is involved in the arrest and removal outside Hungarian jurisdiction of Hungarian citizens.

"Even when the circumstances of the arrests are considered from the angle of internal Hungarian law, it is clear that such arrests are *ab initio* unlawful. They were effected neither in flagrant delicto or by any person having power to effect arrest under Hungarian law. Para. 98 of Law III of 1951 provides that 'until the preferment of an indictment, arrest can only be made by the Police or the Public Prosecutor and thereafter by the Court.'"

International Commission of Jurists, Legal Aspects of the Arrest, Trial and Execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maléter and Associates, p. 6

So great was the popularity of Nagy that for almost five months after his abduction people like Janos Kadar (the first Premier installed by the Red Army), Ferenc Mészáros (the present Premier) and Gyula Kallai (the Minister of Culture) considered it politic not to assail his person and, indeed, to emphasize that they had themselves been members of the Nagy Government. They also repeated their assurances that Nagy would not be brought to trial.

The Silence Before the Crime - November 22, 1956 - June 16, 1958

On November 11 1956 Mr. Kadar declared to a delegation of workers:

"I, who have myself been a member of Nagy's government, hereby state that, according to the best of my knowledge, neither Imre Nagy nor his political group has willingly supported the counter-revolution."

On November 27, five days after the abduction, Kadar gave another assurance - one, moreover, which could not have been motivated by a desire to lure Nagy and his colleagues out of the sanctuary of the Yugoslav Embassy:

"We have promised not to start any punitive proceedings against Imre Nagy, and we shall keep our word."

(NÉPSZABADSÁG, November 28, 1956)

It was during the course of a visit to the Kremlin in March 1957, that Premier Kadar for the first time assailed Nagy and accused him of preparing the destruction of the Party in alliance with the dark forces of reaction. This attack was the first note in the crescendo of vilification that preceded the announcement of the execution.

The many statements issued by the present Hungarian regime do not even attempt to explain how Imre Nagy, who was supposed to be enjoying political asylum in Romania, suddenly turned up in the custody of the Hungarian Communist Government. Whatever their motivation may have been, the Communists had consistently maintained the pretense that the Nagy group were in Romania not as prisoners but as refugees. In the course of the debate in the General Assembly on December 3, 1956, the Romanian Foreign Minister, Mr. Protopopescu, stated that the Romanian Government on being approached by the Government of Hungary with reference to Mr. Nagy, "gave the assurance that the stay of the group in Romania would be marked by all the rules of hospitality and that all necessary steps would be taken to guarantee the personal safety of Mr. Nagy and his friends. Similarly, the Romanian Government gave the assurance that it would observe the international rules relating to political asylum."

The U.N. Special Committee and the civilized world in general did not put much faith in the Communist announcement that Nagy and his colleagues had requested asylum in Romania. On March 14, 1957, the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary requested the Romanian Government to set up a meeting with Imre Nagy. This request, like all others for information about Nagy, was rejected.

Prior to the news of the execution there is no record of any statement suggesting that the political asylum purportedly granted to Nagy and his colleagues by the Romanian Government, had been terminated. The mysterious transfer of Nagy and his fellow refugees to the custody of the Mészáros government throws a meaningful light on Communist legal procedures and on the relations existing between the satellite governments and the Kremlin. The Romanian Government in the statement quoted above gave its assurance that "it would observe the international rules relating to political asylum."

Even in relations between non-democratic governments, there is no precedent in modern times for the arbitrary abrogation of this right once it has been granted. In this instance, the abrogation — and there is no other way of explaining the transfer — involved a publicly announced agreement between the country of origin of the political refugees in question and the country of asylum. It would be interesting to learn on what "international rule relating to political asylum" (c.f. the statement of the Romanian Minister above) this action was based.

Under recognized international procedure, a person enjoying the protection of one government cannot be removed to the custody of his own government without a request for extradition and a formal extradition hearing — any other procedure is unthinkable in relations between sovereign nations. In the hundreds of pages of statements and documentation issued by the Communist authorities there is no mention at any point of a formal request for extradition or of a hearing on Romanian soil in which Nagy and his colleagues were given the opportunity to defend themselves against this request. The mysterious transfer of Nagy and his colleagues from Romanian to Hungarian custody demonstrates conclusively that the relations existing between the satellite countries and the Kremlin are not those that traditionally obtain between independent and sovereign powers. On the basis of the evidence, there is every reason for believing that the Kremlin was immediately responsible — as it was immediately responsible for their arrest — and that it gave the requisite orders to its Romanian and Hungarian vassals.

The Trials

The shock with which the world reacted to the news of the murder of Nagy and Maleter has not been mitigated by the official Communist revelation of the atmosphere of secrecy, and transparent illegality in which the trials were conducted. The United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary met "as a matter of urgency" and on June 21 issued a communique noting that the statement on the trials issued by the Hungarian Government was "imprecise and vague" and appealing to "interested governments" possessing further information to make this available to the committee. The communique also said:

"The execution of Imre Nagy and his companions demonstrates that the oppression of

the Hungarian people has not abated and that the reign of terror which began when Russian forces moved into Hungary early in November 1956, continues. . . The Committee deplores this tragic event in which these men, symbols of the hope of a nation for freedom from foreign domination, were secretly sent to death in circumstances which call for full exposure, in violation of solemn undertakings that their persons would not be harmed, and in defiance of the judgement and opinion of the United Nations. It expresses its grave concern lest the end of this repression and killing may not yet be in sight."

The statement of the U.N. Special Committee repeatedly emphasized that the Nagy-Maleter trial was not an isolated act but was, rather, a symptom of the general reign of terror organized and imposed by the Red Army after its re-subjugation of Hungary. Many thousands of the victims are nameless and many thousands more exist only as names. About those who were sentenced together with Nagy and Maleter, something at least is known — although the details of their arrests remain obscure.

The other two who were executed — Miklos Gimes and Jozsef Szilagyi — were journalists; both were Jews, and Gimes was a close adviser of Nagy. Perhaps the best known of the group, at least outside Hungary, is Zoltan Tildy, an ordained minister of the Hungarian Reformed Evangelical Church and Premier Minister in 1945, when his party, the Independent Smallholders, won a majority in the only completely free elections held in Hungary after World War II. He became the Republic's first President in 1946 and was one of the first non-Communists to be included by Nagy in his cabinet. His relatively light sentence may be due to the universal respect which is felt by Hungarians for this old man. Sandor Kopacsi, who, like Maleter, was charged with "mutiny" as well as the other crimes, was head of the Budapest police and played an important role during the revolution when the police force almost to a man sided with the Freedom Fighters. Both he and Ferenc Donath, a journalist, were members of the so-called Preparatory Committee which was formed during the revolution to reorganize the Hungarian Communist Party. Varsarhelyi was another journalist. Ferenc Janosi, Nagy's son-in-law, was an ordained minister in the Reformed Evangelical Church and had held a number of government posts.

The U.N. Committee's appeal to the governments of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries for information on the trial was ignored as completely, and as rudely, as were its previous requests for information. Rather than submit the facts to international scrutiny, the Soviet Hungarian Government, through the information office of the Council of Ministers, issued a special (fifth) volume of its "White Book" on the "Counter-Revolutionary Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Associates." The primary purpose of this document was to bestow a facade of legality on the conduct of the trial. However, it did make available some previously unknown facts. A close study of the evidence presented in the "White Book," the original communiques announcing the trials and executions, the Chief Prosecutor's indictment and other material confirms overwhelmingly that neither Premier Nagy nor General Maléter were tried according to the provisions of Hungarian Communist law — let alone the more liberal legal standards of the civilized world — and that their execution was, in effect, political murder concealed behind a flimsy juridical camouflage.

First of all, there is the matter of the jurisdiction of the court. According to the Hungarian Constitution (Article 27, Paragraph 2), and to Special Law 11, Article No. 14, the Prime Minister and members of his government are only responsible to and can only be tried by the National Assembly. "Judgment shall be rendered in open proceedings," says Section 24, "by a panel of judges chosen by secret ballot from the members of the National Assembly." Unlike the purposeful vagueness of portions of the Communist legal code, the language here is clear and unmistakable: under the laws which obtain in Hungary today, the National Assembly was the only court which had jurisdiction over Nagy, Maléter and Zoltan Tildy, all of whom were members of the legal government. Nagy and Tildy were tried, however, by the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court; while Maléter was tried by the Supreme Military Court.

The People's Chamber of the Supreme Court, established by virtue of Decree No. 25 of April 6, 1957, consists of one professional and four "People's judges". The "People's judges", whose majority vote prevails, are appointed by the Presidential Council of the People's Republic, and they are, it may safely be assumed, hardened Communists who are subject to Party discipline.

Under these circumstances, a verdict other than that demanded by the prosecution is inconceivable.

The trial violated the provisions of the Hungarian Constitution and legal code in other ways. The most flagrant — and most revealing — violation was that the trial was held in secrecy. Significantly enough, this procedure is permitted by Soviet Russian law — but not by Hungarian law. The Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure (Law III of 1951 as amended by Law V of 1954 and Edict VIII of 1957) expressly provides that *all trials except those involving military security, shall be open. Even the most important show trials conducted by the Rakosi regime those of Leslie Rugh and Cardinal Mindszenty were held in public.*

The charges against Nagy were described in vague and general terms in the communique of the Ministry of Justice issued on June 17:

"The People's Chamber of the Supreme Court stated, on the ground of the testimony of the accused and of 29 witnesses, and having investigated the wide range of documentary evidence, that Imre Nagy and his most intimate accomplices — Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donath, Miklós Gimes, and József Szilágyi — established in December, 1955, a secret anti-State organization with the aim of seizing power by force and overthrowing the Hungarian People's Republic.

"It was established during the trial that Imre Nagy and his accomplices had played a leading role in the preparation and unleashing of the counter-revolutionary uprising of October, 1956. Zoltan Tildy and Pál Maléter became acquainted with the identical aims of Imre Nagy and his companions in October, 1956, agreed with them and actively joined the counter-revolutionary revolt. The conspirators...in association with the foreign imperialists, made a putch, designed to overthrow the Republic...

"The group of conspirators...worked out in detail the political platform of the movement against the people's democracy, intermediate tasks, methods, and future objectives. These secret documents, written largely by Imre Nagy himself, were submitted by the Public Prosecutor to the Court."

To deal with all the inaccuracies, forgeries and falsifications contained in the White Book issued by the Communist regime would require a tome of at least equal size. Within the scope of so brief an analysis we shall have to confine ourselves to a sampling of the indictment and the evidence.

The indictment of Imre Nagy and the judgment brought against him preassumed that the uprising of October-November 1956, was a "counter-revolution". But as the report of the U.N. Special Committee stated after an exhaustive investigation, "What took place in Hungary in October-November, 1956, was a spontaneous national uprising." Although the Kremlin may dispute this analysis as biased, they have yet to comment on the following statement which Janos Kadar, their first quisling Premier, made on November 1, 1956, three days before the Red Army attack:

"Hungarian workers, peasants and intellectuals...In a glorious uprising our people have shaken off the Rakosi regime. They have achieved freedom for the people and independence for the country without which there can be no socialism. We can safely say that ...those who prepared this uprising were recruited from our ranks. Communist writers, journalists, university students, the youth of the Petofi Circle, thousands and thousands of workers and peasants and veteran fighters who were imprisoned on false charges fought in the front lines against Rakosi's despotism and political hooliganism. We are proud that you have stood your ground honestly in the armed uprising...You were permeated by true patriotism and loyalty to socialism..."

There is a second false preassumption on which the indictment was based, without supporting evidence of any kind: that Nagy and his colleagues acted on behalf of and in concert with certain foreign powers. The record of history will show that the foreign governments in question were even more surprised than the Russians by the Hungarian revolution; that they were torn between admiration for the heroism of the Hungarian people and the conviction that, in the given situation, they could take no effective measures to assist them; and that they limited their aid to a few shipments of medical supplies and food.

The specific acts with which Nagy was charged within the framework of these false assumptions

were of two quite different kinds. The first consisted of acts which, if proved, might indeed have constituted criminal offenses from the standpoint of Hungarian Communist law; but no evidence was shown that they were committed. The other kind consisted of acts which, although they were in fact committed, were not contrary to any provisions of the Communist criminal code.

In the first category were the charges that Nagy had played a leading role in "establishing and anti-state organization," in "preparing and unleashing the counter-revolutionary uprising," in "associating with foreign imperialists." But no names, dates, or other relevant facts were presented to support these charges.

Under the second category, Nagy was accused of, and sentenced for, "treason" by — as the White Book tersely and darkly puts it, "writing essays." These "essays" — political discussions such as every Communist leader produces on occasion — were written in 1955 and 1956 after Nagy's expulsion from the Hungarian Communist Party under Article 55 of the Hungarian Constitution which guarantees freedom of speech, press and assembly. Furthermore, Nagy openly circulated all these essays among his former colleagues in the Party leadership and in the government in order to explain his attitudes. The Party, with Kadar as a leading member, had studied these documents, considered and discussed their ideas; and on October 13, ten days before the uprising, had concluded that Nagy was worthy of being reinstated as a member.

The indictment also charged that Imre Nagy, "relying on counter-revolutionary forces, gained the post of Premier by force and fraud." This charge contradicts a massive body of direct evidence on the manner in which Imre Nagy became Premier. The fact is that he was recommended to the post by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, acceding to the wishes of the Hungarian people. Radio Kossuth made this announcement on May 24, 1956:

"The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party proposes to the Supreme Council of the People's Republic that Comrade Imre Nagy be elected President of the Council of Ministers..."

As late as May 10, 1957, Istvan Dobi, President of the Presidential Council of the People's Republic, said to the National Assembly:

"On October 24, 1956, the President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic elected Imre Nagy Prime Minister in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution" (NEPSZABADSAG, May 10, 1957)

One of the conspiratorial plans of which Nagy was accused was his advocacy of neutralism for Hungary; yet this proposal had previously been approved by Bulganin himself in his speech in Geneva on July 18, 1955. Nagy was also accused of wanting to revise the terms of the Warsaw Pact — though proposals for such revision had been publicly released by the Soviet Russian Government itself on October 30, 1956. Finally he was charged with calling for the democratization of the Hungarian regime — which, in the eyes of his prosecutors, appeared as evidence of his bad faith and his conspiratorial activities.

Let us examine in more detail the charge relating to the Warsaw Pact. This portion of the charge reads:

"Imre Nagy and his traitorous group — with a view to realizing their aims and paving the way for imperialist intervention — sought illegally and unilaterally to renounce the nation's definitive alliance, the Warsaw Pact. The culmination of this attempt was Imre Nagy's November 4, 1956, radio appeal calling upon the Western imperialists for armed intervention against Soviet troops, whose aid the worker-peasant government had solicited."

The mode of renouncing the Warsaw Pact, as the Hungarian Committee pointed out in the able analysis prepared by Dr. László Varga, head of its Justice Department, is not regulated by law. The Pact itself was signed by the Hungarian Government and no ratification was requested of the National Assembly. When a treaty does not define the mode of abrogation, as is the case of the Warsaw Pact, then it is proper to conclude that the same rules which governed its adoption also govern its abrogation. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, since it was adopted by executive action it was subject to abrogation by the same action.

There is, of course, not an iota of truth to the charge that Nagy called for armed intervention by the "Western imperialists." In his last address to the free world, Nagy spoke in these words:

"This is Imre Nagy, the President of the Council of Ministers. Today, at dawn, Soviet forces launched an attack on our capital with the evident aim of overthrowing the lawful democratic Hungarian Government. Our troops are fighting! The Government is at its post! This is my message to the people of Hungary and to world public opinion."
(Free Kosuth Radio, Budapest, November 4, 5:20 a.m.)

As for the charge against General Maléter that he had engaged in the crime of "military revolt," there is the hard unanswerable fact that he was installed in his post as Minister of Defense on the morning of November 3, 1956, by Istvan Dobi, President of the Republic, whose ideological trustworthiness has enabled him to retain his position under the Soviet occupation regime.

The world can only speculate on the reasons which moved the Kremlin to the act of murder, which compelled them to hold their trials in secrecy and to attempt a legal rationalization where even rationalization was impossible. The Soviet show trials of the past have, almost without exception, relied on self-flagellatory confessions by the accused — extracted by physical and psychological tortures which have been vividly described by some of those who have survived. These confessions have enabled them to maintain a pretense of proper legal procedure. If the experts of the Kremlin attempted to extract such confessions from Nagy and Maléter, they failed abysmally. According to the official admissions of the puppet regime, both men protested their innocence to the end. When they refused to confess, the Soviets apparently decided to go through the fraudulent formality of a secret trial before committing the act of murder.

In the history of Soviet terror, there is ample precedent for such ruthlessness. With public show trial or without it, with legal pretense or without it, the leaders of the uprising had to be murdered as a demonstration to all the captive peoples of the fate that will befall those who do not

obey their rulers. In any case it is obvious that the Kremlin was more interested in the results — the executions — as a lesson to the Hungarian people of the folly of their dream of freedom, than they were in the effect such trials would inevitably have on the outside world.

Referring to the trial of Nagy and his associates, NEPSZABADSAG on June 18th issued this warning against future revolutionary activities:

"These sentences constitute a warning to all those who dare attack our legal order. They serve as a warning example: those who attack the peaceful work of construction of the people will have to face the full rigour of the laws of the Hungarian People's Republic."

It may, however, turn out that these murders, like so many other acts of political terror, produce an effect which the murderers themselves did not foresee.

There is ample evidence that the Hungarian authorities were worried over the possible reaction to the execution. According to reports from Hungary, all border guards along Hungary's western frontier in the regions of Győr, Csorna and Szombathely were alerted on June 15th. The guards were given no reason for the alert, but when it lasted beyond the usual two days they began to speculate. Even after the executions had been announced, the guards were not officially notified, nor were the trials discussed at the regular political weekly lectures. For

the first two or three days after the news of the executions was broadcast, many of the guards did not believe it — perhaps because they did not want to believe it. Some of them suggested the flimsy explanation that the report had been faked by the Communists for the purpose of observing the people's reaction. It was only after they heard the news broadcast by the Western nations that it was generally credited.

It may be that, by their act, the despots in the Kremlin have converted Nagy and Maleter into symbols, endowed them with the role of heroes in the national legend and made them part of that unshatterable mystique from which true nationalism derives its strength.

* * *

When we consider that this was a trial without notice of arrest, without indictments, without names of witnesses, without announcements of the place or time of trial; where we are not told the names of the judges, prosecutors or defense counsels; where we cannot know what the accused said in their own defense; where international standards of justice and the law of the land were so flagrantly violated on so many points — it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that this was a case of common murder. The murderer was the Soviet Union, a member nation of the United Nations. The victims were the heads of government of another member nation of the U.N. This is properly a matter for grave consideration by an organization dedicated to the rule of law in international affairs.

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY AND THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION

The report of the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary testified in great detail on the direct employment of the Red Army as an apparatus of coercion and repression in the period immediately following the revolution. It also surveyed the evidence that the reconstituted internal security forces were set up under the aegis of the Soviet command and functioned under its control. It set forth the manner in which the Revolutionary Committees and Councils, the Workers' Councils, the Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intellectuals, the Writers' Union, and other opposition organizations were suppressed, and described the regime of summary jurisdiction which was introduced by decree laws.

"HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE?" carried the account of the Soviet terror in Hungary up to the end of August 1957. The year that has intervened since then has witnessed no appreciable change. The puppet regime apparently can maintain itself only by mass arrests, ruthless purges of the professions and by bullying threats and references to the availability of the Red Army.

"...We work with our right hand and hold the gun in our left hand," said Premier János Kádár to the miners at Tatabánya, "and we shall teach those people a lesson who have any objections. Whoever revolts against the regime will have to bear the consequences..." (Radio Budapest, September 1957).

Every sector of the population has been the target of special threats couched in similar terms. Minister of Public Information Gyula Kállai has threatened the writers. Minister of State György Marosán has threatened the students. Minister of Education Valeris Bánko has threatened the teachers. Mrs. József Nagy, Minister of Light Industry, has threatened the small traders. István Doby, Chairman of the Council of the Peasants, has threatened the independent peasants. István Kossa has threatened the complaining railway employees. All of

these threats have been given substance by the mass arrests and secret trials and ruthless jurisdiction, by the secret police and the slave labor camps, and the fear of deportation. But above all, the threats derive their strength from the presence of the Red Army.

The terror in Hungary has been characterized by alternate periods of relaxation and intensification. The Hungarians themselves refer to this phenomenon as the "accordion system." They are convinced that these alternations are in no way haphazard, but are part of a calculated psychological technique. Accounts of Soviet police methods abound in descriptions of the "accordion system," applied for the purpose of crushing the will to resist and extracting confessions. The Hungarians believe that they are presently being subjected to the same psychological conditioning on a national scale.

All the information indicates that in recent months there has been an intensification of the terror. It has become increasingly difficult, however, to keep an accurate count of the number of imprisoned, interned and executed. This is due (1) to a calculated rationing of news items dealing with arrests for counter-revolutionary activities and with verdicts against those arrested; (2) to the increasing number of trials conducted under conditions of total secrecy; (3) to the deliberate obfuscation of the political nature of certain arrests by combining the charges with alleged common law offenses. (JUSTICE IN HUNGARY TODAY, February 1958, published by the International Commission of Jurists.)

Competent estimates of the number of those imprisoned or in concentration camps in Hungary today range from 50,000 to 60,000. Estimates of the number of those executed since the revolution range from a low of 2100 to more than 2500. An additional 10,000 Hungarians have reportedly been the victims of internal deportation. Deportations to the Soviet Union are believed to exceed 12,000—although according to reports some deportees have returned.

The prisons and concentration camps are filled to overflowing. In Budapest's Mátyás

Street Prison it is reported that cells meant for two at present accommodate eight persons and that those meant for ten have 30 to 35 persons crowded into them. The living conditions in the concentration camps at Kistarcsa, Tokol and especially in the infamous camp at Recsk are on a par with those in the worst camps operated by the MVD and by the Gestapo in its time. The three concentration camps named above are the best known, but information from many sources indicates that there are at least four and probably six other large camps at present in operation in Communist Hungary. At Tatabanya there is a special camp for juveniles 10 to 16 years old. A few months ago, according to a report, a group of 40 of the juvenile inmates attempted a mass escape. Several were shot, and the majority were recaptured. With the help of the local populace, however, some 15 were reported to have made good their escape.

As in the Soviet Union, detentions are coupled with the system of slave labor. Slave labor is said to be extensively used in the coal mine at Edeleny. More than 400 prisoners are employed in the four shafts. Some 40 to 50 civilians work with and supervise the prisoners in each shift. The prisoner huts at Edeleny are surrounded by a double row of barbed wire, with watchtowers at the corners of the perimeter. Prisoners sentenced to less than three years of forced labor may write one letter each month if they produce in excess of 130% of the norm. Those who produce 160% or more are allowed to write two letters per month. Prisoners are chained for the most trivial offenses such as smuggling letters out of the camp.

Deportations to the U.S.S.R. are still rumored to be taking place, although not on the massive scale of the post-revolutionary period. According to one report, the secret police arrested two young technicians of the Bosch Electrical Factory at the end of April 1958. In mid-August, the parents of one of the boys received a postcard mailed from the Soviet Union.

Though the Kadar regime was at first inclined to deny that Hungarians were being deported to the Soviet Union, in the face of the incontrovertible evidence contained in the report of the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary and in other studies, certain admissions were finally made. For example, Reuters News Agency reported on February 20, 1958, that a number of railroad workers had been sentenced for the crime of

sabotaging deportations to Russia after the uprising.

Internal deportations continue at a substantial rate. It is estimated that during August alone nearly 300 families were deported from Budapest. From the standpoint of the regime, these deportations serve a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, they punish those who are considered untrustworthy. On the other hand, deportations make choice apartments available to the party faithful and serve to create concentrations of ideologically reliable people in strategic areas of Budapest.

The most subtle, and in many cases the most effective, instrument of terror is that of economic pressure. Under a decree law of January 1, 1958, only persons of unblemished political record may be appointed or promoted to important and/or confidential posts. The so-called "Rakosi System" has again been introduced for admission to universities. Candidates for admission and those for scholarships are carefully screened by the secret police for family background, general personal attitude and the personal attitude of their relatives and friends. Finally, in a country that is desperately short of housing, a proper political attitude can make the difference between having a modest private apartment of one's own or having to share living quarters with two or three other families.

Although the hated "AVO" has never openly been reconstituted, the secret police is as much of a fact today in Hungary as it was in the first days of the Rakosi era — and the Hungarian people still refer to it as the AVO. It is generally believed that the real director of the secret police is a Soviet NKVD officer.

Spurred on by the memory of the revolution, the AVO is striving to create a national network of informers or "controllers" through which they can keep tab on the activities of every individual Hungarian. A key position in this network is held by the concierges. Since the AVO apparently did not consider the old concierges reliable, they have reportedly replaced some 60% of them in Budapest. To hold their jobs, they must submit written weekly reports concerning all the inhabitants of their premises — their mode of living, their guests, what they talk about. Everyone is encouraged to act as informer — and threatened with

punishment if he refuses. "The gravest punishment," said MAGYARORSZAG (December 31, 1957) "should be given to those who fail to fulfill the obligation to denounce criminals."

No foreign critic has described the atmosphere of terror in Hungary with more eloquence than did NEPAKARAT, central organ of the Communist Trade Unions (December 19, 1957):

"Readers keep approaching our editors with complaints we cannot ignore. Mothers complain that for weeks they can find no trace of their children. Factory managers ask our help in finding out what happened to one or another of their employees. After long investigation, we have learned that the missing persons were in the Marko or Fo-ucca prisons where for days no one had so much as questioned them or revealed the cause of their detention. Lawyers come to us who for days have not been able to reach clients imprisoned for long periods, because at times, not even the authorities know where they may be."

The intensification of the internal terror has been accompanied by stepped-up precautions in the frontier area. A recent report in the respected organ of the Austrian Socialist Party, the ARBEITER ZEITUNG (August 15, 1954) describes the frontier in these words:

"At Austria's dead border with Hungary, the Iron Curtain has now fallen completely shut. Even Lake Neusiedel and the River Leitha have been bisected by a mined barbed wire fence. Austrian farmers who accidentally come a bit too close to the border while they work their fields are being shot at by Hungarian border patrols, and curious tourists suffer the same fate. Immense quiet rules the border land. But the silence is oppressive. . .

"The flow of refugees has almost run dry . . . so very few succeed nowadays. We only know of those who, face to face with liberty, were stopped by land mines and bullets; but we don't know of those others who are caught en route to the border, within the 25-mile forbidden zone, and who disappear behind prison walls. . . Yet a few always make it. The refugee's ability to invent ways and means of escape is inexhaustible. Some rock

into freedom on ladders, others — to wit two soldiers — recently staged a pursuit with the result that both the pursued and the pursuer managed to cross the border."

In the spring of 1954, the Hungarian border guards began replacing the old wooden watchtowers with higher and more modern ones reputedly modelled after Soviet prototypes. The new towers are mounted on four diamond-shaped concrete foundations which are sunk five feet into the earth. They are approximately 50 feet high with sentry boxes at the top. The sentry boxes, which are approximately 7 x 7 in size, are fabricated of sheet iron almost one-half inch thick. The towers are constructed of three prefabricated sections which are bolted together. (It is, of course, a common-places that prefabrication justifies itself only in quantity production.) The estimated weight of the new model watchtower is in excess of six tons and they are planned to last approximately 50 years.

As of mid-July, 11 new watchtowers had been completed in the area of Caorna District Command (among others in the Sopronköhida, Nagy-cenk, Denesmajor, Agfalva, and Sopronkövesd areas). Another nine are scheduled for completion in this area by the end of the year. Plans have been made for the construction of an additional 60 watchtowers along the 75 miles of frontier controlled by border guard headquarters in Caorna.

In recent months, too, the Hungarian regime has sharply restricted the issuance of passports for visits to Western European countries. Applicants for such passports are summoned to police headquarters where they are cross-examined for hours. While they are being questioned, their quarters are searched by special police details whose assignment is to ferret out any evidence of ideological unreliability or of intention to defect. If no incriminating evidence is found, a passport, valid for one year, may be granted — but only on the conditions (1) that the applicant sign a declaration pledging to return from the West within a period of 6 to 8 weeks, and (2) that a member of the applicant's immediate family remains in Hungary — obviously as a hostage.

The intensification of the terror in recent months is viewed with foreboding by party

members as well as by anti-Communists. The only ones who seem to be pleased about the situation are the so-called Stalinists or "Rakosi-ists". This is understandable because for them the terror represents not merely a vindication of the iron rule they have demanded but an instrument for strengthening their hold over the apparatus.

2. The Juridical Terror

The suppression of the Hungarian revolution was followed by an unprecedented reign of terror. To give this terror the pretense of legality, a series of decree laws were promulgated which, for their ruthlessness, are without parallel in modern jurisprudence.¹ Summary jurisdiction was established for a long list of crimes, including the unlawful possession of fire arms and ammunition, or the failure to report such possession by other persons to the authorities; "organization against the People's Republic or against the people's democratic order; willful damage of public service installations or of public institutions...or trespassing on the territory of such installations." The sentence prescribed for all of these crimes was death.

Because of the manifest unreliability of the professional judges, other decree laws established co-called "People's Chambers" within the County Courts, the Metropolitan Court of Budapest and the Supreme Court. The Peoples Chambers of the lower courts consisted of one professional judge and two lay assessors appointed by the regime; the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court consisted of one professional jurist and four lay assessors. It was specified that the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court could serve either as court of first instance or as court of review or appeal if the Chief Public Prosecutor or the President of the Supreme Council was dissatisfied with the verdict rendered by a lower court.

Prosecutors were authorized to bring defendants before summary courts without presenting any charge in advance and without setting any date of trial; charges were to be presented orally at the trial. Legal redress against the decisions of the summary courts was excluded. The duration of the trial was limited to three

times twenty-four hours. Unless there was a court recommendation of clemency, death sentences were ordered carried out within two hours of the pronouncement.

In addition, "public security detention" and "internal deportation" were made arbitrarily applicable to all those who, in the eyes of the police authorities, "were dangerous to the state and public security, or to Socialist co-existence, or for economic reasons, or who cause concern from the point of view of other important state interests."

Armed with these sweeping powers, the puppet authorities in Budapest have been able to establish a semblance—but only a semblance—of public order.

Prior to the trial of Premier Nagy and his associates there was evidence that the Budapest authorities were embarrassed by the worldwide revulsion to their reign of summary justice. The several reports on Hungarian "justice" which have been published by the International Commission of Jurists have had great international impact on the legal profession, even behind the Iron Curtain. The I.C.J. has stated, for example, that the communist delegates to an international conference of lawyers which met in Moscow in November 1957, were most embarrassed by the Commission's disclosures.

On November 3, 1957, with much fanfare, the communist authorities promulgated Decree Law No. 62 (See Annex No. 7) which ostensibly abolished summary jurisdiction. Almost certainly the real reason for this action was the desire to persuade the Hungarian public and world opinion that the era of harsh repression was at an end and that legality and leniency would henceforth be the rule in the administration of Hungarian justice. The preamble to this decree law says promisingly: "The successes attained in the last year in the re-establishment of law and order make it possible to abolish the summary jurisdiction which was introduced for a transitory period."

But the change was confined to paper. The U.N. Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, in its report of July 14, 1958, declared flatly,

"No real alleviations have been introduced by the Decree Laws of 15 June and 3 November 1957 as to the sentences to be imposed or the summary procedures to be followed."

(Special Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, July 14, 1958, p. 10)

This evaluation confirmed the one made by the International Commission of Jurists in its report of February 1958, which concluded that the purported abolition of summary jurisdiction "is misleading in the extreme." This report points out that the People's Chambers of the lower courts and of the Supreme Court still continue to function, that the procedure before these chambers is of a summary nature and continues "to violate human rights in failing to provide the minimum safeguards of justice in criminal trials which are recognized by civilized nations."

In support of this conclusion, the International Commission of Jurists notes that (1) there is still no requirement for a written accusation or for advance notification of the date of trial; (2) only the Prosecutor arranges the presence of witnesses; (3) the accused cannot be represented by counsel of his own choice but must select him from a list provided by the Ministry of Justice "if the security of the state should specially warrant it;" and (4) the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court may still act as a court of first instance and may sentence an accused who has been acquitted by a lower court or increase the sentence imposed on him by a lower court - even if the Prosecutor has not appealed for such increase in sentence.

On December 21, 1957, seven weeks after Decree Law No. 62 announced the abolition of summary jurisdiction, Supreme Public Prosecutor Giza Szenasi made this statement before the Hungarian National Assembly:

"The introduction of summary jurisdiction demonstrated the strength of the revolutionary Worker Peasant Government and that initial success made it possible to start the large-scale liquidation of the counter-revolution by legal action. Steps in that direction were the introduction of the accelerated criminal procedure and

the setting-up of People's Chambers of the Supreme Court and later, also of County Courts. People's Chambers have also helped to remove counter-revolutionaries from the Law Courts and the appointment of People's Judges has further strengthened the judiciary."

(NEPEZARADSAG, December 22, 1957)

Among the chief victims of this regime of judicial terror are the professional judges. Despite repeated pressures and open threats, the majority of the professional judges had no stomach for the barbarous legal system introduced by the decree laws of the puppet government. Though they knew that their livelihood and personal security were in the balance, their attitude has remained one of sympathy for the accused and defiance of the regime which has thus demeaned their profession.

The prosecutors too, have come in for attack. On November 10, 1957, Dr. Szenasi complained that Prosecutors had been too lenient. "They did not," he said, "always apply adequate firmness when dealing with violators of the law. Public Prosecutors must work in such a way that the offenders' punishment is always commensurate with the offense..."

(NEPEZARADSAG, November 10, 1957)

Early in 1958, Dr. Ferenc Nevezal, Minister of Justice, warned that both the lower and higher courts of justice were much too merciful to enemies of the regime. He stated that he would be obliged to consider all judges who passed mild sentences on counter-revolutionary elements accomplices of these elements and that they should not be surprised if they found themselves in the prisoner's dock.

Addressing the National Conference of Judges on February 21-23, 1958, Dr. Nevezal said again that far too much leniency had been displayed by the courts. He praised "the tough and consistent work of the People's Chambers passing sentences at second instance."

"Following the example set by the People's Chambers," said Dr. Nevezal, "the activities of the legal judges have gradually improved too."

"...The preservation of legality is one of the leading principles of the government and this principle can be preserved only through consistent and uncompromising justice. The judges should pass sentences courageously in the spirit of socialist legality, and, if they do not forget that they are members of the class tribunal of the proletarian dictatorship, they may be certain that the Party and the government will take care of their safety should an attack come from whatever direction." (NEPSZABADSAG, February 22, 1958)

These threats were accompanied by drastic action against judges and prosecutors who were not considered cooperative. According to the NEW YORK TIMES of December 22, 1957, and LE MONDE of December 24, Dr. Szenasi and Mr. Jozsef Domonkos, President of the Supreme Court, both admitted in speeches that half the total number of Hungarian judges had been dismissed for refusing to participate in the summary courts for the trial of revolutionaries. In a statement reported in MAGYAR NEMZET of April 2, 1958, Dr. Nezval admitted that there was a serious shortage of judges and revealed that 150 young judges had been installed and that accelerated training courses were being arranged for them.

The wholesale dismissal of professional jurists, the installation of untrained Communist trustees as judges, and the repeated threats and demands for severity, have in recent months resulted in more severe sentences by the lower courts and in a rash of stepped-up sentences by the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court and by the Supreme Military Court. For example, it is reported that Lieutenant Janos Jaborza, who was sentenced to 14 years by a lower court for refusing to fire on Freedom Fighters, was retried by the Supreme Military Court on appeal by the Public Prosecutor and sentenced to death (end of July 1958). Since the execution of General Maleter, there have been other reports that the government has appealed many of the sentences imposed by lower courts on Hungarian army personnel accused of joining the revolutionaries, with a view to obtaining the death penalty from the Supreme Military Court or the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court. Two of these death sentences were subsequently said to have been commuted to life imprisonment. According

to another report from Hungary, during July and August of this year, the People's Chamber of the Supreme Court issued increased verdicts in 15 cases that were brought before them.

The lawyers of Hungary, to their eternal honor, have done their utmost to defend the clients to whom they were assigned and to maintain the integrity of their profession. In the post-revolutionary period there were repeated purges of the National Committee of the Chamber of Lawyers. But, from the standpoint of the regime, the situation apparently did not improve very much. In April 1958, the government announced that the National Committee of the Chamber of Lawyers would be abolished and would be replaced by a Council of Lawyers, part of whose task would be to control admissions to the bar and to institute disciplinary proceedings against unreliable members of the bar. This announcement touched off the broadest and most ruthless purge to which the Hungarian legal profession has yet been subjected. Laszlo Martai, Ministerial Commissioner of the Budapest Chamber of Lawyers, announced that 22 "Control Committees," each consisting of one lawyer and four Communist appointees, would be set up to screen the 1600 lawyers in Budapest.

According to information received from Budapest in early September, the process of screening the lawyers of the metropolitan area was completed on August 29th. Of the 1600 lawyers in the city, 720 were disbarred from practice. The others, with very few exceptions, will be compelled to carry on their practice within the framework of so-called "Lawyers' Cooperatives." The government has announced that "the Minister of Justice is entitled to permit private practice to lawyers in quite exceptional cases." (Statement of Dr. Nezval, March 22, 1958.) In essence what this means is that approximately 20 lawyers will be permitted to conduct their private practice. The 20 lawyers in question, it goes without saying, are for the most part carefully screened members of the Communist Party.

For the lawyers who were disbarred, said a letter from Budapest, "a prison sentence or even execution might have been more merciful. The majority of them are men of middle age,

who have no other training and no other means of livelihood. With these liabilities, and with the black mark of disharmon on their personal records, what is left to them but to become street sweepers or cleaners of latrines?... Already several prominent lawyers have committed suicide."

3. The Persecution of the Intellectuals

The physical act of the revolution of October 23rd was preceded by a spiritual resurgence in which the Hungarian intellectuals gave both inspiration and leadership to their people.

As the U.N. report conclusively demonstrated, the revolution was unpremeditated and without central organization. But to the extent that there was leadership, it was the writers and newspapermen who articulated the aspirations of the people and who were recognized as the leaders. The newspapers and periodicals published during the brief period of liberation featured articles, poems and appeals that were intoxicated with the meaning of freedom. Communist and non-Communist writers alike joined in this outpouring. The discussions in the Petofi Circle and the articles in *INODALMI ÚJSÁG*, organ of the Writers' Union, sparked a desire for freedom so passionate and universal that not even the Red Army was able to withstand it in the first round of battle.

The special role that the intellectuals had played in the revolution singled them out for special persecution when the communist regime was reinstalled by Soviet bayonets. Both the Writers' Union and the Journalists' Union were dissolved by decree, and scores of prominent writers and newspapermen were imprisoned. But as much as eight weeks after the suppression of the revolution, the underground organizations of the writers and journalists were still issuing statements demanding the restoration of freedom and the release of their imprisoned colleagues.

No regime can properly present its position or implement its propaganda without the co-operation of writers and newspapermen. Because of this the Kadar regime since early 1957 has made repeated efforts to woo the writers. Extravagant promises have been made to those who

were willing to cooperate. To all of these efforts, the writers and newspapermen replied with a campaign of silence more eloquent than any critique they could have spoken. Without the freedom to say what was in their hearts and in their minds, they simply refused to write.

Only a small number of competent writers have contributed to the literary journals established under the Soviet puppet regime. Most of the contributors are third rate authors who have been dug out of professional obscurity to staff the newspapers, magazines and radio stations.

The journalists — and the Communist journalists in particular — were the flag-bearers of the people's demands. As we have pointed out, their federation was one of the first organizations to be dissolved after the suppression of the revolution, and it was eighteen months before the journalistic profession had been purged to the point where the regime felt safe in reconstituting its organization. The purified Journalists' Federation was established on June 1 of this year, under the chairmanship of Arpad Szakasits, former President of the Republic and leader of the pro-Communist wing of the Social Democratic Party. What the regime had hoped for was a political sterilization; in practice, however, they have produced a qualitative sterilization — as even a cursory reading of the Hungarian press reveals.

Internationally, the greatest uproar was caused by the sentencing of four well-known Communist poets and writers who had been among the revolution's intellectual leaders — Tibor Deri, Gyula Ray, Zoltan Zelk and Tibor Tardos. Intellectuals all over the world have appealed for their release — but in vain. This group, however, represents only a tiny fraction of the list of prominent writers and newspapermen who have become victims of the terror. At the end of this section we append a partial list of those writers, journalists and intellectuals whose execution or imprisonment has been recorded.

Many other intellectuals, whose names are not included in this list, have been released after being detained and cruelly tortured. Among these is Hungary's greatest living poet, Gyula Elyes, who was imprisoned after the second Russian intervention and subjected to torture for months on end. He was finally removed to a mental institution suffering from a complete nervous collapse. Istvan Bibó, the heroic social-

ogist who served as Minister of State in the Nagy government, is also reported to have been cruelly tortured.

The comeback staged by Gyula Kallai, the present Minister of Culture, has resulted in a limited relaxation of pressure on the remaining writers and intellectuals. Kallai and Kadar are generally believed to belong to the anti-Stalinist wing of the party, while Jozsef Revai, Antal Apro and Gyorgy Marosan represent the Stalinist wing.² Both groups are completely Communist but whereas the Stalinists believe in total terror and total subjugation to the Soviet Union, the anti-Stalinists are supposed to favor a measured use of terror and a degree of national independence. As a sequel to the breach between these two groups, there has been a cautious rapprochement between the writers and the Kadar group and this, probably more than anything else, has been responsible for the relaxation already reported.

The rapprochement referred to in the paragraph above is, however, an exceedingly tenuous and uneasy one and is limited to certain groups of intellectuals. Apparently it does not extend to the so-called Populist writers of whom Gyula Illyes is the most prominent member. The Populists, who have championed the cause of the peasantry, have probably had the largest influence of any literary group on the Hungarian people, and this influence continues to make itself felt to this day. Janos Kadar attacked the Populists in these terms in a speech made in January of this year:

"We are against political groups in the field of literature and culture that advocate reactionary ideas or antiquated political news. We consider, for instance, the group of so-called Populist writers, not a literary trend but a political group, one which is opposed to progress in one way or another. . ."

(NEPSZABADSAG, January 28, 1958)

Gyula Kallai, in an address to the Party's Political Academy on March 5th, also lashed out at the Populists who, he said, under the leadership of Gyula Illyes, had "formed a reactionary party of intellectuals during the revolution."³ Kallai also assailed the magazine,

KORTARS, as "the officially sanctioned periodical of cultural decay," because it had carried some articles openly sympathetic to Populist writers or expounding their views.

In the same speech Kallai singled out for special attack Gyorgy Lukacs, who for many years enjoyed a reputation as the Party's foremost philosopher, aesthetician and scientific authority, and who had particular influence among the young people of the country. During the revolution he sided with Imre Nagy and, when all was lost, took refuge with him in the Yugoslav Embassy and was abducted with him into Romania. It has been reported that he is no longer in prison but that he is prohibited from publishing his writings.

There are some who believe that these recent attacks by Kadar and Kallai on the Populists and on the persons of Illyes and Lukacs are genuine expressions of personal attitudes. However, others believe that Kadar and Kallai have been pressured into taking this stand by the Russians because their denunciations would carry far more weight than denunciations coming from people like Marosan or Apro who are known to parrot the Soviet point of view.

Apparently despairing of winning over the writers and journalists ideologically, the regime has recently concentrated on stressing the futility of continued resistance. This was the primary purpose of the delegation of East German writers which visited Hungary this year on Soviet orders. It is reliably reported that during their tour of the country, not a single Hungarian writer of standing, either Communist or non-Communist, showed up at the official meetings, receptions and parties which had been organized so that the East German visitors could exercise their powers of persuasion on their Hungarian colleagues.

The regime's failure to win over the intellectuals has resulted in almost psychotic expressions of hatred by a number of its spokesmen. Deputy Prime Minister Gyorgy Marosan was quoted, for example, as saying that he would like to hang every intellectual from the "first available tree on a rope woven of their own intestines."

**List Of Hungarian Writers And Newspapersmen Who Have Been Executed Or Imprisoned
Since The Soviet Occupation Of Hungary. (All data confirmed)**

Gabor Folly	journalist	Budapest	executed May 15, 1957
Jossef Galy	journalist	Budapest	sentenced to death, commuted to 15 years
Gyula Obersovszky	journalist	Budapest	death sentence, commuted to life imprisonment
Gabor Foldes	dramaturgist of the Gyor Kistheatre		Death sentence
Attila Szegedy	journalist	Gyor	committed suicide in prison, probably tortured to death
Mihaly Lendvai	writer	Gyor	8 years
Ferenc Kuszababó	journalist	Kaposvár	10 years
György Peterdy	writer	Gyor	6 years
Imre Turi	journalist	Gyor	5 years
Istvan Eörsi	poet	Budapest	5 years
Emil Szabo	writer	Gyor	4 years
Sándor Pétercz	journalist	Kaposvár	2 years
Sándor Molnár	journalist	Budapest	18 months
Frigyes Grubics	writer	Gyor	8 months
Andras Sandor	writer	Budapest	8 years
Zoltan Molnar	journalist	Budapest	1 year
Gyula Fekete	journalist	Budapest	3 years (suspended)
Gyula Hay Kossuth Award winner	writer	Budapest	6 years
Zoltan Zolt Kossuth Award winner	writer	Budapest	3 years
Tibor Tardos Kossuth Award winner	writer	Budapest	18 months
Domokos Varga	writer	Budapest	2 years
Balazs Lengyel	writer	Budapest	detained in prison
Sándor Novobuckzy	writer		1 1/2 years

Tibor Dery	Kossuth Award winner	writer	Budapest	9 years
Lajos Simon		journalist	Gyor	detained in prison
Nandor Keresztenyi		journalist	Gyor	" " "
Zoltan Szepe		playwright radio commentator	Vac	" " "
Pal Locsei		writer	Budapest	" " "
Miklos Gimes		journalist		executed
Jozsef Szilagyi		journalist		executed
Miklos Vasarhelyi		journalist		5 years hard labor

In the weeks preceding the preparation of this study, there were many official and private reports which, taken together, suggest a reinforced reign of terror against the intellectuals. After the Nagy-Maleter trial, it was reliably reported that more than 100 trials and retrials took place during a single ten-day period in the middle of June and that 105 more cases were scheduled for trial during the summer months.

Among those who were reported sentenced to imprisonment during this period were Domokos Kosary, writer and historian, and Gyorgy Adam, prominent economist. On August 28, the Associated Press reported from Budapest that Istvan Bibó, after all his suffering, had been brought to trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. Mr. Bibó is revered by the Hungarian people for his singular courage in remaining at his post in the Parliament building until it was occupied by the Red Army on November 4, 1956. It was Mr. Bibó, too, who telephoned the last appeal to the free world from the Parliament building just before the Red Army entered it.

Also included in the report was the internationally known journalist, Gyula Obersovsky. In a press conference in New York, Mr. Alsing

Andersen of Denmark, Chairman of the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary, said the following:

"The special committee has been informed that Gyula Obersovsky, journalist, who had been sentenced on July 4, 1957, to life imprisonment, is now scheduled for retrial July 23, by the supreme court of Hungary," he said. "Mr. Obersovsky, who was the editor of Igazsag (Justice) and Elunk (We Live) had originally been tried, together with several other defendants, in April, 1957, in connection with counter-revolutionary activities and was originally sentenced to death.

"It was announced, however, on July 4, 1957, that the Presidium of the Supreme Court reviewed his case and changed his death sentence to life imprisonment. It was reported at that time by the world press that world-wide demands for clemency may have saved the life of Obersovsky in the summer of 1957. According to information received by the special committee in connection with the rescheduled trial of Obersovsky, the state prosecutor is now demanding the death penalty once again."

(NEW YORK TIMES, July 12, 1958)

4. Persecution of Religion

The Communists have made it absolutely clear that their ultimate goal is the destruction of all organized religion. On the way to this goal, however, they have in all countries displayed a willingness to temporize and compromise. But whenever they have displayed leniency, their concessions have been granted only in return for certain acts of cooperation on the part of the clergy.

The Catholic Church

Approximately 65% of the Hungarian people belong to the Catholic Church.

In the months immediately following the revolution, the Kadar government attempted to re-establish the same strict control over religious activities that had existed previously. Because it was still unsure of its strength, however, it was afraid to indulge in the wholesale persecution which had characterized the Rakosi era. In the case of the Catholic Church, it concentrated its efforts initially on discrediting Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty, whose heroism during years of imprisonment and torture had made him a hero to Hungarians of all faiths, and whose liberation during the revolution had symbolized the end of terror and the birth of freedom. In his refuge in the American Legation in Budapest, Cardinal Mindszenty was made the focus of the government's submissions against "clerical fascism". He was accused of being the ringleader of the revolution, financed from abroad, who had only just been prevented by the Soviet Army from leading Hungary "along the road to disaster". He was forbidden by official decree from "carrying out church functions", and compliance with his directives was declared "contrary to law". During the reign of terror which held sway in the first six months after the revolution, many Hungarians were executed for the sole crime of having known or admired Cardinal Mindszenty.

Although the clergy were not persecuted on the same scale as the writers and the workers' leaders, during the post-revolutionary period hundreds of priests were arrested - especially the younger ones who had played a more active role in the events than their elders. Those who had close connections with Cardinal Mindszenty were given particularly severe sentences: Egón

Turcsanyi, the Cardinal's long-time private secretary, was condemned to life imprisonment on January 8, 1958.

Simultaneously the Kadar government made strenuous efforts to bring the Church under the strict surveillance which had existed during the Rakosi era. The Priests' Peace Movement, which had originally been set up in an attempt to reconcile faithful Catholics to communism and which had been abolished by Cardinal Mindszenty during his few days of freedom, was re-established. An "autonomous" State Department of Church Affairs was once again placed in control of religious matters. To strengthen its control, a decree of March 1957 provided that all ecclesiastical appointments "belonging to the sphere of authority of the Pope, . . . must previously be approved by the Presidium of the People's Republic."

The Priests' Peace Movement, however, was a complete fiasco. Even before the revolution it had largely fallen apart because the overwhelming majority of the clergy and of the students at Catholic seminaries had avoided joining it. The ill-starred effort to revive it in the post-revolutionary period produced no results. Many former members dropped away because of Cardinal Mindszenty's directive. With the lone exception of Miklos Suraszczyk, not a single member of the hierarchy took part in the movement.

Against this background of failure, the Kadar government in June 1957, embarked on a new policy toward the Church. The first indication of this was the "voluntary" dissolution of the Priests' Peace Movement and its replacement by a new organization, *Opus Pacis*, nominally sponsored by the Council of Bishops, which, in the absence of Cardinal Mindszenty, was the supreme authority of the Hungarian Catholic Church. Simultaneously, the State Office for Church Affairs was abolished and its functions transferred to the Ministry of Education.

It first appeared that the *Opus Pacis* was simply the Priests' Peace Movement under another name. There is, however, a vital difference between the two. The *Opus Pacis* movement is being used to establish a relationship between church and state similar in form to that which existed, at least until recent weeks, in Poland - but with the difference that in Poland the concessions granted to the Church were far more

significant. This relationship is characterized by an ostensibly "permissive" attitude on the part of the state authorities, in return for which the clergy are obliged to remain silent on political issues and to participate in peripheral organizations in a manner which, though limited, suggests a passive support of the regime. The terms of this "entente" were explicitly stated by MAGYAR NEMZET, the organ of the People's Patriotic Front:

"The Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government openly supports the activities of the churches. It may duly expect therefore from the churches that they too, should openly support the fostering of patriotism, an atmosphere helpful to productive work, the defense of peace and the rallying of national forces — while preserving their religious principles and religious teachings. The participation and work of the different churches in the peace movement and in the People's Patriotic Front demonstrates that the churches fully undertake these obligations."

(MAGYAR NEMZET, January 1958, p. 3)

In some respects the church has undoubtedly gained from the new policy. Attacks on Cardinal Mindszenty have virtually ceased. The Bishops of Vac and Veszprem, removed from their posts because of their close association with the Cardinal, have been reinstated. In October 1957, priests' salaries, which in Hungary have always been paid by the government, were restored to their 1950 levels, and the government promised to reconsider the whole question of church support a year later. The Council of Bishops is functioning with comparatively little interference. It is even permitted to make some — though not the most important — ecclesiastical appointments and transfers. Whereas, prior to the inauguration of the "New Course" by Imre Nagy in 1953, less than 12% of the parents dared register their children for religious instruction, today more than 80% of the children are receiving such instruction at the request of their parents.

Perhaps the most important evidence of the church's relative autonomy is to be found in UJ EMBER, a weekly magazine published by the Council of Bishops. Although, like all periodicals, it is subject to strict censorship, it displays considerable independence in its defense

of the rights of the individual as opposed to the demands of the state. Even more daring are its favorable discussions of such Western Catholic writers as Graham Greene, Francois Mauriac and Georges Bernanos, and its sharply worded commentaries on anti-clerical and atheist propaganda.

In return for these concessions the Council of Bishops is required to participate as a body in the work of *Opus Pacis*. The bishops must preside over *Opus Pacis* conferences in their dioceses. In addition, the clergy is required to take an active part in the reorganized People's Patriotic Front.

The Protestant Church

Prior to the revolution the regime had succeeded in achieving a somewhat larger measure of control over the Protestant Church than over the Catholic. Precisely because of this, the Protestant Church was more affected by the uprising of October 23rd. All those clergymen who were considered fellow-travelers were forced out of their posts by the passionate and concerted action of the Protestant faithful. Among those who were removed by popular action were the collaborationist Bishops Janos Peter and Albert Bereczky of the Reformed Church, Bishop Lajos Veto of the Evangelical Church, and many lay moderators.⁴ To this day Bishop Peter has not been able to re-install himself in his diocese despite the powerful support of the regime.

The Kadar government responded to the popular purge of fellow-travelers in the Protestant church during the revolution by instituting an even more thorough purge of all those whom it considered "enemies of the regime." Bishop Laszlo Ravasz, the renowned clerical authority of the Reformed Church, and Bishop Laszlo Papp, who during the revolution had become the *de facto* leader of the Reformed Church, were forced to retire into almost complete seclusion. The fate of Bishop Lajos Ordass of the Evangelical Church, who was compelled to resign from his post in June of this year, is uncertain. The best that may be concluded from his total silence is that he is obliged to abstain from all public manifestations.

The new policy of "permissiveness" has brought the same advantages and imposed the same difficulties on the Protestant church as on

the Catholic. A "Protestant Peace Council" has been set up as the counterpart of *Opus Pacis* with mandatory participation by the Protestant clergy. The participation is enforced by a combination of "the carrot and the whip." Numerous inducements are offered to cooperative clergymen, while those who do not cooperate are threatened with the example of Bishop Ordass. For example, SOMOGYI NEPLAP of January 10, 1958, said:

"We raise our voice and say that we deplore the alien spirit of non-conciliation shown by Lajos Ordass, his encouragement of counter-revolutionary forces, his hit-and-run peace stand. We deem this unworthy of a prelate, an officer of the National Council of the People's Patriotic Front - all the more so because, during his whole tour of Somogy County, he said not a word about peace. For this reason he is condemned not only by most of his parishioners but by all peace-loving Hungarian workers faithful to socialism and the People's Democracy."

Particularly brutal attacks have been launched against Protestant clergymen participating in the "Bethanist" Movement, which aims at promoting a more intense spiritual life. On September 25, 1957, NEPSZABADNAP complained that "Whenever there is a KKEZ (Hungarian Communist Youth Organization) meeting, the Bethanists appear, intent on saving the boys and girls from the devil. . . . During the counter-revolution, the Bethanists came into the open. The counter-revolutionary church leader, Dr. Laszlo Papp, gave the Bethanists permission to operate openly in Bekes County."

The Jewish Religion

In its early days the Kadar regime, in its efforts to paint the revolution with all the attributes of fascism, repeatedly charged the revolutionaries with anti-Semitic excesses. They were not deterred from this by the fact that throughout the uprising there was not a single anti-Semitic manifestation or a single recorded instance of anti-Semitic agitation. In November 1956, the European office of the American Jewish Committee publicly stated, on the basis of thorough inquiries conducted in the refugee camps in Austria, that the regime's charges on the subject of anti-Semitism were "complete fabrications and

obviously part of the Communist propaganda campaign to depict the Hungarian revolution as a 'fascist plot'."

The chief purveyor of the anti-Semitic calumny was Minister of State Gyorgy Marosán. On December 21, 1956, for example, the JEWISH CHRONICLE of London quoted a public statement made by Marosán at a press conference in Budapest to the effect that in many Hungarian towns bloody anti-Jewish pogroms had been staged by the revolutionaries.

But it was not very long before the puppet regime abandoned these untenable allegations and substituted for them - at least for domestic consumption - a diametrically opposed thesis. During the course of 1957, the Hungarian revolt was miraculously transformed from a "fascist, anti-Semitic" plot, into a "Jewish" plot. Although the thesis was reversed, the same Gyorgy Marosán continued to act as spokesman for the regime on the Jewish question. In January 1957, he declared that the participation of so many Jewish writers in the ideological preparation of the uprising clearly demonstrated that it was the result of "a Jewish cabal." In June 1957, Marosán declared that the Hungarian Communists "should not allow the spirit of the 'Jewish bourgeoisie' to contaminate the Party's proletarian concept of socialism." (NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, June 9, 1957)

But while inciting to anti-Semitism, Marosán considered it expedient to pretend that he was opposing anti-Semitism. In a speech delivered to the Political Academy of the Communist Party in December 1957, he said the following:

"The counter-revolution made use of the most detested means of deceiving and misleading the workers - anti-Semitism. The fact that the essence of everything is not religion but the class war is shown by the political emigration outside the country. There is much unity between the Jew, Bela Fabian, and the Arrow Cross Fascists; between the Jew, Ignobus, and the Fascist, Laszlo Metz."¹

(NEPSZABADNAP, November 18, 1957.)

On another occasion Marosán said that it was intolerable to see the Budapest Opera House filled "with the Levys and the Cohens as previously," instead of with workers. (Quoted in an article in the Paris periodical, EVIDENCES,

of April-May 1958)

The same article quoted Janos Kadar as saying that most of the past mistakes of the party resulted from the fact that under Matyas Rakosi it was led not by "real workers" but by "petty bourgeois Jews."

* * *

The "entente" between the churches and the state is on both sides an uneasy one. Underneath the surface a mortal struggle is proceeding. The churches are fighting for the survival of religion - and, since the premise of true religion is the dignity of Man, they are, in the ultimate sense, committed to the liberation of their people. For this reason the Communists are committed to the destruction of religion, even though the situation within the country may make a temporary understanding with the churches expedient.

In entering into their entente with the state, the clergy unquestionably hoped that the concessions they obtained would enable them to keep their religion alive and that they would be able to limit their political cooperation to a point where it did not seriously violate their conscience. Having consented to say "A," however, they are finding it increasingly difficult to refuse to say the succeeding letters of the alphabet.

On April 23, 1958, the Hungarian press announced that a group of prominent Catholic and Protestant clergymen would visit the Soviet Union. The Catholic delegation was led by Endro Hamvas, Bishop of Csanad, and Polikarp Rado, Rector of the Academy of Theology. It also included Canon Bela Mag, Dr. Richard Horvath and Dr. Miklos Beresztoczy, the last two of whom were excommunicated by the Pope in October 1957 for their open collaboration with the Communist regime. The Protestant delegation was led by Bishop Lajos Daranyi and Tamas Esze, Lay Moderator of the Danube Synod. It also included the notorious and hated Protestant fellow-travelers, Imre Kadar and Bishop Albert Bereczky.

Bishop Hamvas, Rector Rado, Bishop Daranyi and Lay Moderator Esze are widely respected men and are spiritual foes of Communism rather than fellow-travelers. One can only

imagine the agony they endured in finding themselves obliged to visit the Soviet Union as official representatives of their Church, and this in the company of collaborationist clergymen, two of whom had several months previously been excommunicated by the Vatican.

The statement they issued on their return could not have been more reserved or carefully qualified. They spoke of "the feelings of sincere friendship on the part of the Soviet people toward the Hungarian people" and they noted that religious services in the Soviet Union "have a surprisingly high attendance." To a circumspect reader, the statement was notable for its failure to endorse any aspect of Soviet religious policy and for its almost daring use of the word "surprisingly" in connection with the "high church attendance." But the visit, despite this, provided effective propaganda material for the Communists and served as another indication that the regime would not content itself with a purely supine attitude toward the Soviet camp.

The regime has also tried to create an impression of religious support by bestowing high decorations on members of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish clergy - which, for obvious reasons, they could not refuse even if they were disposed to do so. Among the members of the Catholic Church who have received such decorations are Richard Horvath, Miklos Beresztoczy Dr. Sandor Varga, Dr. Gyorgy Halasz, Dr. Gyula Regos and many others. Dr. Beresztoczy and Dr. Horvath, the most notorious of the clerical collaborators, were, as we previously pointed out, excommunicated last year. Among the members of the Protestant clergy who have been decorated by the regime are the Lutherans, Dr. Lajos Veto, Adam Makis, Pal Nyary and Calvinists Albert Bereczky, Dr. Tibor Bartha and Dr. Laszlo Pakozdy. Rabbi Endre Sos has also received an award.

Not all of the clergymen thus honored were fellow-travelers; it is safe to assume that at least some of them did not accept their awards without qualms of conscience. They were aware that the act of acceptance would be utilized by the regime for internal propaganda purposes. On the other hand, their refusal to receive the awards would have been construed as an open act of opposition and might very well have resulted in imprisonment. Their decision to

accept in many cases was almost certainly not a personal one. They did so because they felt that their removal would weaken their religious organization and that acceptance, therefore, was the lesser of two evils.

While the churches are subject to rigid control, the Soviet rulers and their Hungarian puppets have given no evidence of unqualified enthusiasm over the manifest strength of religion in the hearts of the people. Indeed, a new anti-religious campaign was launched after the National Assembly's meeting in January 1954.

The Hungarian Communist press has repeatedly emphasized, especially in recent months, that religion cannot be considered a private matter. Characteristic in this respect was an article in *NEPSZABADSAG* of February 11, 1954, which said, among other things:

"We have recovered from the counter-revolution, by and large. We have to observe, however, that certain Party members shun discussions about religion. ...There are many among the Party functionaries who go to church, who have enrolled their children for religious teachings. They are good Party members, but they hold church weddings and baptisms. Some Party members even pay church taxes. ...There are many who think that a Party position and religion is a 'private affair' ... We Communists fight unceasingly to liberate humanity from the blind forces of capitalist society and from the fear of materialistic forces. Let us use the weapons of clear, scientific argument in the fight against the enslavement of the human spirit. We Communists must insist that the struggle between dialectical materialism and the idealistic philosophy of life is not a private affair but is, rather, one of the basic conditions for the victory of our ideas and simultaneously for the victory of our people."

5. The Persecution of the Hungarian Youth

While it was the intellectuals and writers who provided the leadership for the Hungarian revolution, it was the youth of Hungary - university students, high school students and young workers - who provided its shock troops.

Indeed, it would not be an over-simplification to say that it was the spiritual union of Hungarian intellectuals and Hungarian youth which brought about the explosion. Spontaneously the student organizations arrived at demands virtually identical with those presented to the regime by the writers and journalist associations and by the Petöfi Circle. And when the fighting began, it was the university students who stood in the forefront of the battle physically and who became the *ad hoc* leaders of the Freedom Fighters.

The Communists have been inclined to look upon the youth, whose education and training has always been their special concern, as ideologically reliable. For this reason, when the revolution was suppressed, they turned upon the youth with a fury suggesting a sense of personal betrayal. The youth were made the primary target of the terror instituted by the Red Army and pursued by the Kadar regime when its own apparatus of repression had been reconstructed. Thousands of young people were executed and imprisoned. The overwhelming majority of the 12,000 Hungarians deported to the Soviet Union were in their teens or early 20's.

Terror and persecution, however, could not solve the problem of the youth. In Communist countries, as in other countries, they are, by force of biological fact, the custodians of the future. How to win back the youth, in particular how to create a generation of university students whose loyalty could be counted upon, has been a major dilemma of the regime.

Initially an attempt was made to reform or take over the democratic student organization, the *MEFESZ*, which had sprung up during the revolution. When it became apparent that it could not be reformed either by reprisals, or by threats, or by inducements, it was dissolved (April 1957) and a new Communist youth organization - *KISZ* - was set up. At first *KISZ* was supposed to be for the Communist elite and membership was purportedly voluntary.

An effort was made in 1957 to set up a separate organization for young farmers. This, however, quickly became a hotbed of the Populist youth movement - whereupon it was dissolved and incorporated into *KISZ*. An effort was also made to provide the young Communist intellectuals with an ideologically reliable successor to the Petöfi Circle, which had been

dissolved in February 1957. But no sooner did the new organization, the Tancsics Circle, begin to function than it became apparent that the membership was intent on making it a true successor of the Petofi Circle. In the fall of 1957, accordingly, the Tancsics Circle was also dissolved and incorporated into KISZ. As a result of these developments, KISZ has become an all-embracing youth organization, similar to the Hitler Jugend. Membership in it is mandatory for young people who wish to enter universities or aspire to higher positions.

The puppet government has found it difficult to formulate a clear-cut educational policy. On the one hand, it has purged the universities and stiffened educational requirements, both scholastic and ideological. On the other hand, it has made strenuous efforts to woo the students by improving facilities, offering increased scholarships, and providing low cost entertainment for them.

Only students with high grades who did not take part in the revolution can apply for admission to a university or technical school. Marked preference is given to those of "worker-peasant" origin, despite the fact that students with this background played as prominent a role in the revolution as any other group. Applicants of middle class background are severely discriminated against and cannot receive scholarships. Moreover, even if young people with middle class antecedents succeed in gaining admission to the universities, their origin continues to plague them: all examination papers must contain the students' "social background."

Numerous credentials must be presented before a student is even allowed to take entrance examinations. These include a *curriculum vitae*; a recommendation from the high school; a recommendation from the Communist youth organization; a police certificate stating that the student did not take part in the revolution; a statement as to his family's financial status; and finally a letter from his parent's employer regarding the family's "reliability." If these are found satisfactory, the student takes the three entrance examinations - one in his field of specialization, one in Marxism-Leninism, and one on his "attitudes on various questions." Failure in any of these excludes him from higher education.

The limited autonomy universities were able to achieve during the "thaw" initiated by Premier Imre Nagy in 1953 has completely disappeared. The faculties of all high schools and universities have been purged - it is interesting in this connection that the greatest purge was carried out in the Lenin Institute, which turned out to be one of the chief centers of revolutionary resistance. It is estimated that since the revolution approximately 2000 teachers have been removed from their posts.

The Ministry of Education established a special branch to decide on the content of high school and university curricula. Primary emphasis is of course placed on Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, in both high schools and universities.

On February 1, 1958, MAGYAR IFJUSAG complained that the technology students were not paying enough attention to the Marxist-Leninist courses:

"They must learn more because their knowledge of ideology is certainly not adequate for college graduates...At the University of Technology, students for years went to the examination on Marxism with the idea that 'we shall bluff it out.' ...There will be no compassionate passing. Of course it must also be admitted, and this is done not only by the teachers but also by the students, that during the year too little time was devoted to the study of philosophy or political economy. Particularly early in the year the students were undisciplined at those courses. During the lectures they read the papers, doodled, etc. This needs no commentary. Only one warning: the intolerable behavior of some students must be stopped by the rest of the classes."

NEPSZABADSAG on May 24, 1958, reported on a conference of deans of all universities and colleges convened by the Ministry of Education. The only item on the agenda was how to make the universities reliable instruments of Marxist-Leninist education. Today, even more than before the revolution, the progress a student makes depends on the marks he receives in his Marxist-Leninist studies. Doctors of Political Science in particular are "expected to take the lead in spreading Socialist ideals." (Radio Kossuth, May 10, 1958)

During the summer of 1957, the study of Russian was made obligatory in all secondary schools and universities. English, French and German were also permitted but only as second choices. A Hungarian student who aspires to be an engineer or doctor soon discovers that his marks in Russian have a fateful influence on his over-all grades and on his general progress.

The teachers have themselves been the subject of a campaign of re-education. They have been told repeatedly that they should model their methods after the "superior" methods of the Soviets. Beginning with the spring of 1957, Hungarian educators have been sent to the Soviet Union, in groups of 300 to 400, for concentrated instruction in Soviet methods. Those who have not yet been accorded this privilege have been obliged to spend a portion of their summer vacations studying Marxism-Leninism. As during the Rakosi era, Russian textbooks translated into Hungarian are used almost exclusively.

Under the Soviet occupation, Hungarian universities and technical schools have become cogs in the machinery of over-all planning; the output of Ph.D.'s and M.D.'s is regulated in much the same way as the output of agriculture and industry, as is evident from a Decree of June 3, 1956:

"In the interest of better planning of education and simpler division of students, the Council of Ministers decrees:

"The general education and compulsory special practical training of university and special high school students will be planned each year by the minister in charge of the university and special high school.

"The ministers and heads of national institutions will determine the number of students to be admitted to universities each year on the basis of the actual need for trained men in their territory and with consideration for the prospects in the people's economy. The decision will then be conveyed to the minister in charge of the individual school.

"Graduates of universities in specialized high schools will be distributed by the

minister in charge, on the basis of previously determined need, among the various ministries and national institutions.

"The detailed process of admissions and distributions will be determined by the Minister of Education and the Chairman of the National Planning Bureau, in cooperation with the Minister in charge."

The regime is constantly thinking of new techniques to influence or strengthen the allegiance of the Hungarian youth — or at least to create the appearance of such allegiance. On April 26, 1958, Radio Kossuth announced that KNEZ members of the University of Technology had taken the following oath:

"I, a member of the Hungarian Communist Youth Association, solemnly pledge in the presence of my comrades, to remain true and faithful to the flag of the Party and of the KNEZ. I shall serve faithfully the future purposes of my Party and my country. I hereby swear to defend with all my strength, and if necessary take up arms for, my country, the Hungarian People's Republic."

The regime's uncertainty about its youth is apparent from many admissions in the official press and from repeated admonishments to the youth that they are not to regard themselves as leaders of the Hungarian people. "The working class and its party respect the youth, who are the future of the nation," said NEPSZABADSAG on September 29, 1957, "but only the working class can provide the kind of leadership that always takes into consideration the interests of the entire people." A month later, on October 26th, NEPSZABADSAG reprimanded the youth in much harsher terms. It expressed its indignation that young people should "morally dare to claim the right to lead the nation — especially those youngsters who have not earned a kilo of bread by their own labor. We must tell them that, were they to take over the leadership of the nation, it would be like the fly who sits on the shaft of a coach and imagines that he is pulling it."

The admonishments and inducements are accompanied by periodic applications of terror. On May 22nd of this year, for example, a group of 14 students was tried for counter-revolutionary activities. Six of the defendants were condemned to death and the others received

lengthy sentences. The news of this trial was not made public, as the International Commission of Jurists points out, until after the Nagy-Maleter trial had taken place.

As we shall see in the chapter that deals with resistance, all the terror, pressure and inducements have had surprisingly little effect on the attitude of the youth toward the regime.

6. The Persecution of the Workers

In all of its propaganda international Communism portrays itself as the champion of the working class. In Soviet parlance all Communist regimes are described as "workers' and peasants' governments"; and their party they invariably describe as the "party of the working class". The Hungarian revolution exploded this myth so effectively that it wreaked havoc in the ranks of the Communist faithful in non-Communist countries who had been disposed to accept the identification of the party with the working class as a matter of dogma.

The Hungarian workers sided with the revolution almost to a man. They confiscated the arms of the factory guards and ammunition plants, established Workers' Councils freed of Communist control, and organized armed detachments which played a central role in the events of the October revolution and in resisting the Soviet invasion of November 4, 1956. There is no record of a single factory or industrial plant where the workers sided with the Communists. The Soviet invasion encountered its bitterest resistance from the workers in the Csepel Steel Plant in Budapest and in the "socialist" city of Sztalinvaros.

For long months after the Soviet invasion the workers continued to defy both the puppet regime and the Red Army. The country was paralyzed by a general strike which lasted till January. The Workers' Councils, meeting quite literally under the bayonets of the Red Army, continued to demand the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and the extension of political democracy.

The Red Army, with the Kadar regime serving as the nominal authority, was finally able to crush organized working class resistance. The Workers' Councils were illegalized and their leaders were imprisoned or executed;

a rough tally made in December 1957 indicated that as of that date some 700 leaders of Workers' Councils and Factory Councils had been imprisoned and 60 had been executed.

The puppet regime since that time has been attempting an impossible feat. On the one hand, it has striven to restore the country's shattered economy; on the other hand, as a matter of self-defense, it has been compelled to use terror as the chief instrument of control over the workers in factories and mines. Its dilemma has been further complicated by the fact that tens of thousands of skilled workers were among those who sought asylum in the free world.

The regime now finds itself involved in a vicious circle. The workers have responded to the terror not with more production but with less production. This has resulted in an increased application of pressures, terror and control measures. All reports from Hungary agree that the workers loathe the present regime even more intensely than they did the infamous Rakosi government.

During the second half of 1957, in connection with the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, the regime reinstituted the hated Soviet system of "workers' competitions". The reaction to this measure has been frankly admitted by the Communist press. *MAGYARORSZAG* of October 30, 1957, for example, said: "Loud-mouthed counter-revolutionaries spoke of labor contests as something forced upon the workers. They said that the only reason we have labor competitions is that there are competitions also in the Soviet Union. The competitions are not a mere emulation of an admirer. The workers of Diosgyor and Tatabanya are increasingly convinced that the noble workers' competitions produce not only material advantage but they are important factors in the further development of our living standards."

NEPSZABADSAG of December 7, 1957, went even further in its admission:

"The workers do not miss work competitions; they are well off without them, it is a fact that many of the workers do not want the reinstatement of workers competitions. When somebody raises the question the immediate answer is: 'What? You would like to have new norms?'"

After the suppression of the Workers' Councils, the regime proceeded to bring the trade unions under the firm control of the Communist Party. As the trade union organ NEPAKARAT put it (July 19, 1957), "The trade unions should be the schools of Communism."

Sandor Gaspar, Secretary General of the National Council of Trade Unions, developed this idea further:

"The trade unions are representative organs, but they fight for more than merely economic aims. They defend the revolutionary interests of the working class in the political and ideological front lines of the class war. We must also be responsible for bringing victory to the cause of the working class, socialism under the leadership of the Party..."

(NEPSZABADSAG, February 6, 1958)

Reports continue to come out of Hungary of continuing purges in key industries. In the Hungarian State Railways, for example, it is reported that since the revolution several thousand men have been dismissed. Of this number, 300 have been dismissed since the spring of 1957 in the Szeged area alone. The committees which were set up to purge the railway personnel of "counter-revolutionary elements" function in the greatest secrecy in cooperation with the political police organs. Railway personnel who are denounced as counter-revolutionaries learn about the matter only when they receive their dismissal papers. The letter of dismissal informs the worker that he is released from his job, effective immediately, with complete loss of rights, because of his "anti-democratic attitude". No appeal can be made. Many hundreds of those dismissed are immediately apprehended and sent off the prisons or concentration camps. Of the more fortunate ones who are not incarcerated, the majority are reported to be living in conditions of dire poverty. With the words "anti-democratic attitude" on his record, it is difficult for the dismissed worker to obtain a job even as a common laborer.

Needless to say, these purges have resulted in a chronic labor shortage which is reflected in the many posters inviting young people to enlist in the Hungarian State Railways.

The London ECONOMIST (September 6, 1958) reports that the impossible industrial goal which the regime has set itself "implies the most severe wage discipline...already in the first half of 1958, the total wage bill was pushed below last year's 'anarchistic' level. A device called 'average wage control' achieves wonders which should make exploiters' mouths water; even workers exceeding their norms are simply told that 'the money isn't there' to pay them more."

7. The Persecution of the Peasants

In the period immediately after the revolution the regime was disposed to treat gently with the peasantry, since it did not have the forces to wage a two-front war — against the workers and intellectuals in the cities, and against the independent peasants in the countryside.

Under the "New Course" introduced by Premier Nagy in 1953, the peasantry had begun to extricate themselves from the hated collectives — and the October revolution turned what had been a trend into a mass movement. This movement continued into the first half of 1956, by which time it was estimated that almost 90% of the Hungarian peasantry were again producing as independent farmers. The Kadar regime, in addition to permitting individual peasants to continue to leave their collectives, made some other important concessions: the abolition of compulsory crop deliveries to the state, the return of deported "kulaks" (well-to-do peasants) to their places of origin, and the establishment of a free market for surplus products.

In mid-1957, the Communist authorities felt certain enough of their position to embark on a campaign of containment and repression against the peasantry. The purpose of this campaign was to undermine the position of the individual producer and to force the peasants back into the collectives. All the evidence indicates that this campaign has met with singularly little success. Those who are forced back into the collectives apparently concentrate their energies on the small individual plots they are permitted to maintain and neglect their collective farming assignments. SZABAD FOLD complains of this in its issue of December 25, 1957: "Only 50 to 60% of the existing collective farm groups and associations performed some kind of communal work and only 10% were really working collectively."

Despite the renewed pressures and sporadic use of physical terror, the peasantry, by and large, had managed to maintain their position. But the further intensification of the class war in the villages is ominously presaged in the pronouncements of government officials and in newspaper editorials. In an article entitled, "Some Problems of the Class War in the Countryside," NEPSZABADSAG (October 16, 1957) stated

"After the revolution the crushing of the enemy must be continued not only in the cities but in the villages also...It is characteristic that the aim of the counter-revolutionary sects in the villages was the destruction of the Party and Council organs and of the socialist sector of agriculture. Thus it cannot be doubted that there are fierce enemies of our people's democratic system, of our socialist achievements, in the villages. Our concern should therefore not be limited to the kulaks alone, but the notion of class enemy should be interpreted on a wider basis. The other characteristic battlefield of the village class war developed over the problem of the collectives...In considering the aspects of the village class was the black market operation must also be mentioned."

The drive to re-collectivise the peasantry is being spurred on by the Kremlin for the obvious reason that the existence within the Soviet bloc of a large body of peasants working as individual farmers serves as a dangerous example to the collectivised peasantry of the other satellite countries and of the Soviet Union itself.

8. The Economic Exploitation of the Hungarian People

To repair the damage and restore the loss caused by the revolution, the Soviet Government was compelled to give massive economic aid to its puppet regime. This aid, however, represented only a temporary departure from the pattern of economic relationship between the Soviet Union and her satellites. Reports from the country now indicate that the wheels have been reversed and that Communist Hungary is again functioning as a cog in a satellite economic machine geared to the interests of the Soviet Union.

The products of Hungarian industry are once again strictly regulated by state planning. Hungary's plan is coordinated with that of the other

satellite countries by the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which was established for this purpose in Moscow two years ago. At its most recent meeting in May, 1958, each of the Soviet dominated "peoples democracies" was required to submit long-range plans which called for the "rational specialization of production" and the establishment of uniform standards, i.e., those of the Soviet Union, in certain types of machinery and equipment. At the conclusion of the COMECON meeting, the overall plan was adopted by Hungary and the other satellite countries and barter agreements were established for the years 1961-65. Thus, for the next eight years at least, Hungary's economy will be closely geared to that of the Soviet Union.

Among Hungary's most important industries are shipbuilding and the building of locomotives and railroad equipment. Virtually the entire output of both these industries is going to the Soviet Union. A recent letter from Hungary says:

"We were informed of an unscheduled train. On such occasions we are always on the alert because we know from experience that we are bound to see something interesting — either a military train will pass through, or else our "defenders" are looting something. But this time we just stood there agape: ten wonderful brand new locomotives were loaded on the freight train. The red star was painted on front of each one. I was terribly depressed — how good it would be if we, too, could receive one of those locomotives now and then. Everything we produce is being taken by these people. When will it end?"

To facilitate the systematic despoilment of the Hungarian economy (and perhaps to ensure more efficient troop transport should another uprising take place), the railroad from Russia which enters Hungary at Zahony and goes to Budapest, has been converted to the Russian broad-gauge system, so that trains can run directly from Russia into Hungary without stopping. The Russian switch system has been introduced into the entire Hungarian railroad system. As before the Revolution, all shipping and air transport is directly under Soviet control which, according to reliable reports, has now been extended to highway patrols and traffic on the Danube.

Soviet tactics are designed to camouflage the fact that Hungarian industry is producing for

the primary benefit of the Kremlin. An example of this may be found in the program of Soviet economic aid to the under-developed countries of the Near East and Asia. Transactions with these countries are handled by KOMPLEX, which ships complete plant equipment to countries in the Near East and also engages in projects such as the construction of a bridge across the Nile. Delivery prices for goods shipped by KOMPLEX are far below those of the world market. The fact that the goods are not shipped from Hungary to the Soviet Union but directly to the Near East serves to hide from the Hungarian people the true facts of Soviet exploitation. On the other hand, the Asian and Near Eastern people are told that they are being helped by their great friend, the Soviet Union, and are quite unaware either of the real origin of the goods, or of the suffering which went into their manufacture.

THE ECONOMIST of September 6, 1954 points out that the series of agreements concluded between Hungary and the other Communist nations will take care of three-quarters of the planned volume of Hungarian trade over the next three to five years. Commenting on this situation THE ECONOMIST stated:

"Of these agreements, the one with Russia makes the most sense and the one with China the least from the Hungarian point of view. The export list contains machine tools, diesel locomotives, tractors, lorries, buses, telephone exchanges, complete steel tube works, vegetable oil and food processing plants and aluminium (which seems to have a sad story of its own). China, in return, will supply such unlikely odds and ends as asbestos, natural rubber, beteltes, soy beans, fish filets, leather and paper goods, clothes and cigarettes. In Kispest, one of Budapest's grim counter-revolutionary suburbs, the Red Star plant is working on a Chinese order for 3,000 tractors; while the Hungarian peasants, some of them laden with cash gathered in during last year's free-for-all when the Kadar regime attempted to offset revenge and terror with economic liberties, cannot buy tractors and in their frustration spend the money on huge weddings and lavish funerals. 'The idea,' they say in Kispest, 'is for the peasants

to eat the fish filets, smoke the cigarettes and let off the firecrackers we get from the Chinese for these tractors.'"

THE ECONOMIST provides some interesting details about the Hungarian aluminum industry as an example of the economic stupidities imposed on the Hungarian regime by their masters in the Kremlin. Because of inefficient plants and the paucity of hydro-electric power, it costs 240 forints to produce the equivalent of one dollar's worth of aluminum ingot. The official exchange rate is 11.74 forints to the dollar. What this means in effect is that the cost of producing aluminum in Hungary is 20 times greater than the world market price. The Hungarian trade authorities seem disposed to exchange their produce at a rate equal to 35 or 40 forints to the dollar, but even at this level the cost of producing aluminum made indigenous production an almost prohibitive luxury. It was, therefore, declared unsuitable as a branch of the export industry. But a short while later—apparently a new set of orders had come from somewhere—it was decided to raise the output from last year's figure of 26,000 tons to 45,000 tons by 1960, the major part of it for export. As THE ECONOMIST comments: "The planners must have walked through the looking-glass—or else the 'socialist world market' demands aluminum to replace that dumped on western markets by Russia."

The Kremlin's economic exploitation of Hungary, like all colonial exploitation, constitutes a fundamental violation of human rights. There is, however, a vital difference between the colonialism of the Soviet Union and the colonialism which it charges to the Western powers. Contradictory though this may seem, the colonialism of the Western Nations gave to its subject peoples a familiarity with the practice of modern democracy. In doing this, it prepared the way for the peaceful, if often grudging, transition to self-government which has already taken place in the greater part of what was once Europe's colonial empire. Soviet colonialism on the other hand has brought the rule of totalitarian tyranny to peoples who were once free; and the years that pass, instead of preparing the way for national self-rule, forge ever stronger bonds on the captive nations.

possible over church or school meetings along with clerical members.

¹The complete texts of these Soviet laws are printed in "KIS-
GAZDASAGI TUDOMANYSZAKI SZEMLE".

²Former Soviet Ambassador in and to stand midway between the two groups.

³Article from, "On Tyranny," is printed in the first of this volume.

⁴In the Hungarian Reformed Church there are the lay officials who

⁵Dr. Bela Palocz, a survivor of both Soviet and Gestapo concentration camps, is Chairman of the Federation of Former Political Prisoners. He is now living in New York City. Paul Spontak, writer and journalist, is now living in England.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTINUING RESISTANCE OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE

The General Situation

In our previous report we pointed out that whereas all the great revolutions of the past had been bitterly fought contests between contending classes or groups, in the case of the revolution of October 23rd the Hungarian people — with the negligible exception of the members of the secret police — were completely united against their Soviet oppressors. "Men, women and children; the very young and the very old; conservatives, liberals, socialists, Titoist Communists, and even Rakosi Communists — all fought together on the barricades against the Soviet tanks." (HUNGARY UNDER SOVIET RULE I, p. 32)

The same degree of popular unanimity has been manifest to this day in the continuing resistance offered by the Hungarian people to the Soviet occupiers and their handful of quislings. In the period immediately after the Soviet occupation, the resistance was open and fearless. An examination of the official Hungarian press of that time reveals literally thousands of instances of public defiance of the regime. By instituting a reign of unlimited terror — during which almost 2000 Hungarians were executed, some 50,000 were imprisoned, and many thousands more were deported — the Soviet despots were able to stamp out open resistance by the summer of 1957. But when open resistance became impossible, the Hungarian people found other ways of expressing and giving effect to their opposition to the regime.

Without preparation or organization, there seems to exist a tacit understanding between the intellectuals, the workers and the peasants, between the adults and the children, on the manner in which each group should conduct its resistance. The children and the teen-agers carry on their resistance openly because their age gives them general immunity. (This immunity, however, is at best an erratic one. For example, *MAGYARORSZAG* of December 31, 1957, reported a trial of a group of revolutionaries age 14-15 whose chief was a 14-year old boy.) The grownups pursue their resistance by a variety of passive means — by nonattendance at political meetings, by boycotting Soviet films

and Communist books, by deliberate wastefulness and spiteful indolence in the work they perform, by the spoilage or pilfering of national property, by massive attendance at church services, by enrolling their children for religious education despite the disapproval of the regime.

Letters from Hungary report that on St. Stephen's Day (August 20) this year the Communists attempted to organize hundreds of meetings under their auspices in Budapest and in the counties in celebration of the 9th anniversary of the introduction of their present "democratic" constitution — obviously for the purpose of competing with the traditional religious services honoring Hungary's patron saint. With rare exceptions, the rival ceremonies organized by the regime were abysmal failures. In Esztergom, Kecskemet, Hodmezovasarhely and other towns the ceremonies were the objects of such successful boycotts that the scheduled speakers did not even attempt to read their speeches. It is also reported that the students of the Summer University at Keszthely near Lake Balaton were obliged to take part in the 9th anniversary celebration, but that afterwards they went in groups to the nearby mountains to honor St. Stephen.

On occasions the Communists, with the help of the AVO and the Workers' Militia, have been able to mobilize mass meetings that were reasonably impressive from the standpoint of turnout. But the Communists themselves have no illusions about the real significance of these meetings. "We should not be deceived by the fact that several tens of thousands attend mass meetings, irrespective of how successful the meetings may appear to be," said Geza Kassai, in *TARSADALMI SZEMLE* (Social Review), January 1958. "We should not forget those who did not attend and those who attended but did not agree with us in all matters..."

While the regime may be able to compel attendance at mass meetings, no method has yet been devised for compelling people to attend

Soviet films or to purchase books which the Communists would like them to read. Soviet dramas and films frequently play before almost empty houses; and when Soviet dance groups and choirs come to Hungary as part of the Communist cultural exchange program, free tickets are lavishly distributed to insure attendance. In a survey of book sales last Christmas, not a single Soviet or Communist author appeared on the best seller list. A recent report from Budapest states that the Soviet book, "Misty Dawn," which was widely hallyhoooded, had sold only a few dozen copies one month after publication.

More than anything else, the position of the regime is threatened by the unorganized but universal campaigns of deliberate slacking, waste, pilfering and abuse of social property. Everyone appears to guide himself by the principle that he must perform only enough work to insure his own livelihood and safety - but that he should not perform an iota of additional work because this might strengthen the regime. There is another and almost equally cogent reason for this attitude. As a recent Hungarian visitor to Vienna put the matter: "Where people have no faith, there is no incentive and no sense of security."

Another recent visitor to Vienna, the manager of a large industrial concern, made this statement to some of his countrymen there:

"I am not exaggerating when I say that many millions of workers have apparently made a solemn oath to bring about the economic ruin of the Communist system. The worker intentionally produces less, and what he produces is of inferior quality. When he feels he can get away with it, he damages machinery and manufacturing materials and other 'social possessions' which belong neither to him nor to the people. If, for example, one kilo of material is needed for the manufacture of a unit of a certain commodity, the workman will manage to consume at least two kilos per unit. Documents which could be processed in one or two days by competent office workers often wander about for months from one desk to another or from one office to another, in this way inflicting serious delays on the process of management and planning. Since paper is scarce, it is wasted in unheard-of amounts.

"In my own case I have been sent to Western Europe to acquire some materials

that are essential for our industry. I know the market well and I have all the necessary connections. The business could probably be concluded in 24 hours. But I am doing just the contrary. I shall travel for another two or three weeks in the Western countries, then I shall return home, and I shall compose an elaborate 20-page report in many copies in order to waste a lot of paper. In this report I shall dialectically analyze the state of the Western markets, and I shall prove why it was impossible to buy the materials in question; I shall suggest that other materials be bought instead of those listed in my original instructions; and I shall add that to buy the necessary materials will require another journey. This report will be studied for at least two months before the bureaucratic asses in the ministry come to a decision. Then I shall be sent on another trip. . . Of course, this is a game which one always plays with one foot in the anteroom of a prison. But, like everyone else, I cannot resist the desire to do damage to the system whenever this is possible."

The varieties of economic sabotage described by the industrial manager in the paragraphs quoted above have been the subject of numerous diatribes in the Communist press. The repeated attacks on "social crimes" and "social property violations," the identification of such actions with "counter-revolution," seem only to have stimulated the Hungarian people to further defiance. The seriousness with which the regime views the situation was frankly admitted by Minister of Justice Ferenc Nerval last September:

"Counter-revolutionary activity takes a different shape today. The loosening of morale and the citizens' disobedience of the law are still manifest. The increase in the number of social property violations, if we do not act with proper firmness, may threaten our power as seriously as an open counter-revolution."

(NEPSZABADSAG, September 2, 1957)

Almost five months later, on January 19, 1958, Premier Janos Kadar spoke in almost despairing terms about the continuing wave of "violations of people's property."

"It is not true, it cannot be true that right thinking adults should not understand it. It

cannot be that they do not act, they do not unite, they do not condemn, they do not expose, they do not banish the criminals and thieves. ...We have dealt with the necessity of creating the atmosphere essential to the suppression of such crimes. What are we waiting for?"
(NEPAKARAT, January 19, 1958)

The Working Class

It is the Hungarian working class which is playing the central role in the campaign of economic resistance of which the spokesmen for the regime complained. Their attitude, as we have indicated above, springs on the one hand from an active hatred of the Soviet puppet regime, on the other hand from a total lack of incentive or confidence in the future. As a Hungarian shipyard foreman put it:

"The only thing we are certain of is today. God knows what will happen to us tomorrow! It simply makes no sense to think of the future, to make plans, to save money for a piece of ground or for a little house. It's possible, too, that when I return home again, the AVO will already be waiting for me and will take me off to a concentration camp or ship me to the Soviet Union. It's just not worthwhile working — and you can't put your heart into it either because you know that the Russians take everything of value!"

The unsystematic production in the factories, and the tendency for productivity to fall off rather than to rise was the subject of an analysis in the periodical FIGYELO, of February 18, 1958. The analysis contained a table which compared production of certain commodities in December 1957, and January 1958, on a *per diem* basis. Rating December 1957, as 100, these were the relative percentages for January of this year:

Bauxite.	86.8 %
Rolled steel products	99.6 %
Aluminum ore	82.0 %
Sulphuric acid	96.4 %
Nitric acid	98.5 %
Bricks	67.0 %
Busses.	88.5 %
Steam locomotives	61.6 %
Railway passenger cars.	74.4 %
Center lathes.	75.3 %
Tractors.	88.8 %
Cutting machines	53.3 %

The same article in FIGYELO included this statement on the subject of "crimes against state property:"

"The main reasons for the increased number of offenses of crimes committed against state property, should be sought in the 1956 counter-revolution. The 1957 report of the Property-Safeguarding Department of the Ministry of Metallurgy and Machinery Industry gives a good example: The police authorities of the Ministry discovered 2665 cases of violation of state property in industrial plants during the first half of 1956. The total value was 2,821,000 forints. In the second half of 1957 there were 5268 cases at a total cost of 4,461,000 forints, while the over-all damage caused is in the vicinity of 7 million forints. In the Telecommunication Research Institute the loss of inventoried instruments reached a value of 500,000 forints. In the Ganz Wagon and Machinery Plant 450,000 forints worth of tools were found in the lockers of 408 workers. There was a pile of excess tools worth 45,000 forints in the locker of a turner, Jozsef Vlasits. An organized group stole the instruments and the imported spare parts in the Electronic Measuring Instrument Plant."

To cope with the epidemic of crimes against social property, the regime has revived the so-called "Social Courts." These courts are established in enterprises employing 300 or more workers. They consist of 10 to 15 members of the trade union in the factory and preside over public trials of their fellow workers. The courts may reprimand the worker or recommend that he be downgraded or dismissed, or they may even propose criminal persecution. There is no provision for appeal against their rulings. One of the earliest reports of the re-establishment of "Social Courts" in Hungary appeared in MAGYAR NEMZET of February 21, 1958. The article stated that because of the large number of crimes against social property in the Csepel automobile factory (339 cases had been investigated during the first nine months of 1957), a "Social Court" had been established in this enterprise. Since the date of this article there have been other reports which indicate that the system is now becoming more or less general.

Resistance is reported to be particularly active among the railway workers, despite the

many purges to which they have been subjected. The railway workers in the eastern part of Hungary are understandably bitter when they see trains carrying the best of Hungary's industrial and agricultural products to the Soviet frontiers. Their bitterness is increased by the long hours of overtime they must work in consequence of the reduction in railway personnel and the improved communications with the Soviet Union. In recent months there have been many reports of the sabotage of deliveries to the Soviet Union, of the arrest of railway men by the AVO, and even of open shooting between railway men and the AVO.

Although the workers are frequently forced to attend meetings, there is no way of compelling an attitude of enthusiasm. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the meetings convened on the basis of compulsory attendance turned out to be political boomerangs. For example, when the Muesnich government was officially installed on January 27, 1958, meetings were held in every factory, government office and institution to explain the importance of the change to the Hungarian people and to try to stimulate a sympathetic atmosphere. In the big Budapest plants the workers who attended these meetings were indifferent and sullen. According to reports, in the Obuda brick factory none of the hundreds of workers who had been gathered together applauded at the end of a half-hour peroration by the Party secretary, and stony silence greeted the mention of Prime Minister Muesnich's name. The workers at the "First of May" textile plant contrived to leave the assembly hall when they were invited to sign a telegram of congratulations to the new Premier. At the Lang factory the speeches were delivered against persistent murmurs of discontent, and the audience openly interrupted several times with demands for free elections.

One of the most significant and moving reports to come out of Hungary in recent months deals with the development of a "white" underground in Hungarian industry, which takes collections for the families of imprisoned workers. The United Press on July 12, 1958, carried this report from Budapest:

"The Hungarian Communist Party organ NAPSZABADSAG said today a 'white' underground was organizing relief for the families of Hungarian workers jailed for counter-

revolutionary activities".

(NEW YORK TIMES, July 12, 1958)

The paper said that when Laszlo Zeke, a foreman of a tobacco factory at Debrecen was sentenced to 15 years, a meeting was held in the factory and the workers undertook to provide for Mr. Zeke's family during his imprisonment. The paper said that this was just one example of such activities. It said that it took the local Communist Party committee 18 months to establish that an illegal "white" relief organization was collecting money from the workers of the Debrecen factory every payday.

The Peasants

As was pointed out in the section on the persecution of the peasantry, the opposition of the peasants is primarily of an economic nature. They continue to resist the pressures to force them back into the collectives—and when they are forced back, they do as little work as they can for the collectives and as much as they can for themselves. The black market in food of which the regime constantly complains is for the most part an open market—the peasants simply refuse to sell their produce at the artificially low prices prescribed by the Communist authorities.

Although they have less opportunity, the peasants, like the workers, give eloquent expression to their hatred of the regime by boycotting meetings that have been arranged for their edification. Typical of many of the stories of peasant resistance that come out of Hungary is an account of the rally which was addressed by Minister of State Gyorgy Marosan in Baja on May 11, 1958. The village councils, the local party organizations and the managers of state farms in the southern part of Bacs and Kiskun county did everything in their power to produce the largest possible attendance at the meeting. Peasants working on the state farms and collectives were taken to Baja in convoys of trucks on May 11th. The Staged management of the Hungarian State Railways, in a special telegram dated May 10, stated that because of the "great interest expected on the occasion of Comrade Marosan's speech" the Kiskunhalas railway station would run a special train of 2 engines and 25 coaches to carry the peasants to Baja and back. Station masters between Kiskunhalas

and Baja were instructed to inform the population immediately of the special train and of the greatly reduced fares, and to report the number of passengers boarding the train on the morning of May 11. The special train left Kishunhalas station as scheduled in the early morning of that day. At the stops along the route the stations were almost empty. Sometimes two peasants would get aboard, sometimes three, sometimes none. When the train had gone as far as Bacsalmás, 23 of the 25 coaches were still empty. The Szeged office of the Hungarian State Railways stopped the train by telegram and ordered it to return to Kiskunhalas.

When Marosan arrived in Baja only a few thousand people were on hand to greet him (the official report of Radio Budapest spoke of 30,000). Marosan, whose language is so coarse that it frequently has to be edited before publication, assailed the peasants for their opposition to collective farming. He was particularly vicious in his attack on the peasant women. He said that, because "they wanted to wear nylon pants" they prevented their husbands from joining the collectives and persuaded them to engage in "capitalist small peasant farming" and to sell their produce on the black market. It was reported that as a result of this attack the meeting dwindled rapidly in size, so that when Marosan came to the end of his remarks, scarcely 150 Communist functionaries remained to hear him.

The Students

The students remain the most openly defiant sector of the population — this despite threats, purges, arrests, deportations and even executions.

The re-introduction of the compulsory study of Marxism and Leninism in the fall of 1957 resulted in open protests and mass absenteeism. The Communist authorities, by drastic measures, finally overcame the campaign of resistance — but NEPSZABADSAG's account of this battle between students and commissars is highly illuminating:

"The attempted organized absenteeism got under way during the first days of the school year — but it was not successful. It was thwarted by the presence of a majority of students in the classes. Absence on a larger

scale was organized only in the faculty of electrical engineering of the Technological University in Budapest and in the faculty of philosophy of the Eotvos Lorand University of Science in Budapest...The following slogan was written on the walls of the rest rooms: 'Don't learn Marxism, don't attend the lectures!'"

(NEPSZABADSAG, November 15, 1957)

The students may have lost the battle — but it is quite obvious from everything that has happened since last fall that they do not feel they have lost the war.

NEPSZABADSAG on January 21, 1958, discussed the fight against "nationalism" among the students in these terms:

"The spread of bourgeois nationalism has made all the basic questions secondary in the eyes of the students swayed by it...To a great degree its spread can be explained by the fact that during the counter-revolution the class conscience of a large layer of the youth in our colleges and at the universities was dulled. Students of worker or poor-peasant origin stood guard outside the university buildings so that 'revolutionary' committees could work undisturbed...Bourgeois nationalism has gravely afflicted the university youth...Let us eradicate its remnants from our halls of education."

Dramatic evidence of continuing resistance is also contained in the numerous threats addressed to the recalcitrant students by the Communist authorities. In March of this year, to give one instance of many, Dr. Lajos Juhasz wrote this warning to the students at the University of Debrecen:

"The atmosphere of leniency has apparently been considered an encouragement by the counter-revolutionary elements in hiding. The disciplinary committee of the University of Medical Sciences initiated disciplinary proceedings only against a few people and passed very fair and mild sentences. This induced the hidden enemy to go into action."

After referring to certain counter-revolutionary activities such as the writing of 'slandorous slogans' on the walls of the University buildings, Dr. Juhasz continued:

"There is no room for inveterate counter-revolutionaries in the University and our state organs will take the necessary measures against them."

(HAJDU-BEHARI NAPLO, March 19, 1956)

In the law faculty of the University of Budapest, according to reports, during the 1957-58 term the students continued to defy the Communist Youth League. In effect they told the KHSZ to "mind its own business" and not concern themselves with the lives and views of the 80% of the students who did not belong to the League. The trial of a group of law students earlier this year and the harsh sentences handed out against them has, if anything, strengthened the students' will to resist.

The high school students and apprentices bear themselves as bravely and defiantly as do their elders at the university. In the Rann Street Apprentice Home in Budapest, photographs of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were hung in black crepe frames in the entrance of the institute at dawn of the day following the announcement of the execution. Under the photographs flowers had been arranged, surrounding a shield of Kossuth.

According to another report the school boys of the Real Tazoda Street High School demonstrated loudly when it was announced over the speakers that, beginning with the next term, the study of the Russian language would again be mandatory. Several of the demonstrating youth, according to the same report, were arrested and sent to the youth internment camp at Tatahanya.

* * *

In the paragraphs above we have described only in part the implacable, and apparently indestructible resistance of the Hungarian people to the Soviet occupiers and their quislings. Almost two years have elapsed since the Soviet invasion of November 4, 1956 - but the regime has found no way of coping with the techniques of passive resistance which the people have evolved. In some of their statements the puppet leaders admit to frustration and almost to despair. In other statements they display an almost psychopathic fear that the Party apparatus, the managerial apparatus and the general apparatus of repression are not trustworthy and

must again be drastically purged.

"Hundreds of Communists write worried letters to our paper," said NEPSZABADNAG (October 3, 1957), "saying that, while several key people have been removed from their positions, because they had collaborated with the counter-revolutionaries, others equally unreliable still occupy leading posts. At the same time, we are all aware of the fact that even those who have been removed find positions in other cities or towns. Sometimes they have achieved greater influence than they previously occupied. It appears that certain companies or authorities are concerned only with their 'own' counter-revolutionaries. They show unwarranted tolerance towards those who come from somewhere else; they often find excuses even for those guilty of real crimes by saying that they did not see clearly, or that they are indispensable experts, etc. As we proceed towards consolidation we are increasingly apt to overlook the dangers such an attitude holds for our proletariat."

The regime has every reason for living in fear. The Hungarian people do not accept their defeat at the hands of the Red Army as final. They have faith in freedom and they are convinced of their ultimate liberation. They are almost certainly the most political people in the world today. According to all reports, they listen with almost feverish eagerness to the international news programs of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, BBC, and other Western transmitters. A letter from Budapest at the end of May 1958, said this among other things:

"We hold meetings and Radio Free Europe is mentioned each time. It was never considered such a crime to listen to RFE as it is now. They emphasize that those who listen to these broadcasts are secretly counter-revolutionaries. Protest meetings for the suppression of RFE are held. They send telegrams, collect signatures for protests and I don't dare imagine what would happen to a person who refuses to sign when such a protest is held under his nose."

The acute jitters of the Red Army command and their Hungarian puppets was never more evident than it was at the time of Khrushchev's visit to Hungary in early April 1958. According to reports from several sources, the

Red Army moved a number of its units about in a manner which placed major concentrations within easy reach of the Budapest area. The Minister of Transport declared a state of alert for the railway employees on April 4th and all leaves were cancelled for the day. Railway stations were placed off limits for civilians. The honor guard which greeted Khrushchev was composed of carefully selected AVO men. The audience of steel workers who greeted him on Csepel Island was made up for the most part of reliable Party officials brought together from all parts of the country.

* * *

This is the picture of Hungary almost two years after its resubjugation by the Red Army. On the one hand, there is the Hungarian people, grimly united in a passive but nonetheless effective campaign of national resistance. On the other hand, there is the Soviet occupation administration—which endeavors to conceal itself behind the facade of the quisling regime, which is becoming increasingly desperate as it finds that orthodox methods of terror are totally ineffective against the defiant hatred of the entire Hungarian nation, and which lives in constant fear of the people it governs.

**ANNEX I: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
WITH REFERENCE TO HUNGARY**

Question considered by the second emergency special session of the General Assembly from
4 to 10 November 1956 (Item 67)

RESOLUTION 1121 (XI)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING its resolutions 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956 and 1005 (ES-II), 1006 (ES-II) and 1007 (ES-II) of 9 November 1956, adopted at the second emergency special session,

NOTING that the Secretary-General has been requested to report to the General Assembly on compliance with resolutions 1004 (ES-II) and 1005 (ES-II),

HAVING RECEIVED information that the Soviet army of occupation in Hungary is forcibly deporting Hungarian men, women and children from their homes to places outside Hungary,

RECALLING the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principle embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, the obligations assumed by all Member States under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, the principles of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in particular article II (c) and (e), to which Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are parties, and the Treaty of peace with Hungary, in particular the provisions of article 2,

1. CONSIDERS that the information received adds urgency to the necessity of prompt compliance with resolutions 1004 (ES-II) and 1005 (ES-II) of 4 and 9 November 1956 calling for the prompt withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and for the dispatch of observers to Hungary by the Secretary-General;

2. URGES the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian authorities to take immediate steps to cease the deportation of Hungarian citizens and to return promptly to their homes those who have been deported from Hungarian territory;

3. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly informed as to com-

pliance with this as well as the above-mentioned resolutions, so that the Assembly may be in a position to consider such further action as it may deem necessary.

**SIXTH PLENARY MEETING,
21 NOVEMBER 1956.**

RESOLUTION 1122 (XI)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

NOTING that certain Member States have affirmed that Hungarian nationals have been forcibly deported from their country,

NOTING FURTHER that certain other Member States have categorically affirmed that no such deportations have taken place,

RECALLING paragraph 5 of its resolution 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, in which the Government of Hungary is asked to permit observers designated by the Secretary-General to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein, and to report their findings to the Secretary-General,

NOTING that the Secretary-General is pursuing his efforts in this regard with the Hungarian Government,

NOTING FURTHER that the Secretary-General has urged Hungary as a Member of the United Nations to cooperate with the great majority in the clarification of the situation,

1. URGES Hungary to accede to the request made by the Secretary-General without prejudice to its sovereignty;

2. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly without delay.

**SIXTH PLENARY MEETING,
21 NOVEMBER 1956.**

RESOLUTION 1129 (XI)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

NOTING the grave situation described in the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Secretary-General in the interim report of the Secretary-General on refugees from Hungary,

CONSIDERING that the flow of refugees from Hungary continues at a high rate,

RECOGNIZING the urgent need of these tens of thousands of refugees for care and resettlement,

1. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION of the action taken by the Secretary-General to determine and help to meet the need of the Hungarian refugees, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist these refugees and to bring about co-ordinated action on their behalf by Governments, intergovernmental agencies and non-governmental organizations;

2. REQUESTS the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue their efforts;

3. URGES Governments and non-governmental organizations to make contributions to the Secretary-General, to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or to other appropriate agencies for the care and resettlement of Hungarian refugees, and to co-ordinate their aid programmes in consultation with the Office of the High Commissioner;

4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to make an immediate appeal to both Governments and non-governmental organizations to meet the minimum present needs as estimated in the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Secretary-General and authorizes them to make subsequent appeals on the basis of plans

and estimates made by the High Commissioner with the concurrence of his Executive Committee.

587TH PLENARY MEETING,
21 NOVEMBER 1956.

RESOLUTION 1130 (XI)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING its resolutions 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005 (ES-II), 1006 (ES-II) and 1007 (ES-II) of 9 November 1956, and 1127 (XI) and 1128 (XI) of 21 November 1956 relating to the tragic events in Hungary,

HAVING RECEIVED AND NOTED the report of the Secretary-General that United Nations observers have not been permitted to enter Hungary,

NOTING WITH DEEP CONCERN that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has failed to comply with the provisions of the United Nations resolutions calling upon it to desist from its intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary, to cease its deportations of Hungarian citizens and to return promptly to their homes those it has already deported, to withdraw its armed forces from Hungary and to cease its repression of the Hungarian people,

1. REITERATES its call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian authorities to comply with the above resolutions and to permit United Nations observers to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein and to report their findings to the Secretary-General;

2. REQUESTS the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian authorities to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 7 December 1956, their consent to receive United Nations observers;

3. RECOMMENDS that in the meantime the Secretary-General arrange for the immediate dispatch to Hungary and other countries as appropriate, of observers named by him pursuant to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956;

4. REQUESTS the Governments of all Member States to co-operate with the representatives named by the Secretary-General by extending such assistance and providing such facilities as may be necessary for the effective discharge of their responsibilities.

608TH PLENARY MEETING,
4 DECEMBER 1956.

RESOLUTION 1131 (XI)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

DEEPLY CONCERNED over the tragic events in Hungary,

RECALLING those provisions of its resolutions 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005 (ES-II) of 9 November 1956, 1127 (XI) of 21 November 1956 and 1130 (XI) of 4 December 1956, calling upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to desist from its intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary, to withdraw its forces from Hungary and to cease its repression of the Hungarian people,

RECALLING ALSO those provisions of its resolutions 1004 (ES-II) and 1127 (XI), calling for permission for United Nations observers to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein and to report their findings to the Secretary-General,

HAVING RECEIVED the report of the Secretary-General of 30 November 1956, stating that no information is available to the Secretary-General concerning steps taken in order to establish compliance with the decisions of the General Assembly which refer to a withdrawal of troops or related political matters, and the note of the Secretary-General of 7 December 1956,

NOTING WITH GRACE CONCERN that there has not been a reply to the latest appeal of the General Assembly for the admission of United Nations observers to Hungary, as contained in its resolution 1130 (XI),

CONSIDERING that recent events have clearly demonstrated the will of the Hungarian people to recover their liberty and independence,

NOTING the overwhelming demand of the Hungarian people for the cessation of intervention of foreign armed forces and the withdrawal of foreign troops,

1. DECLARES that, by using its armed force against the Hungarian people, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is violating the political independence of Hungary;

2. CONDEMNES the violation of the Charter of the United Nations by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in depriving Hungary of its liberty and independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental rights;

3. REITERATES its call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to desist forthwith from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary;

4. CALLS UPON the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make immediate arrangements for the withdrawal, under United Nations observation, of its armed forces from Hungary, and to permit the re-establishment of the political independence of Hungary;

5. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem, in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly.

618TH PLENARY MEETING,
12 DECEMBER 1956.

RESOLUTION 1132 (XI)

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING its previous resolutions on the Hungarian problem,

REAFFIRMING the objectives contained therein and the continuing concern of the United Nations in this matter,

HAVING RECEIVED the report of the Secretary-General of 5 January 1957,

DESIRING to ensure that the General Assembly and all Member States shall be in possession of the fullest and best available information regarding the situation created by the intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its use of armed force and other means, in the internal affairs of Hungary, as well as regarding developments relating to the recommendations of the General Assembly on this subject,

1. ESTABLISHES, for the above-mentioned purposes, a Special Committee, composed of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate, in order to report its findings to the General Assembly at its eleventh session, and thereafter from time to time to prepare additional reports for the information of Member States and of the General Assembly if it is in session;

2. CALLS UPON the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Hungary to co-operate in every way with the Committee and, in particular, to permit the Committee and its staff to enter the territory of Hungary and to travel freely therein;

3. REQUESTS all Member States to assist the Committee in any way appropriate in its task, making available to it relevant information, including testimony and evidence, which Members may possess, and assisting it in securing such information;

4. INVITES the Secretary-General to render the Committee all appropriate assistance and facilities;

5. CALLS UPON all Member States promptly to give effect to the present and previous resolutions of the General Assembly on the Hungarian problem;

6. REAFFIRMS its request that the Secretary-General continue to take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problems, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly.

636TH PLENARY MEETING,
10 JANUARY 1957.

RESOLUTION 1133 (XI)

Question considered by the second emergency special session of the General Assembly from 4 to 10 November 1956

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING its resolution 1132 (XI) of 10 January 1957, establishing a Special Committee, consisting of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate,

HAVING NOW RECEIVED the unanimous report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,

REGRETTING that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary have failed to co-operate in any way with the Committee,

1. EXPRESSES ITS APPRECIATION to the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary for its work;

2. ENDORSES the report of the Committee;

3. NOTES the conclusion of the Committee that the events which took place in Hungary in October and November of 1956 constituted a spontaneous national uprising;

4. FINDS that the conclusions reached by the Committee on the basis of its examination of all available evidence confirm that:

(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;

(b) The present Hungarian regime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(d) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has violated its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

(e) The present authorities in Hungary have violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary;

5. CONDEMNES these acts and the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly;

6. REITERATES ITS CONCERN with the continuing plight of the Hungarian people;

7. CONSIDERS that further efforts must be made to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in regard to Hungary in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly;

8. CALLS UPON the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary, in view of evidence contained in the report, to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people, to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and to ensure the return to Hungary of those Hungarian citizens who have been deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

9. REQUESTS the President of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, as the General Assembly's special representative on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as he deems appropriate, in view of the findings of the Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005 (ES-II) of 9 November 1956, 1127 (XII) of 21 November 1956, 1131 (XII) of 12 December 1956 and 1132 (XII) of 10 January 1957, to consult as appropriate with the Committee during the course of his endeavours, and to report and make recommendations as he may deem advisable to the General Assembly;

10. DECIDES to place the Hungarian item on the provisional agenda of the twelfth session of the General Assembly.

677TH PLENARY MEETING,
14 SEPTEMBER 1957.

ANNEX 2: REPORT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM

In paragraph 9 of its resolution 1133 (XI) of 14 September 1957, the General Assembly requested me, the President of the eleventh session, as the General Assembly's special representative on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as I deemed appropriate, in view of the findings of the Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005 (ES-II) of 9 November 1956, 1127 (XI) of 21 November 1956, 1131 (XI) of 12 December 1956 and 1132 (XI) of 10 January 1957, to consult as appropriate with the Committee during the course of my endeavours, and to report and make recommendations as I might deem advisable to the General Assembly.

I now have the honour to report to the General Assembly the steps I have taken in this connection.

The objectives which it has been my aim to achieve are: (1) humanitarian treatment in Hungary; (2) return from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of deportees; (3) withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; and (4) free elections in Hungary.

I was aware of the difficulties of my task and I realized that I would have to proceed step by step and that this would take time. I was hopeful, however, that an appeal to one of the essential purposes of the United Nations would meet with a favourable response, and that is that the United Nations is a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of the Organization's common ends, including international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

My first step, therefore, was concentrated on humanitarian treatment in Hungary.

It was with this approach that, on 30 September 1957, I contacted the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and made an appeal for humanitarian treatment in Hungary. His reply was that this did not concern the Soviet Government.

Then I made a humanitarian appeal for the

return from the Soviet Union to Hungary of the deportees. His reply was that the deportations were a made-up story and that the item on Hungary constituted an interference in internal affairs and was illegitimate": he could not discuss it.

I offered to pursue the discussion with him in Moscow. He repeated that he could not discuss the Hungarian item.

I made a similar approach to the Foreign Minister of Hungary, on 10 October 1957 by making a humanitarian appeal for more lenient treatment of prisoners, of persons detained in concentration camps, and of persons awaiting trial and for due judicial process in trials, for admission of students to universities without discrimination, and so on, and, finally, for an amnesty for political offenders. His reply was that these were matters for the Hungarian Government to determine by virtue of its sovereign rights. But I pointed out that that did not preclude an exchange of information and views in the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. Finally, he said that if I would draw up a memorandum enumerating the questions on which I wanted information, he would supply the information. I said that I would do so, and I also mentioned that I could proceed to Budapest to pursue the discussion with him there. His reply was that, as the Hungarian Government could not admit observers from the United Nations, they could not give me a visa.

On 22 October 1957, Mr. Horvath told me that he was returning to Budapest but I could see Mr. Sik, who, however, would not be able to answer questions on Hungary, because the Hungarian Government considered the General Assembly resolution on Hungary illegal.

Mr. Sik confirmed to me, on 15 November 1957, that Mr. Horvath had instructed him not to accept the memorandum of questions from me. He, however, agreed to ask for instructions from the Hungarian Government; and on 2 December 1957, he informed me that his Government confirmed its former attitude that it would not negotiate on a matter which was an internal affair of Hungary and that, therefore, he could not accept my memorandum of questions.

As no question involving the Special Committee has been raised, I have had no occasion to consult with the Committee.

I wish to record my warm appreciation and thanks for the facilities and assistance which the Secretary-General and the Secretariat have given me.

I regret that so far I have not been able to find an opportunity for negotiations. I cannot believe, however, that the Hungarian and Soviet Governments will remain insensible to the voice of world opinion and the conscience of mankind

which continues to make an insistent and righteous appeal for the freedom of the Hungarian people. It is my hope, therefore, that as the international tension relaxes, I would be given an opportunity to assist in establishing full international co-operation in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hungary.

(Signed) Wan WAITHAYAKON
General Assembly's Special Representative
on the Hungarian Problem

9 December 1957.

**ANNEX 3: COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE UNITED
NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF
HUNGARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC¹**

A. Text of letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian
People's Republic approved by the Special Committee on the Problem
of Hungary at its 72nd meeting on Friday, 20 December 1957

"Sir,

"In accordance with its terms of reference in General Assembly resolution 1132 (XI) of 10 January 1957, the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary has met on two occasions this week to examine certain aspects of the situation in Hungary.

"At these meetings, members of the Special Committee have had occasion to consider the treatment accorded by the Government of Hungary to those who participated in the resistance of the population of Hungary to the intervention of Soviet armed forces, as related in the Report of the Committee submitted to the General Assembly. The Committee noted with deep and special concern the reports of trials said to be at present proceeding in Hungary of General Pal Maleter, of General Istvan Kovacs, and of Colonel Sandor Kopacsi. Other reports have related to the trial of significant personalities such as former members of the Revolutionary Council of the City of Győr and Roman Catholic priests for their participation in the uprising. The condemnation to death, and execution of, Major Antal Palinkas-Pallavincini is understood to have been definitely announced by the Hungarian Telegraph Agency on 12 December 1957.

"The Committee is well aware that certain of the reports relating to these matters are subject to confirmation, and the Committee would not wish, especially in view of the statement issued on behalf of the Government of Hungary on 17 December 1957, to attach final credence to them. Nevertheless, it has reached the conclusion that the reports have a character which warrants an indication by the Committee to the Government of Hungary that it would be appreciative of precise information on these matters, which constitute an important element in the situation arising from the circumstances which the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary is charged by the General Assembly to investigate.

"A deep impression has been made on the members of the Committee by the persistent anxiety displayed throughout the world regarding the fate of men and women who played a part in the events of October to November 1956. This anxiety arises from humanitarian considerations and is shared by men and women of the most diverse political opinions. World opinion will continue to be disturbed until it is satisfied that the present authorities in Hungary are shaping their policy in this matter in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 14 September 1957, which called upon Hungary 'to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people'.

"On the occasion of their meeting, the members of the Committee wish to express their conviction that a significant contribution to the relaxation of international tension could be made by the Hungarian Government if it were to give the world reliable information on this subject, and to give an assurance that the highest humanitarian standards are being applied in the treatment of all who participated in the uprising.

"Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Alsing Andersen
Chairman
Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary"

¹ Circulated as United Nations document A/AC.88/1, 23 December 1957.

² This letter was returned by the permanent representative of the Hungarian People's Republic on 21 December 1957 with the following observation:

"As it was expressed many times, the establishment and the functioning of that Committee were not and are not recognized by the Hungarian Government, since the resolution which set up that Committee is contrary to United Nations Charter. Consequently, the Hungarian permanent representative is not in a position to transmit communications and requests by that Committee."

**ANNEX 4: COMMUNIQUE DATED 21 JUNE 1958 BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY¹**

The Special Committee met this morning to consider the circumstances surrounding the recent reports from Moscow and Budapest that Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, and two of their companions have been executed.

To assist its study of these tragic events, the Committee had before it the text of the statement issued by the Hungarian Government on 16 June, when the trials were first announced, and a recent statement from Belgrade in which the Government of Yugoslavia recalled the undertakings which had been given to them by János Kádár when Imre Nagy left the asylum of the Yugoslav Embassy at Budapest on 22 November 1956, namely,

"...that it (the Hungarian Government) does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes."

The report of the Committee, already presented to the General Assembly and endorsed by it, records the circumstances in which Imre Nagy, on leaving the Yugoslav Embassy, was arrested and taken to an unknown destination, subsequently indicated by the Hungarian authorities as being Romania; it also recalls the unsuccessful efforts made by the Committee later to arrange with the Romanian Government an opportunity to meet Imre Nagy in the interest of the Committee's inquiry.

The Committee notes that no reply has ever been received to its letter addressed to the Hungarian Government on 20 December 1957. That letter drew the attention of the Hungarian Government to the persistent concern displayed throughout the world regarding the fate of the men and women who played a part in the events in Hungary during October and November of 1956. It pointed out that anxiety would continue until

General Assembly resolution of 14 September 1957, which called upon Hungary "to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people."

The Committee notes that, since the uprising in Hungary in October 1956, the United Nations has adopted a number of resolutions calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw her troops from Hungary so as to create an atmosphere in which free elections could be held. All these appeals have been ignored. The execution of Imre Nagy and of his companions demonstrates that the oppression of the Hungarian people has not abated, and that the reign of terror which began when Russian forces moved into Hungary early in November 1956 continues.

The Committee notes that the recent statement by the Government of Hungary in which the executions were announced was imprecise and vague in many particulars. Some unanswered questions are: What were the movements of the prisoners between the time of Nagy's abduction and the time of the trials? In what country were they tried? Where did the executions take place? What was the precise form of the indictment? Under what laws and under what procedures were they tried and sentenced — laws and procedures in operation at the time of the uprising or laws promulgated subsequently? These are matters on which the United Nations has every right to be fully informed.

The Committee accordingly issues an appeal to interested Governments having at their disposal any information regarding the circumstances of the arrest, trial and execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter and their two companions, to make such information available to the Committee.

The Committee deplores this latest tragic event in which these men, symbols of the hope of a nation for freedom from foreign domination, were secretly sent to death in circumstances which call for full exposure, in violation of solemn undertakings that their persons would not be harmed, and in defiance of the judgement and opinion of the United Nations. It expresses its grave concern lest the end of this repression and killing may not yet be in sight.

¹Circulated as United Nations document A/AC. 88/2, 21 June 1958.

Annex 5: LETTERS DATED 26 JUNE 1958 FROM THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF HUNGARY, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ROMANIA
AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

A. Text of letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, approved by the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary at its 74th meeting on Thursday 26 June 1958¹

"Sir,

"On 21 June 1958 the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary set up by General Assembly resolution 1132 (XI) considered the statements issued in Budapest and in Moscow during the night of 16-16 June announcing that Prime Minister Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter and two of their associates had been executed.

"The Committee noted with grave concern these reports which, in addition to other aspects, raise important questions of fundamental human rights. In view of the deep anxiety throughout the world over the fate of those men and women who had played a part in the events in Hungary during October and November 1956, the Committee appealed on 21 June to interested Governments to provide it with any information at their disposal on the circumstances surrounding the arrest, trial and execution of these four men. (General Assembly document A/AC.88/2.)

"In particular, the Committee, continuing to act in the exercise of the functions conferred upon it by the General Assembly, wishes to receive from the Government of Hungary information about-

- (a) The time and circumstances of the transfer of custody of these persons from the Soviet authorities to the Hungarian authorities;
- (b) Their movements from the time they were handed over by the Soviet authorities until they were tried and executed;

(c) The time and place of the trials;

(d) The time and place of the executions;

(e) The precise terms of the indictments;

(f) Details of the trial proceedings;

(g) The laws or decrees under which the prisoners were tried, including the dates when those laws or decrees were promulgated.

"The Committee requests that this information be made available as early as possible.

"Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

E. RONALD WALKER
Acting Chairman
Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary"

¹This letter was returned by the deputy permanent representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations on 30 June 1958 with the following observation:

"Upon instruction from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Hungary I have the honour to return the letter sent to me by the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. I wish to recall that the position of Hungary on the above-mentioned Committee has not changed, that is Hungary has not, and will not justify the establishment of the Committee, and will not co-operate with it."

B. Text of letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, approved by the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary at its 74th session on Thursday, 26 June 1958¹

"Sir,

"On 21 June 1958 the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary set up by General Assembly resolution 1132 (XII) considered the statements issued in Budapest and in Moscow during the night of 16-17 June announcing that Prime Minister Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter and two of their associates had been executed.

"The Committee noted with grave concern these reports which, in addition to other aspects, raise important questions of fundamental human rights. In view of the deep anxiety throughout the world over the fate of those men and women who had played a part in the events in Hungary during October and November 1956, the Committee appealed on 21 June to interested Governments to provide it with any information at their disposal on the circumstances surrounding the arrest, trial and execution of these four men. (General Assembly document A/AC.88/2.)

"The Committee has found that Imre Nagy and his party were taken to Romania immediately after they were seized by the officers of the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as they left the Yugoslav Embassy at Budapest on 22 November 1956. The Committee, therefore, continuing to act in the exercise of the functions conferred upon it by the General Assembly, wishes to receive from the Government of Romania any information that Government may have concerning the movements and treatment of these men while

they were in Romanian territory, as well as any other information in its possession concerning the arrests, trials and executions of the prisoners.

"The Committee requests that the information be made available as early as possible.

"Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

E. RONALD WALKER

Acting Chairman

Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary"

C. Text of letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, approved by the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary at its 74th meeting on Thursday, 26 June 1958²

"Sir,

"On 21 June 1958 the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary set up by General Assembly resolution 1132 (XII) considered the statements issued in Budapest and in Moscow during the night of 16-17 June announcing that Prime Minister Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter and two of their associates had been executed.

"The committee noted with grave concern these reports which, in addition to other aspects, raise important questions of fundamental human rights. In view of the deep anxiety throughout the world over the fate of those men and women who had played a part in the events in Hungary during October and November 1956, the Committee appealed on 21 June to interested Governments to provide it with any information at their disposal on the circumstances surrounding the arrest, trial and execution of these four men. (General Assembly document A/AC.88/2.)

"This letter was returned by the permanent representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations on 30 June with the following observation:

"I do not feel able to comply with Ambassador Walker's request in view of the slanderous nature of the letter addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR."

¹This letter was returned by the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of the Romanian People's Republic on 1 July 1958, with the following observation:

"Owing to the fact that, as stated in the note of March 30, 1957 sent to you by the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations the Romanian Government was against the creation of this Committee and cannot take into consideration its requests, I feel unable to forward the above-mentioned letter to my Government.

"Imre Nagy and his party were seized by officers of the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 22 November 1956 as they left the Yugoslav Embassy at Budapest. Pal Maleter was seized by Soviet officers on 3 November 1956 while, as reported to the Security Council by the Hungarian representative, he was negotiating with the Soviet Command on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Committee therefore asks the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to provide it with information on the time, place and circumstances of the subsequent transfer of the prisoners to the Hungarian authorities.

"Further, having regard to the role played by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the events in Hungary during October and November

1956, the Committee, continuing to act in the exercise of the functions conferred upon it by the General Assembly, wishes to receive from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics any information that Government may have on the trials and executions of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter and their associates.

"The Committee requests that the information be made available as early as possible.

"Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

E. Ronald Walker
Acting Chairman
Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary"

ANNEX 6: DECREE-LAW OF NOVEMBER 3, 1957

ARTICLE 2

DECREE-LAW NO. 62/1957 OF THE PRESID-
RUM OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC CONCERNING THE ABOLISHING OF
SUMMARY JURISDICTION.¹

The successes attained in the last year con-
cerning the reestablishment of law and order,
make it possible to abolish summary jurisdic-
tion, introduced for a transitory period. There-
fore the Presidium of the People's Republic
enacts the following Decree-Law:

ARTICLE 1

- 1) Summary jurisdiction, introduced by De-
cree-Law No. 28/1956 and the Decree-Law
No. 22/1956 supplementing the former, is
repealed from the date of the publishing of
present Decree-Law.
- 2) The Hungarian - Revolutionary - Workers' -
Peasants' - Government is charged with the
promulgation of the repeal of summary
jurisdiction.

- 1) The present Decree-Law comes into force
on the day of its promulgation.
- 2) On the coming into force of the present
Decree-Law proceedings which are sub-
judice before summary courts, must be
transferred to courts which have jurisdic-
tion and are competent according to general
provisions. The prosecutor may in these
cases also move for a hearing by the People's
Court.

ISTVAN KRISTOF M.P.
Secretary of the
Presidium of the
People's Republic

ISTVAN DOBI M.P.
President of the
Presidium of the
People's Republic

Note: For other repressive decree-laws passed
by the Hungarian puppet government since
December, 1956, see HUNGARY UNDER
SOVIET RULE, I, Appendix A.

¹MAGYAR KOZLONY, No. 117, November 3,
1957.

**ANNEX 7: LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 2, 1957 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS TO UN DELEGATIONS**

Your Excellency,

On the eve of the special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, I venture to draw your Excellency's attention to the views of the International Commission of Jurists as set out in its publications, "The Hungarian Situation and the Rule of Law", published in April 1957, and "The Continuing Challenge of the Hungarian Situation to the Rule of Law", published in June 1957. A brief summary of the reports together with additional documentation is appended to this letter.

I would firstly emphasize that the concern of the International Commission of Jurists over the Hungarian situation is based not on political or national considerations, but on the common interests of the legal profession over a wide part of the world to maintain, in international and in municipal law, respect for Human Rights as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, and for the minimum standards of justice recognized by all civilized nations.

Secondly, it may be pointed out that the information on which the Commission has based its report is exclusively drawn from the Official Laws, Government Statements and Press of Hungary. While the Commission has reason to believe that these do not give a complete picture of the situation, they do at the very least reveal conditions which are profoundly disturbing to the conscience and professional standards of lawyers in all countries.

The information published by the Commission showed that the laws and decrees of the authorities in Hungary failed to provide the minimum safeguards of justice in criminal trials as are recognized by civilized nations. In particular, these laws and decrees:

- 1) failed to provide for an impartial tribunal;
- 2) defined offences in vague terms open to abuse in interpretation;
- 3) gave the accused no proper notice of the charge preferred;
- 4) Allowed no adequate time and facilities for the accused to prepare his defence, to call

witnesses and to instruct counsel of his own choice on his behalf;

- 5) empowered a higher Tribunal to sentence an accused person previously acquitted, or to increase the sentence when no appeal had been made in the interests of the accused.

The Commission would now respectfully draw your attention to the incontestable fact that, since the publication of the Commission's reports in April and June last, and since the issue on June 22 of the Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, repression in that country has been intensified rather than diminished. On June 15 a consolidating law confirmed the main features of the legal system set up by the Hungarian authorities, thus establishing on a permanent basis the system of trial for political offenders which had been described in the Commission's publications.

Moreover, the evidence of Hungarian official sources and press shows that the legal system instituted by the Hungarian authorities to deal with political offenders has, in recent months, been used with increasing severity. Thus, in a two-month period, June 22 — August 22, Hungarian official sources and Press have admitted the arrest of at least 194 persons and the trial of 204 other persons for offences of an allegedly political nature. Of 204 persons tried in this period, concerning whom the details of sentence are known, 22 have been sentenced to death, 11 to life imprisonment and 171 to long periods of imprisonment. In the whole preceding period of approximately seven-and-a-half months from the outbreak of the Revolution until June 22, the Commission obtained exclusively from Hungarian sources information concerning 423 persons brought to trial and sentenced. It should be emphasized that, owing to the secrecy with which most of the trials have been conducted, these figures necessarily give an imperfect idea of the scale of repression in Hungary; they are only significant in so far as they show, on the basis of information released by the Hungarian authorities themselves, that this repression is continuing with increasing force.

Of even greater significance than these figures are the statements recently made by Hungarian spokesmen.

Thus, on June 1, in a speech reported over Budapest Radio, Dr. Némethy, the Hungarian Minister of Justice, announced that "mercy" would be only an exceptional step. On June 4, Mrs. Imre János, member of Parliament, in a speech reported in NEFTZBADS/ 7, said:

"Quite a fair number of judges have asked to be transferred from the Criminal Court to the Civil Court. . . a good many of our public prosecutors have shown procrastination in drawing up indictments and in ordering preliminary arrests."

In reference to "counter-revolutionaries", she said, "We cannot show mercy towards them". In the same sense, on July 10, Dr. Némethy, at a Press conference reported over Budapest Radio said:

"We must make sure that the courts keep counter-revolutionary elements and aspirations at bay and mete out punishment for counter-revolutionary criminal acts."

On July 17, an article in DELMAGYARORSZAG entitled, "Lendancy - Why?" began with these words:

"Counter-revolutionaries have got the jitters, they do not like the pressure of the steady hard fist and the determination of the workers' class. . . It is superfluous for them to lament and moan, they will get where they deserve to be, irrespective of where they keep in hiding."

Between the middle and the end of July the western press published confirmed reports of a new wave of arrests. Hungary, the most of which were of which had been arrested 1900 to 2000 people had been arrested. Mr. Marosán, Minister of State, in a speech reported in the Hungarian Press on July 16, and on Budapest Radio on July 21 and August 1, said:

"We do not deny that we have arrested a few counter-revolutionaries who had well deserved it. . . the detection of some handful of people has aroused indignation

in the West. Why all this excitement? Our organs of internal security are today striking blows at those at whom Rakosi should have struck. . . We showed patience for a while, but after the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) resolution, a number of dubious elements were discovered and began to spread the 'words': 'We start again in October'. Our patience was then exhausted and our authorities did what they should have done in the years 1945 to 1948."

The Commission has noted with the utmost concern that among the most recent lists of arrested or convicted persons are included a number of lawyers, including amongst them the President of the Budapest Bar. In this connection, it is significant that a number of official spokesmen of the present regime in Hungary have repeatedly reprimanded the judges and public prosecutor, as well as university professors of law, for their adherence to "an excessively strict interpretation of the law" and to the "dream of the judge's independence" and "impartiality".

In the light of the foregoing consideration, the Commission respectfully urges

1. that the claim of the present Hungarian regime in regard to the effectiveness of its law enforcement should depend on its ability to maintain law without recourse to methods of oppression which are at variance with the respects for Human Rights required by the Charter of the United Nations, with the specific provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of 1947 and the Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as with the fundamental principles of law recognized by all civilized countries;

2. that the increasing repression in Hungary as evidenced by the findings of the International Commission of Jurists based on the exclusive evidence of Hungarian sources, raises a case against the present regime in Hungary which cannot be satisfactorily answered until that regime is prepared to allow an impartial commission of investigation to visit Hungary.

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient servant,
NORMAN S. MASON

APPENDIX

A Partial List of the Victims of the Legal Terror in Hungary (September 1957 to August 1958)

This list of those who have been executed, arrested and imprisoned by the Budapest regime was compiled from (1) official Hungarian sources; and (2) reports that have come out of the country and whose reliability there is every reason to credit.

For this reason, many names that were not of public record are included. The information in some of the cases is incomplete because this was all that appeared in the Hungarian press. In other cases, the information is incomplete because one of the compilations included in the following list — that prepared by the Viennese Hungarian newspaper, *MAGYAR HIRADO* — concerned itself only with names and basic facts of arrests and sentences.

The actual number of those executed and incarcerated is, of course, many times greater than the list presented here. As our report points out, there has for some time been a standing directive to the Hungarian press to print only an occasional item relating to political trials.

CODE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation

Source

AP	Associated Press
BN	Bekesmegyei Nepujsag
Dmg	Delmagyarország
DN	Dunantuli Naplo
EH	Esti Hirlap
Emg	Eszakmagyarország
FH	Fejermegyei Hirlap
H-BN	Hajdu-Bihari Naplo
KdN	Kozepdunantuli Naplo
Kis	Kisalfold
Kmg	Keletmagyarország
MN	Magyar Nemzet
Na	Nepkarat
Nsz	Nepszabadsag
PN	Petofi Nepe
RB	Radio Budapest
RK	Radio Kossuth
Tsz	Tiszavidek
ZH	Zalai Hirlap

Name	Charge	Sentence	Source	Date
ABRAHAM, STEVEN		4 yrs.	Eng	
ABRAHAM, PAUL		1 yrs.	RM	
ACTON, STEVEN		2 yrs.	No	
ACER, ANDREW		14 yrs.	No	
ADAM, JAMES	Anti-Racial activities	4 yrs.	Tue	Oct. 8, '57
ADAM, GUYBERT		2 yrs.	RM	
ALLEN, LAMAR		death	No	
ALLEN, STEVEN		4 yrs.	RM	
ARNOLD, LARRY		12 yrs.	No	
ATKIN, LAMAR	Conspiracy	10 yrs.	No	Nov. 22, '57
BABBITT, LAMAR	Armed and Dangerous	10y	Eng	Oct. 22, '57
BADA, SANDOR		death	New Brunswick Evening	
BAL, JOSEF		12 yrs.	U-20	
BALOG, ANDREW		4 yrs.	RM	
BALOG, SANDOR		4 yrs.	RM	
BALOG, PAUL		death	No	
BALLAGH, STEVEN	Anti-Racial activities	10 yrs.	Tue	Oct. 8, '57
BALLET, FREDERIC		10 yrs.	Eng	Sept. 1, '57
BALUCH, SAM		4 yrs.	RM	
BALUCH, LAMAR		death	No	
BALUCH, LAMAR	Conspiracy	death	No	Oct. 9, '57
BALUCH, LAMAR		death	No	Nov. 15, '58
BAL, STEVEN		4 yrs.	Eng	
BARNHART, LAMAR		10 yrs.	No	
BARN, STEVEN		4 yrs.	No	
BARTHA, BELA		14 yrs.	No	
BARTHA, BELA		death	Eng	
BARTHA, STEVEN		death	No	
BARNI, STEVEN		death	RM	
BICK, STEVEN		4 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, BELA		death	No	May 18, '58
BIRCH, LAMAR		2 1/2 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, JIM		death	RM	
BIRCH, JOSEF		4 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, JOSEF, JR.		4 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, JOSEF		2 yrs.	U-1	
BIRCH, JIM		2 1/2 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, LARRY		10 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, STEVEN		2 1/2 yrs.	Eng	
BIRCH, FREDERIC		2 1/2 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, JOSEF		2 1/2 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, LAMAR		2 1/2 yrs.	RM	
BIR, SOLYAR		2 yrs.	RM	
BIR, MOSLEY	Disrupting British movement	1 yr.	Eng	
BIRCH, FREDERIC		10 yrs.	No	
BIRCH, KAROLY		death	RM	
BIRCH, JOSEF		12 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, BERNARD		12 yrs.	No	
BIRCH, LARRY	Prevention of Justice	death	No	Oct. 15, '57
BIRCH, DR. SOLYAR	Counter revolutionary activities	2-4 yrs.		
BIRCH, FREDERIC		2 1/2 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, JIM		2 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, STEVEN	Tried to escape	2 1/2 yrs.	Radio News	Sept. 15, '57
BIRCH, JOSEF		4 yrs.	No	
BIRCH, WATTYAN		4 yrs.	Eng	
BIRCH, JOSEF		4 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, KAROLY		4 yrs.	No	
BIRCH, DR. ARPAD	Conspiracy	10y	Eng	Nov. 26, '57
BIRCH, JOSEF		10 yrs.	No	
BIRCH, FREDERIC		1 yr.	U-20	
BIRCH, BELA		10y	No	May 15, '58
BIRCH, JAMES		12 yrs.	RM	
BIRCH, BELA		10 yrs.	Eng	
BIRCH, ANDREW	Refused cooperation	2 yrs.	No	Oct. 8, '57
BIRCH, STEVEN	Attempting to escape	4 yrs.	Tue	Sept. 21, '57

Name	Charge	Sentence	Source	Date
CSATO, IMRE	Anti-Soviet actions	11 yrs.	Tsz	Oct. 8, '57
CSERBA, ISTVAN		5 yrs.	Nsz	
CSERBAKAI, ENDRE		life	Nsz	
CSERE, TIBOR	Anti-Soviet actions	10 yrs.	Na	Oct. 8, '57
CSERNA, ISTVAN		10 yrs.	Nsz	
CSERNUS, MRS. JANOS		10 yrs.	Nsz	
CSETENYI, LASZLO	Anti-Soviet actions	12 yrs.	Tsz	Oct. 8, '57
CSINCSAK, DR. ENDRE		5 yrs.	RK	
CSOMANY, SANDOR		2 yrs. 4 mo	Kis	
CSORDAS	Concealing weapons	10 yrs.	Naplo	Oct. 5, '57
CSUPER, JOZSEF		5 yrs.	PN	
CZIFRIK, LAJOS		death	Nsz	
CZIGO, LASZLO	Conspiring to overthrow State	10 yrs.	Na	Nov. 13, 1957
CZOTTER, FERENC		5 yrs.	Kd N	
DARVAS, IVAN		2 yrs.	RK	
DEDE, LASZLO	Conspiring to overthrow State	15 yrs.	H-BN	Nov. 13, 1957
DERY, TIBOR		9 yrs.	Nsz	
DOBOS, FERENC		3 yrs.	KdN	
DOBROVICS, EMIL	Conspiring to overthrow State	14 yrs.	KdN	June 17, 1958
DOMBAI KISFALL, JOZSEF		3 yrs.	KdN	
DONATH, FERENC		12 yrs.	RB	
DORGO, PAL	Conspiracy	6 yrs.	H-BN	Oct. 20, 1957
DORMANYI, LASZLO		10 yrs.	Emg	
DUDAS, JOZSEF		death	Nsz	
EGRES, BELA	Conspiracy	2 yrs.	KdN	Oct. 20, 1957
ELEKES, JANOS		3 1/2 yrs.	BN	
EORSI, ISTVAN		5 yrs.	EH	
ERDESZ, JOZSEF	Conspiracy	death	Na	Oct. 20, 1957
ESZTE, ZOLTAN		6 yrs.	Na	
EVA, SANDOR		1 yr.	Emg	
FARKAS, BALAZS	Murder; counter-revolutionary activity	6 yrs.	PN	March 11, 1958
FARKAS, IMRE		death	Nsz	
FARKAS, ISTVAN		18 yrs.	Emg	
FARKAS, TIBOR JOZSEF	Insulting Party Member	10 yrs.	Dmg	Oct. 22, 1957
FATA, FERENC		3 1/2 yrs.	ZH	
FATA, MRS. LAJOS		2 yrs.	ZH	
FEHER, KAROLY	Conspiring to overthrow State	2 yrs.	KdN	Sept. 1, 1957
FEKETE, GYULA		2 yrs.	KdN	
FEKETE, ISTVAN		3 yrs.	RB	
FEKETE, JOZSEF	Counter-revolutionary activities	(suspended)		Oct. 9, 1957
FEKETE, KAROLY		2 yrs.	Nsz	
FEKETE, PAL		9 yrs.	BN	
FEKETE, SANDOR	Attempting to overthrow state	4 yrs.	Tsz	Dec. 12, 1957
FEKETE, ZSIGMOND		life	BN	
FERENCZI, LASZLO				
FERESI, LASZLO	Propaganda against collective farms	1 yr.	Tsz	Sept. 14, 1957
FILEMAN, LASZLO		4 1/2 yrs.	H-BN	
FILEP, ISTVAN		2 yrs. 4 mo.	Emg	
FODOR, ENDRE	Conspiracy	6 yrs.	PN	Oct. 20, 1957
FODOR, MIHALY		3 yrs.	H-BN	
FOLDES, GABOR		5 yrs.	PN	
FOLDI, BELA	Conspiracy	5 yrs.	Na	May 15, 1957
FOLLY, GABOR		10 yrs.	Nsz	
FULOP, IMRE		death	Nsz	
FULOP, JANOS	Concealing weapons	2 yrs. 4 mo.	Kis	May 15, 1957
FUNNE		death	Kis	
FUREDI, MRS. ISTVAN		4 yrs.	H-BN	
GABOR, GESA	Concealing weapons	4 yrs.	H-BN	Oct. 5, 1957
GAJDA, ISTVAN		12 yrs.	Naplo,	
GAL, FERENC		death	Neue Zurcher Zeitung	
GAL, ROBERT	Concealing weapons	2 yrs.	Kis	Oct. 5, 1957
GAL KISS, IMRE		1 1/2 yrs.	Dmg	
GALGOCZY, GYULA		10 yrs.	PN	
GALI, JOZSEF	Concealing weapons	5 yrs.	Dmg	Oct. 5, 1957
		10 yrs.	KdN	
		2 yrs.	Kis	
	Concealing weapons	life	Nsz	Oct. 5, 1957

Name	Charge	Sentence	Source	Date
KALDOR, VERA		1 yr.	EH	
KALLAI, ISTVAN		2 1/2 yrs.	PN	
KANYO, BERTALAN		death	Nsz	
KAPOLNASI, SANDOR		death	Nsz	
KARACSONYI, MIHALY, JR.		3 yrs.	Dmg	Sept. 1, 1957
KARDOS, SANDOR		13 yrs.	RK	
KARFAS, IVAN		15 yrs.	Emg	
KARSAL, MIHALY		2 yrs. 4 mo.	Kis	
KASA, SANDOR		7 yrs.	PN	
KATONA, SANDOR		death	Nsz	
KECSKES, ZSUZSANNA		10 yrs.	Dmg	Sept. 1, 1957
KELEMEN, JANOS		12 yrs.	KdN	
KELEMEN, JOZSEF		6 yrs.	Kmg	
KELEMEN, KAROLY		15 yrs.	Nsz	
KELETI, LAJOS		1 yr.	Tsz	
KENDEFFY, ANDRES		15 yrs.	Nsz	
KERESZTURI, ISTVAN		2 yrs.	BN	
KERTESZ, ERNO		1 yr. 8 mo.	Nsz	
KIRALY, IMRE		13 yrs.	Na	
KIS GAL, IMRE	Conspiracy	10 yrs.	Emg	Oct. 20, 1957
KISS, ANDRAS		2 yrs.	Tsz	
KISS, ANTAL		death	Nsz	
KISS, ARPAD		10 yrs.	Nsz	
KISS, BALAZS		4 1/2 yrs.	PN	
KISS, BELA		12 yrs.	Emg	
KISS, GABOR		10 yrs.	H-BN	
KISS, GEZA		life	Emg	
KISS, GYORGY		2 yrs.	H-BN	
KISS, ISTVAN		2 yrs. 2 mo.	BN	
KISS, JANOS		1 yr.	PN	
KISS, LAJOS		12 yrs.	Na	
KISS, SANDOR		2 yrs.	H-BN	
KISS, SANDOR		3 yrs.	KdN	
KISS, SANDOR		death	Nsz	
KISS, SANDOR	Insulting Party members	12 yrs.	Emg	Oct. 22, 1957
KLEM, FERENC		15 yrs.	BN	
KOCH, JOZSEF		15 yrs.	Na	
KOLLARCSIK, JOZSEF	Counter-revolutionary activities	2-4 yrs.		
KOLODZICKY, JOZSEF		died in prison	Nsz	
KOLOMPAR, MATYAS	Murder in October, 1956	death	PN	Oct. 9, 1957
KONCZ, SANDOR	Murder in October, 1956	life	PN	Oct. 9, 1957
KONDOR, JOZSEF		1 yr.	KdN	
KONTRA, LASZLO		7 yrs.	RK	
KONYA, SANDOR		1 yr. 4 mo.	BN	
KOPACSI, SANDOR	Conspiring to overthrow state	life	RB	June 17, 1958
KORNEL, ERZSEBET		3 yrs.	KdN	
KORNEL, KAROLY		7 yrs.	Nsz	
KOS, MARGIT		3 yrs.	Na	
KOSARY, DOMOKOS		4 yrs.	RK	
KOVACS, -----	Counter-revolutionary activities	death	County Court, Szeged	March 5, 1958
KOVACS, ELEMER		8 yrs.	Na	
KOVACS, FERENC		2 1/2 yrs.	Tsz	
KOVACS, ISTVAN		6 yrs.	RK	
KOVACS, IVAN LASZLO	Counter-revolutionary activities	death	Na	Jan. 3, 1958
KOVACS, KAROLY		12 yrs.	Kis	
KOVACS, LAJOS		15 yrs.	Nsz	
KOVACS, LASZLO	Commander of "Corvin Block"	death	Nsz	Jan. 4, 1958
KOVACS, MIHALY		life	Nsz	
KOZMA, JANOS		1 yr. 3 mo.	BN	
KRASSO, GYORGY		7 yrs.	Nsz	
KRUGER, GEZA		12 yrs.	Nsz	
KUHTREIBER, LAJOS		5 yrs.	KdN	
KUHTREIBER, LAJOS		3 yrs.	KdN	
KUNSZABO, FERENC		10 yrs.	Somogyország	
KURUNCZI	Concealing weapons	15 yrs.	Naplo	Oct. 5, 1957
KUTRICH, JOZSEF		3 1/2 yrs.	FH	

Name	Charge	Sentence	Source	Date
LACROIX, JAMES		14 yrs.	No	
LAMBERSCH, DR. WILSON		15 yrs.	No	
LAR, SANDOR		1 1/2 yrs.	No	
LEBOCZKY, ANFAS		4 yrs.	No	
LEONARD, OTTILA	Left group of Russian prisoners	death	No	Oct. 25, 1937
LEONID, NIKOLAI		4 yrs.	No	
LEONTEL, OTYAN		12 yrs.	No	
LEONTEL, LARSLD		10 yrs.	No	
LEUTYAK, JOSEF		4 yrs.	No	
LEVNI, OTYAN		10 yrs.	No	
LEONID, NIKOLAI	Complicity	4 yrs.	Eng	Oct. 25, 1937
LEONID, NIKOLAI		death in prison	No	
LEVNI, OTYAN	Counter-revolutionary activities	arrested		
LEONID, OTYAN		10 yrs.	No	
LEONID, LARSLD		1 yr.	No	
LEONID, LARSLD		3 1/2 yrs.	PR	
LEONID, LARSLD		death	No	
LEONID, NIKOLAI	Complicity	3 1/2 yrs.	Eng	Oct. 25, 1937
LEON, JENI		12 yrs.	No	
LEONID, SANDOR		7 yrs.	Eng	
LEONID, TING		4 yrs.	No	
LEONID, NIKOLAI		3 yrs. 6 mo.	No	
LEONID, L. P. GON, PUL	Treason, espionage	death	No	June 15, 1938
LEONID, NIKOLAI		1 yr.	No	
LEONID, OTYAN		3 1/2 yrs.	0.00	
LEONID, NIKOLAI		10 yrs.	0.00	
LEONID, JAMES		4 yrs.	PR	
LEONID, OTYAN		1 yr. 6 mo.	PR	
LEONID, JOSEF		1 yr.	Eng	
LEONID, OTYAN		4 yrs.	No	
LEONID, OTYAN		death	No	
LEONID, FERENC		4 yrs.	No	
LEONID, LARSLD		death	No	
LEONID, LARSLD		4 yrs.	No	
LEONID, LARSLD		4 yrs.	No	
LEONID, LARSLD		4 yrs.	No	
LEONID, DR. NIKOLAI		death	Eng	
LEONID, LARSLD		3 1/2 yrs.	No	
LEONID, OTYAN		2 yrs.	No	
LEONID, JOSEF		1 yr.	No	
LEONID, JOSEF		2 yrs.	No	
LEONID, FERENC	Anti-Soviet activities	10 yrs.	No	Oct. 5, 1937
LEONID, FERENC		1 yr. 6 mo.	No	
LEONID, NIKOLAI	Armed Party members	10 yrs.	Eng	Oct. 25, 1937
LEONID, LARSLD		3 1/2 yrs.	No	
LEONID, LARSLD	Counter-revolutionary activities	1 yr.	No	Oct. 5, 1937
LEONID, OTYAN	Complicity	3 1/2 yrs.	Eng	Oct. 25, 1937
LEONID, FERENC		death	No	
LEONID, FERENC		2 yrs.	No	
LEONID, FERENC		2 yrs.	No	
LEONID, FERENC		2 yrs.	No	
LEONID, OTYAN	Carrying weapons	7 yrs.	No	Oct. 5, 1937
LEONID, FERENC		4 yrs.	No	
LEONID, FERENC		4 yrs.	Eng	
LEONID, LARSLD		4 yrs.	0.00	
LEONID, FERENC		2 yrs.	PR	
LEONID, FERENC NIKOLAI	Complicity in overthrow Stalin, high treason	death	No	June 15, 1938
LEONID, NIKOLAI		4 yrs.	Eng	
LEONID, NIKOLAI, JR.		10 yrs.	Eng	Sept. 1, 1937
LEONID, OTYAN		7 yrs.	No	
LEONID, LARSLD		4 yrs.	0.00	
LEONID, JOSEF	Murder	death	No	March 15, 1938
LEONID, JOSEF		1 yr. 6 mo.	PR	
LEONID, LARSLD	Counter-revolutionary activity	death	PR	Oct. 5, 1937
LEONID, SANDOR		1 yr.	0.00	
LEONID, SANDOR		7 yrs.	PR	

Name	Charge	Sentence	Source	Date
NAGY, SANDOR	Counter-revolutionary activities	1 yr.	H-BN	Oct. 5, 1957
NAGY, TAMAS		2 yrs.	BN	
NAUGH, REZSO		life	Na	
NEMETH, JANOS		6 mo.	Dmg	Sept. 3, 1957
NEMETH, JOZSEF		2 yrs.	ZH	
NOEL, DR. GYORGY	Possession of arms	2 yrs.	Na	Sept. 25, 1957
NOVOBACZKY, SANDOR		1 1/2 yrs.	RK	
NYITRAI, GYULA		1 1/2 yrs.	FH	
NYULI, ISTVAN		8 yrs.	Nsz	
OBERSOVSZKY, GYULA	Conspiring to overthrow state	life	AP	
OLAH, MIKLOS		death	Nsz	
OROSZ, MIKLOS		3 yrs.	H-BN	
OSTORHAZY, LASZLO		life	Emg	
OSVAI	Concealing weapons	15 yrs.	Naplo	Oct. 5, 1957
OSZE, FERENC		2 yrs.	Kis	
OSZLAI, MIHALY		3 yrs.	Nsz	
OSZTONYICS, LASZLO		4 yrs.	KdN	
PALFI, JANOS		3 1/2 yrs.	FH	
PALINKAS-PALLAVICINI, MAJOR, ANTAL	Organizing counter-revolutionary battalion	death	Nsz	Dec. 11, 1957
PALOCZY, TIBOR		1 yr.	Nsz	
PAPP, ANTAL		3 yrs.	KdN	
PAPP, IMRE		4 yrs.	H-BN	
PATYI, ISTVAN	Murder	10 yrs.	Na	
PATYI, ISTVAN JR.		death	PN	Oct. 9, 1957
PAVELKA, SANDOR		2 yrs.8 mo.	Somogyorszag	
PECH-ECKHARDT, GEZA		life, incr. to death	Nsz	May 18, 1958
PEKO, ISTVAN	Murder	death	PN	Oct. 9, 1957
PEKO, ISTVAN		8 yrs.	Na	
PENTEK, FERENC		death	Nsz	
PERBIRO, JOZSEF	Counter-revolutionary activities	death	County Court, Szeged	March 5, 1958
PERGE, IMRE	Conspiracy	2 yrs.	Emg	Oct. 20, 1957
PERJESI, PAL		3 1/2 yrs.	BN	
PETERDI, GYORGY		6 yrs.	Kis	
PETOCZ, SANDOR		2 yrs.	Somogyorszag	
PETRE, IMRE		6 yrs.	Nsz	
PETRUS, JOZSEF		death	Kd N	
PILGERMAYER, BELANE		6 yrs.	Kd N	
PINTER, JOZSEF		death	Na	
PIROS, ZSIGMOND	Counter-revolutionary activities	1 1/2 yrs.	H-BN	Oct. 5, 1957
POKO, ISTVAN		death	PN	
POLGAR, JANOS		20 yrs.	Na	
POLYA, SANDOR F.		death	EH	
PREISZ, ZOLTAN		death	Nsz	
PRESSMAYER, AGOSTON		death	Nsz	
RABACS, GYORGY		death	Nsz	
RACZ, DEZSO		3 1/2 yrs.	PN	
RACZ, ELEK		6 yrs.	Na	
RACZ, GYULA		10 yrs.	RK	
RACZ, JOZSEF		life	Nsz	May 18, 1958
RACZ, SANDOR		2 1/2 yrs.	Kis	
RACZ, SANDOR		15 yrs.	Nsz	
RATATICS, JENO		3 yrs.	Kis	
REMEYI, SANDOR	Arresting Party members	11 yrs.	Emg	Oct. 22, 1957
ROPER, MAGDA		1 yr.	FH	
ROZSAHEGYI, JOZSEF		3 yrs.	DN	
RUDAS, ANDRAS		death	Nsz	
RUDIAK, FERENC		3 yrs.	Kd N	
SANDOR, ANDRAS	Conspiring to overthrow State	8 yrs.	Nsz	March 7, 1958
SCHAD, JOZSEF		3 yrs.	PN	
SCHECK, DEZSO		12 yrs.	Kis	
SCHIFF, JANOS		death	Nsz	
SENYI, JANOS		5 1/2 yrs.	Kd N	
SINKOVITS, GYULA		life	PN	
SIPO, ZSIGMOND		death	Na	
SIPOCZ, BORBALA		12 yrs.	Na	

Name	Charge	Sentence	Source	Date
SPACK, DEBO		6 mos.	See	
SPACK, DEB		2 yrs.	Drug	
SPILSTEIN, ROBERT	Conspiring to overthrow state	10 yrs.	Drug	Sept. 1, 1937
SPIN, JAMES		6 yrs.	See R	
SPITZER, CYRIL		10 yrs.	See R	
SPITZER, CYRIL		1 yr.	See R	
SPIN, JAMES		11 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL	Armed Party members	11 yrs.	Drug	Oct. 21, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		1 1/2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Counter-revolutionary activities	2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		6 1/2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		7 yrs.	Drug	Sept. 1, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL		4 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL		4 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Attempting escape	2 1/2 yrs.	See R	Sept. 15, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL	Carrying weapons	10 yrs.	See R	Oct. 1, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 1/2 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	Drug	
SPIN, CYRIL		death	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Counter-revolutionary activities	2 1/2 yrs.	See R	Oct. 1, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		1 yr., 2 mos.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL		See	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs., 2 mos.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		1 yr., 2 mos.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Counter-revolutionary activities	2 yrs.	See	March 17, 1938
SPIN, CYRIL		See	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Propaganda against collective farms	2 yrs.	See	Sept. 15, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL	Refusing escape	2 yrs.	See	Oct. 1, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		10 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Refused escape	10 yrs.	See	Oct. 1, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		death in prison	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL	Conspiring to overthrow state	death	See	June 17, 1938
SPIN, CYRIL		1 1/2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 1/2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		20 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		11 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 1/2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		4 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Counter-revolutionary activities	2 1/2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		death	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Counter-revolutionary activities	death	See	Nov. 25, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		10 yrs.	Drug	
SPIN, CYRIL		death	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		7 yrs.	See R	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Counter-revolutionary activities	1 1/2 yrs.	See	Nov. 15, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	Drug	
SPIN, CYRIL		2 yrs.	See	
SPIN, CYRIL	Conspiring to overthrow state	2 yrs.	Drug	Nov. 1, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL	Adding counter-revolution	1 yr., suspended	See	Oct. 15, 1937
SPIN, CYRIL		1 1/2 yrs.	See	

Name	Charge	Sentence	Source	Date
TOKAI, BELA		2 yrs.	BN	
TOKAR, DR. VINCE		death	Nsz	
TOLNAI, ISTVAN		7 yrs.	Kd N	
TOMBA, MIKLOS		1 1/2 yrs.	EH	
TOTH, BELA K.		13 yrs.	Nsz	
TOTH, FERENC		12 yrs.	Na	
TOTH, GYORGY		death	Somogyország	
TOTH, ILONA		death	RK	
TOTH, MRS. ISTVAN	Possession of leaflets	14 mos.	Na	Oct. 16, 1957
TOTH, DR. ISTVAN		12 yrs.	RK	
TOTH, ISTVAN	Conspiring to overthrow state	15 yrs.	BN	Dec. 12, 1957
TOTH, JANOS		death	Emg	
TOTH, LAJOS		6 yrs.	Nsz	
TOTH, MIKLOS		death	Nsz	
TOROK, MRS. BALINT	Possession of leaflets	8 mos.	Na	Oct. 16, 1957
TOROK, ISTVAN		15 yrs.	Kmg	
TOROK, JOZSEF		10 yrs.	DN	
TRUNGER NAGY, GYORGY		6 yrs.	PN	
TURCSANYI, REV. EGON	Crimes against state	life	RK	Jan. 7, 1958
TURI, IMRE		5 yrs.	Kis	
VARGA, DOMOKOS	Counter-revolutionary activities	2 yrs.	RK	Oct. 9, 1957
VARGA, ERNO		7 yrs.	Nsz	
VARGA, GYULA		2 yrs.	Kis	
VARGA, GYULA		12 yrs.	H-BN	
VARGA, ISTVAN		2 yrs.	Kis	
VARGA, ISTVAN C.		death	Nsz	
VARGA, JANOS		3 yrs.	Na	
VARGA, JOZSEF		2 1/2 yrs.	FH	
VARGA, JOZSEF		6 1/2 yrs.	Nsz	
VARGA, JOZSEF		death	Nsz	
VARGA, LASZLO		1 yr.	PN	
VARGA, LAJOS		1 yr.	Tsz	
VARGA, PAL JR.		1 yr.	PN	
VARGA, REZSO		death	Nsz	
VARGA, SANDOR	Damaging Soviet monument	8 mo	Dmg	Sept. 3, 1957
VARGA, SANDOR		5 yrs.	Kis	
VARGA, TAMAS		10 yrs.	Na	
VARGA, VINCE		7 yrs.	H-BN	
VARGA, ZOLTAN		1 yr.	H-BN	
VASARHELYI, MIKLOS	Conspiring to overthrow state	5 yrs.	Nsz	June 17, 1958
VASS, GEZANE		5 yrs.	Na	
VASS, IMRE		5 yrs.	H-BN	
VASS, LASZLO		1 yr.	H-BN	
VASVARI, SANDOR		5 yrs.	Nsz	
VECSERNYES, ISTVAN	Helping escapees	2 yrs. (suspended)	Na	Dec. 3, 1957
VEGH, LAJOS		2 yrs.	Kis	
VEGVARI, FERENCNE		10 yrs.	Nsz	
VERES, PETER		5 yrs.	Dmg	Sept. 1, 1957
VEREB, JANOS	Propaganda against collective farms	2 yrs.	Tsz	Sept. 14, 1957
VERTES, VILMOS		2 yrs.	FH	
VINCZI, BALINT		3 yrs.	H-BN	
VINCZI, SANDOR		3 yrs.	H-BN	
VITA, ARPAD	Arresting Party members	8 yrs.	Emg	Oct. 22, 1957
VOLVAR, SANDOR		7 yrs.	Na	
WAGNER, TIBOR		1 yr.	Kd N	
WEINTRAGER, LASZLO		death	Nsz	
WISZETT, MARIA		4 yrs.	Nsz	
ZAMBORI, JOZSEF		10 yrs.	Nsz	
ZELK, ZOLTAN	Conspiring to overthrow state	3 yrs.	RB	Nov. 13, 1957
ZENTAI, JANOS		4 yrs.	H-BN	
ZILESAS, ESZTER		16 yrs.	Nsz	
ZOLDEST, MIHALY		5 yrs.	Tsz	
ZOMBORI, LASZLO		10 yrs.	Kmg	
ZSAKAI, LASZLO		6 yrs.	PN	
ZSANY, ALBERT		6 yrs.	Nsz	
ZSANYI, SANDOR		5 yrs.	Nsz	
ZSIGMOND, IMRE		death	Nsz	
ZSOLDOS, SANDOR		6 yrs.	PN	

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