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THE PROBLEM
OF
CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
by

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Mr.Chairman,Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great privilege to address a meeting of distinguished free representatives of an East European community of nine nations which does not exist de jure but does exist in our hearts. We are all linked by a common fate and common sufferings,by common interests and common aims. It is my sincere wish that these links should not weaken after the liberation of our nations. One of the lessons of the last decades is that small countries cannot exist alone and are unable to defend their independence. The future belongs obviously to big communities of nations until one day humanity will be ripe for the world government and the world parliament. Thus,my friends,let us prepare our future close collaboration in a European framework already during the years of exile. Benjamin Franklin's words written on the occasion of the signing of the Declaration of Independence can be applied to us also : "We must hang together or we shall all hang separately". If we do not want our countries to be always satellites of a great power,we must create a great power ourselves and enter as such into the European communities.

This,however,is not the subject of my lecture. My task tonight is to speak about past and present events,and not about the future. Mr.Chairman, when you kindly invited me,you suggested that I should speak about the NATO Conference held in Paris a couple of weeks ago. But simultaneously and subsequently,other events occurred which also give us food for thought. Ambassador Kennan made his controversial lecture on the E.B.C.,Marshall Bulganin deluged the Western Governments with his letter. Mr.Rapacki,the Polish Foreign Minister,submitted a plan concerning the creation in Central Europe of a zone free of nuclear weapons. All these events have their importance and seem to create a situation which obliges us to reconsider our position, I should say a situation in which we are engaged in an agonising reappraisal.

May I begin by making a very short survey of past events which led to the current situation.

I must go back to the Second World War. Sir Winston Churchill's original plan to attack Europe's soft underbelly was dropped and the landing in Normandy was decided. Sir Winston, as well as two American Generals,Bedell Smith and Mark Clark suggested that ^{troops} simultaneously with the landing troops should be sent from Italy to the Balkans,preventing Central and Eastern Europe from being occupied by the Russian troops alone. President Roosevelt insisted, however,that all the troops stationed in Italy should be sent to Southern France and General Eisenhower agreed with him. Captain Butcher,who belonged to his staff wrote in his memoirs : "Ike said no,continued saying no all afternoon and ended by saying no in every form of the English language."

Later Sir Winston suggested that a common British-American-Russian occupation should take place. This also was rejected and thus all East Europe was occupied by Soviet troops and Bolshevism reached the heart of Europe.

General Mark Clark in his book "Calculated Risk", writes : "A campaign that might have changed the whole history of relations between the Western World and the Soviet Union was permitted to fade away", and he adds : "not alone in my opinion, but in the opinion of a number of experts who were close to the problem, the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war. Stalin knew exactly what he wanted ... he wanted to keep us out of the Balkans ... I could never see why as the world situation changed, the United States and Britain failed to sit down and take another look at the overall picture ... The American top-level planners were not interested. I later came to understand, in Austria, the tremendous advantages that we have lost by our failure to press on into the Balkans ... Had we been there before the Red Army, not only would the collapse of Germany have come sooner, but the influence of Soviet Russia would have been drastically reduced."

Another tragedy was Roosevelt's trust in Stalin. Before the Teheran Conference he said to William Bullitt, then American Ambassador in Moscow, that he was convinced that Stalin did not want anything but security for his country. And I quote : "I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he will not try to annex anything and will work for the world of democracy and peace."

On the 4th February 1945, Sir Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin agreed in Yalta to create a Russian zone of influence in Eastern Europe and abandoned our countries. The joint communique issued in Yalta spoke about free elections to be held in our countries, and about independent governments. Soviet Russia, however, has quite different ideas about free elections and about independence than the West and pretends that our nations have freely chosen their present systems. The Western powers reminded the Soviet leaders very seldom and very mildly of the commitments made at Yalta.

After signing the armistice, the United States began at once to disarm while Stalin did the opposite. The study of ballistic missiles also began in Soviet Russia shortly after the war ; in the United States only four years ago. On the other hand America had atom bombs before Soviet Russia. This was the moment to negotiate in a position of strength. Unfortunately this period was not used or perhaps could not be used for negotiations. When both had atom bombs, the period of the policy of containment advocated by Ambassador Kennan began. No Russian armed attack would be tolerated if its purpose were the change of the status quo.

When Hungary was attacked in November 1956 the United States did not move, because the consequence of the attack did not mean a change of the status quo. Unfortunately, the attitude of the American administration was such that it rather encouraged the Soviet leaders. An important opportunity was lost. An energetic warning at the right moment would have probably changed the Rus-

sian attitude and even the general situation in Europe without the risk of a world war. It was also tragic that the Suez action was undertaken at the same time.

Poland had more luck than Hungary but we cannot yet see the solution.

By a so-called Package Deal those of the satellite countries which were not members of the United Nations were admitted by the world organisation in contradiction to the rules and the spirit of the Charter. The Hungarian government proving that it deserved this honour did not carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, refused to negotiate with Prince Wan, representing the United Nations, and even to accept a letter written by the President of the Special Committee appointed by the General Assembly. In Hungary we witnessed re-Stalinization and in Poland also the situation begins to deteriorate.

No progress could be made in the disarmament field because the Russians refused inspection and control. The Geneva Conferences were used by the Soviets for propaganda purposes. Russian subversive activity has had some positive results in the Middle and Near East. Last autumn the "sputnik" made its appearance and it was announced that the Russians possess or are able to manufacture intercontinental missiles.

These were the most important events which preceded the NATO Conference. Much has been written, many commentaries were published about this conference. Although at the meetings, except the solemn opening, press and public were not admitted, the truth of another saying of Benjamin Franklin was proved: "Three may keep a secret if two of them are dead."

Thus I do not intend to submit to you after hundreds of reports yet another report and will try to comment on the Paris events mainly from our own point of view.

What was the purpose of this Conference? To strengthen the military defence of the West and to create not only a scientific and economic, but also a close political cooperation between the Member-States.

Concerning the strengthening of the defence of the West, the main target has been reached. As the Americans do not yet possess intercontinental ballistic missiles, it seems to be necessary that nuclear warheads and weapons as well as intermediate range missiles should be stocked in Europe in order that in case of war, targets in Soviet Russia could be reached.

The offer of the United States to supply medium range missiles to those countries which want them was in principle accepted. Nuclear warheads for these missiles and other weapons are to be supplied to NATO Commander, General Norstadt. The fact that representatives of Denmark and Norway expressed a desire that the soil of their countries should not be used is not important, as it is enough if a certain number of the NATO states accept the American offer. Great Britain, Italy, Holland and Turkey gave their acceptance

and the French reaction was also favourable. It seems that not only some other NATO states but Spain too will accept such bases.

Mr. Adenauer's reservations can easily be explained not only by reasons of German internal policy, but also because he is trying to explore all the possibilities of coming to an agreement with the Russians before taking a decision concerning the American offer which in any case cannot materialise earlier than in eighteen months.

In the field of scientific collaboration, the creation of a brain trust of American and European scientists, of the exchange of scientific secrets between allies, the necessary will certainly be done. After all, Mr. Spaak was right in saying that since the Russians know the American secrets already, one might suppose that the Americans will not refuse to communicate them to their allies as well.

The importance of the economic aspect of NATO has been recognised in Paris. It is obvious that the competition between East and West cannot be limited to the armament race. A joint effort is necessary to give aid and support to those countries of the non-Communist world that need it and might otherwise be politically and economically penetrated by Soviet imperialism. The uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa will certainly make their choice between the Western and Eastern systems, having in mind not so much which of the two produces more modern weapons as rather which is able to give them more bread, more liberty, and a more worthwhile life. President Eisenhower spoke about new efforts to further the advancement of the less developed nations and promised to ask Congress to triple the Development Loan Fund and to increase by forty percent the lending authority of the Export Import Bank. The decision, however, depends on Congress. If the Congress does not realise the importance of this problem, even an extraordinary progress in the production of missiles and nuclear weapons would not help. In this respect many missed opportunities have to be repaired as rapidly as possible. The Afro-Asian Conference wrote the last warning on the walls of Cairo.

As regards the political field Mr. Spaak's endeavour to create a kind of NATO community, a coordination of national policies with mutual limitation of sovereignties, unfortunately did not and could not succeed. If six European nations which after surmounting immense difficulties have created an economic community, a common market, but could not organise a political community (as you know the work of the so-called ad hoc committee has been rejected by the French Parliament together with the Defense Community project) how could then fifteen countries of two continents create a real political community? Even a common policy in respect of the non-European problems could not be worked out because the interests of the Western Great Powers concerning certain Asian and African problems are divergent. (For instance, concerning the recognition of Red China, the Algerian Question, the delivery of arms to Tunisia, more or less the boundary problem of Israel, and so on.). The heads of governments agreed, however, that individual actions in the international field cannot be tolerated and consultations should take place to avoid faits accomplis.

An important event was doubtless the solemn declaration of President Eisenhower assuring the member states, in the sense of the Charter of the United Nations, that should any of them suffer an armed aggression, the United States would immediately come to its aid with all its appropriate arms. Thus an aggression against one member state would be considered an aggression against all members.

The greatest political sensation, however, was the decision to approach the Soviet Union in the disarmament field and to suggest that talks should be conducted either in the new disarmament commission of the U.N. or at the foreign ministers level and that other problems than those regarding disarmament could be also be discussed. It was a European initiative which rather surprised the American leaders. It was obvious that especially the peoples of Europe feel directly menaced by the Russians. They expect that their governments will not miss any opportunity to reduce the risk of a nuclear war. The repercussion of the events in the armament field seems to be stronger in Europe than in the United States. The European opposition parties urge everywhere their governments to try to negotiate with the Soviet government, to change their policy considered by them as being too rigid. They expect new ideas, new plans and a new action from them. The governments feel this pressure and are also aware of the great responsibility they have to bear in a period when war means total destruction. Besides this, they are confronted with an enemy who behaves like a man who gesticulates with his revolver all the time. One tries to argue with him, to gain time hoping that later he will change his attitude. Talking is better than shooting said somebody very rightly. We never can know precisely what is happening in Soviet Russia when the situation is such that negotiations can lead at least to the solution of some not so vital problems. Peace is a Russian interest just as it is a Western interest and Mr. Khrushchev must also realize the great risk which the armament race involves.

On the other hand it is certainly advisable to negotiate from strength. The present moment does not seem appropriate. But even now it is better to prepare negotiations through diplomatic channels than to show a purely negative attitude. It is sure that the East uses the international meetings to make propaganda. But why should the West not do the same? The main thing is that the West should be always decided beforehand on how far to go in a negotiation and when to break it off. One should never forget that the issue is freedom. There is no such thing as half freedom. One is free or one is not. One cannot compromise about freedom. One might compromise in the economic or social fields, but not about freedom. The Prime Minister of Canada was right in saying that: "not peace at any price, freedom at any price."

Free representatives of Captive Nations cannot be accused of being warmongers. They often declare that they are seeking peaceful solutions for their problems. They do not want to liberate cripples and ruins. Their own fate cannot be separated from the fate of humanity. They also never were opposed to negotiations. But on the other hand, those of the exiles who exaggerate in urging immediate negotiations should not forget that in a recent interview Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev clearly limited the field of

possible discussion at a Summit Conference suggested by him. He said : "We reject any and all political conditions, such as the solution of the German question on Western terms or the discussion as Mr.Dulles puts it, of the question of Eastern Europe. No such question exists."

And Mr.Bulganin wrote that any attempt "to upset the status quo ... would lead to catastrophic results."

And that is not all. A few days after the end of the North Atlantic Conference on the 24th of December, Mr.Khrushchev in his declaration published by the "Daily Express" said that negotiations covering disarmament cannot be successful if the Western Powers do not accept the status quo.

Mr.Chairman, these are very important statements and it is most regrettable that no energetic reply was immediately given to the First Secretary of the Russian Communist Party. His statement seems to mean that the Soviet Government will reject any proposal which would not include the confirmation of the present situation that is the de jure recognition of the subjugation of our countries. If this is the meaning of Mr.Khrushchev's words we must protest against new negotiations until the Russian position is changed. How would a negotiation end if the defeat were accepted before the beginning ? Unfortunately, we know very well that the Western Powers are de facto acknowledging the status quo. We could see it in October 1956 when they did not defend Hungary against the Russian armed aggression. But Soviet Russia wants now the de jure recognition of the status quo as the price of entering into negotiations on disarmament or on other problems.

There is not much probability that a disarmament agreement can be achieved just now but it should nevertheless be emphasized that new agreements confirming the status quo are once and forever excluded.

In this respect we must refer to two very important joint declarations already nearly forgotten. One was issued by Sir Winston Churchill and President Eisenhower on the 29th of June 1954 in Washington, which sometimes is quoted as the "Potomac Declaration". In article three of this solemn declaration it is said : "As regards formerly sovereign states now in bondage, we will not be a party to any arrangement or treaty which could confirm or prolong their unwilling subordination." The next day, the "Times" commenting on the words "formerly sovereign states, now in bondage" wrote as follows : "The reference is obviously first and foremost to the countries of Eastern Europe. As it stands the sentence seems to rule out any Locarno Pact or any other kind of non-aggression pact between the two halves of Europe or indeed the two parts of Germany."

On February 1st 1956, Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden and President Eisenhower, again in a joint declaration issued a statement, following their conference in Washington, reaffirming the principle contained in the Potomac Declaration.

On the 24th of April 1957 Mr. Dulles at the Associated Press luncheon at the Waldorf Astoria declared : "Two decades ago I wrote that world peace depended not on preserving the status quo but on finding ways of peaceful change. Today this requirement is more than ever imperative." And further on : "Let us see to it that the divided or captive nations know that they are not forgotten, that we shall never make a political settlement at their expense."

And Prime Minister Harold Macmillan answering on June 17, 1957, the letter of Mr. Bulganin of April 20, wrote as follows : "Nor would a non-aggression agreement between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact be, in itself, any real contribution towards European security It would confirm rather than eliminate the present division of Europe and of Germany, which is the main cause of tension in Europe."...

Mr. Chairman, I think it was useful to quote these texts at a dangerous moment when people of good will are so eager for negotiations with Soviet Russia and when the Russians try to exploit this mood hoping to negotiate from strength and asking for a price which would lead to our definite abandonment and cause a terrible depression in our countries.

As no answer was given to Mr. Khrushchev's dangerous declaration, although about ten days have passed since it became public, we cannot remain silent. Mr. Chairman, it is up to you to decide whether a press conference should not be urgently convened, in view of the fact that on the 8th January the NATO Council will coordinate the answers of the governments to Bulganin's letter. We should call attention to Mr. Khrushchev's new prerequisite to disarmament negotiations and protest energetically against its acceptance. But we should emphasise that we are not principally opposed to well timed negotiations if they are prepared through diplomatic channels. On the other hand, we must declare that if the West were to enter into negotiations, although the Russians want concessions before beginning to talk and insist that the status quo should be confirmed, this would be treacherous and it would have tragic consequences. It should not be forgotten that Chamberlain, on his return from Munich said : "If at first you don't succeed, try, try, try again." To which Winston Churchill bitterly retorted : "If at first you don't concede, fly, fly, fly again."

But let us come back to the NATO Conference and let me mention not only what has been discussed but also what has not been discussed. The unification of Germany was one of the subjects which preoccupied the NATO members. The communique issued at the end of the conference, on the 19th December, states that the participants reviewed the international situation and in particular the dangers to world peace and what they had especially in mind, was the problem of reunification of Germany. The Middle, East Africa, and Indonesia were also mentioned in the communique. Our problems, however, have not been mentioned. There is an allusion to the danger caused by the fact that peoples under international Communist rule have been sacrificed to the purposes of world domination and that "the suppression of their liberty will not last for ever."

There is also a statement according to which in these countries "there is evidence of the glowing desire for intellectual and economic freedom." Does this mean that there is no desire for political freedom and independence in our countries? In this respect the communique does not give a correct picture of the real situation. Then follows a pium desiderium in the communique according to which "the totalitarian menace will eventually recede." While, concerning Eastern Germany, the communique with reference to the Geneva Conference of 1955, says: "We call upon the Soviet Government to honour its pledge", nothing of this kind is said concerning our countries.

It is unacceptable that the Western Governments handle the German problem always differently than our problem and avoid linking the two problems instead of insisting that they should be discussed and settled simultaneously.

During the second Geneva Conference I had the honour of being received by the Prime Minister Mr. Harold MacMillan, and complained about the separation of the two problems, that is, the unification of Germany and that of Europe. The Prime Minister whose sympathy for the enslaved European nations is well known answered me that if East Germany were to be liberated first, this would have a very great repercussion on our countries. I told the Prime Minister that this would certainly be the case, but what would it change? It is not at all sure, that revolutions would break out in our countries and even if this were the case, that they would be successful. On the other hand in the West, public opinion would probably say: now the main problem, which caused so much unrest is solved. Let us now live in peace and do business with the East. And our peoples would feel that they are definitely abandoned. We must urge our Western friends not to handle those problems separately and not to be afraid to mention the necessity of liberation only because the Russians do not like to hear about it, but on the contrary to make them understand that this is a condition sine qua non of definite peace and of a collective security treaty.

The only head of government who spoke about our liberation in his public speech in Paris was Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. He, in the same sentence insisted on the unification of Germany and on the solution of the East European problem. His attitude proved that he is aware of the necessity to handle and to solve the two problems simultaneously.

I cannot help repeating what I have said several times in the last years that it is in our interest to contact the West German Federal Government and to create a cooperation with it. Mr. Adenauer is in a position where he can support our cause in case cold war continues as well as in the event of negotiations. I have been opposed during a lifetime to German imperialism, militarism and fascism but now I warmly recommend collaboration with the present Germany. I do not know whether the change in Germany is only superficial, but I know that concerning the Russian problem our interests are the same. Chancellor Adenauer is trying now to find out through diplomatic channels what the real intentions of the Russians are and he is at the same time preparing to enter into negotiation with our countries. He intends to sign commercial treaties with them, to send commercial missions there and he might perhaps later, establish diplomatic missions too.

I know the Polish-German problem quite well which makes collaboration with the Federal Government difficult. I wish from the bottom of my heart that the solution of this problem should be most satisfactory to our Polish friends. Nevertheless, I think that ways and means should be found to render a certain cooperation possible.

But I should not forget another head of Government Mr. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada who received the Paris delegation of ACEN during the conference. Answering my address, Mr. Diefenbaker showed really warm interest in and great understanding of our problems. It is seldom nowadays that one meets such open sympathy.

Mr. Khrushchev very poetically, but quoting only a Western newspaper reports if it were his own invention said, that the representatives of the Soviet Union were also present at the NATO Meeting without being physically in Paris and that their spiritual presence influenced the decisions of the Western statesmen. I think it was not the case. But it is certain that the heads of the governments subconsciously heard the "blip, blip, blip" the voice of the Sputnik, and signs of uneasiness and anxiety had a certain influence on the European statesmen. The atmosphere was not the same as in previous meetings of this kind.

Before the appearance of the Sputnik the American Continent was considered invulnerable. Now, since the Russians seem to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles, not only Europe but the United States are also highly vulnerable. In the past America did not depend less on Europe's help. Now, it is compelled to defend itself with missiles stocked in Europe and at the same time needs the information and collaboration of European scientists. This situation gives Europe a more important part to play. Let us hope that the European statesmen will use their influence to defend the interests of their European brothers and not to abandon them.

Last week in Cairo there was a lot of talk about Afro-Asian solidarity. We would like to see also the signs of European solidarity and the launching of a great propaganda campaign against Russian colonialism in Europe. The Supreme Soviet in its answer to the NATO decisions speaks about not interfering with the internal affairs of the countries of the Middle East. Should the West not insist on non-interference of Soviet Russia in Central and Eastern Europe?

The result of the changed world-situation was that the United States had to respect the overwhelming European desire for an open minded examination of the Bulganin proposals and to sit down at the conference table with the Russians if they want to.

The misfortune of this bad period of cold war is the lack of a leader possessing such will power as Sir Winston Churchill. There were periods during the Second World War when the situation of the Western Allies was much

more gloomy than it is now. All Sir Winston could promise then was "blood, sweat and tears". But he also assured the Western nations that, without knowing how and when, he was sure that they would win the war. He formed "V" with his two fingers as a sign of his belief in Victory and new hope awoke in the hearts of men. Where is now the providential leader who will form with his thumb and his forefinger an "L" indicating that the aim of the West is Liberty, Liberation. Where is the man to unite the West and restore its hope? We have brilliant leaders, inspired by the most humane feelings. But in the fight against defeatism we need a warm approach, faith, dynamism and radiation of strenght. The lack of this was cruelly felt in Paris.

There was a diplomat whose influence was undeniable, although he was not present. It was Ambassador George F. Kennan. The distinguished Professor of History of the Institute in Princeton certainly knows something about the freedom loving Central and Eastern European nations and their fights for Independence, because his father's name was Kennan-Kossuth. As a sign of his admiration he added to his name the name of great Hungarian leader who had to go in exile when the Russian troops, helping the Austrians, defeated the Hungarian freedom fighters in 1849.

Mr. Kennan's suggestions for a Central or Eastern Europe are at first sight attractive. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of our countries would certainly be a great achievement. The question, however, is whether this would mean a change of the present system? The Red Armies of the respective countries, the Secret Police and the Party Organisations, - would they remain? The Russian Army would certainly keep watch on the Western frontier of Soviet Russia and would in case of a revolution, or even of a peaceful change of the system interfere again as it did in Hungary in November 1956. The Kennan plan could perhaps be accepted at a later date under certain conditions if simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Russian troops a treaty could be signed assuring collective security so that in case of a new Russian aggression the Western Powers would automatically mobilize and help us to defend our independence.

But this is only one side of the problem. The price of the withdrawal of the Russian troops is of course the withdrawal of the troops of the Western Powers. But withdrawal from where? This is not yet clear. Mr. Khrushchev wants them to leave Europe. According to him the Americans must leave not only Germany, but the entire continent, and England too. All the bases should be liquidated and the Central and East European countries, even according to Mr. Kennan's plan should not have national armies but only militia. How could a militia defend a country against Russian tanks if the Hungarian Army was not able to do it in 1956? Who would defend Europe? The American troops would be on another continent, while the Russians in the neighbourhood. America could be attacked by intercontinental missiles by the Russians, while the Americans having lost their European bases could not use their intermediate missiles.

But even if Mr. Khrushchev were satisfied with the withdrawal from German territory only, a neutralised Germany could not resist the Russian pressure and neither could our countries. Would the neutrality of these countries be guaranteed by the Western Powers? I doubt it! Besides this the Europeans fear that if the United States had no troops and no bases in Europe they would not be interested any more in the fate of our continent.

I think that the withdrawal of the American troops could be discussed later when there is a German army, when the French troops are back from North Africa and when the United States has intercontinental ballistic missiles. This will probably be the case in 1960. Then Germany and France will be able to defend themselves and America to retaliate against Russian aggression from its own territory. The problem should be studied but it is not at all ripe for concrete decisions.

There is another more concrete plan with which we have to deal. Mr. Rapacki, Foreign Minister of Poland, submitted a plan with Mr. Khrushchev's blessing to the Western Ambassadors in Warsaw. According to this plan an atom-free zone should be created including Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is not yet clear what this means. Does it mean only that the Russian and American troops would remain there where they are but could not use nuclear weapons? What about the conventional arms? Would the zone be half-neutralised? Is such a thing possible? Would a mutual control and regular inspections of the zone be granted and in the affirmative how would it operate? Without knowing all this it is impossible to express an opinion regarding the Rapacki plan.

And why should only Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia be included in this zone? The idea is probably that this part of the atom-free-zone should not be greater than the part which is now occupied by the American and British troops. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to include e.g. Hungary, which according to the resolutions of the Assembly of the United Nations should be evacuated in any case. The Rapacki plan must be studied and one should find out, what is exactly behind this plan. It should be established through diplomatic channels whether it has any advantage. I think no positive decision can be taken before. But on the other hand one should insist that Khrushchev and Rapacki show their cards and tell us clearly what they mean by an atom-free-zone. We must show interest because our negative attitude would be falsely interpreted by the European public opinion.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I could not submit you a brighter report or suggest an immediate and happy solution of our problems.

I did not speak about the situation in Soviet Russia. We all know that the Russian leaders are faced with grave difficulties too. I do not know when these difficulties will compel them to make concessions to give up their imperialistic plans and to try to make real peace.

I do not know either how long the balance of terror can save peace.

I also do not know whether and when an important revolution of the Communist system can be expected which would enable both sides to find a common ground for definite settlements.

I also do not know whether one day a revolution will not change completely the situation.

What I know is, that although the sky is full of dark clouds, we must not despair. It would be a disaster if the West were influenced by the situation prevailing at this moment.

Foreign policy cannot be shaped by fear.

To paraphrase the words of a great French soldier, I should like to emphasize that the West lost some battles but did not lose the cold war.....